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ABSTRACT
This project examines the intellectual discourses and ideas that underlined and
shaped Native American transnational activism and indigenous global
cooperation during the Cold War. It explores Native activists’ use of the political
realities of the Cold War and existing concepts, such as the United Nations’ (UN)
human rights agenda, as frameworks for their strategies and demands for treaty
rights and sovereignty. By using existing concepts and international mechanisms,
Native Americans expanded their presence on the international scene, securing
a permanent place in the UN, from which they worked to redefine the meanings
of individual human rights and international law to include collective rights and
indigenous sovereignty. This dissertation also traces the ideas of shared
historical (and contemporary) experiences with colonization and subjugation
among indigenous peoples that gave impetus to a global indigenous cooperation
and the rise of the global indigenous movement. Transnational work brought
Native activists into a closer contact with other indigenous peoples but also
numerous non-Native supporters, diverse liberation movements, and their
ideologies. Native intellectuals examined these European-based ideologies, such
as Marxism, and their merits and practical application for the struggle for
indigenous rights. This study follows some of these discourses and discussions
about Native intellectual sovereignty as a part of the struggle for Native rights
and political sovereignty. By concentrating on the intellectual discourses among
both radical and moderate Native activists, this project shows the influential role
ideas and their circulation played in shaping Native strategies and transnational
activities, expanding our understanding of Native activism in the second half of
the twentieth century.
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Introduction
On September 13, 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). As a resolution, the
Declaration is not a legally binding document, but it sets standards for the treatment of
indigenous peoples by specifying individual and collective rights, including (but not limited to)
rights to culture, identity, language, education, health, and self-determination, as well as the
right to maintain and regulate indigenous peoples’ own institutions.1 The Declaration
encourages countries to work with indigenous peoples in solving problems. It affirms the right of
indigenous peoples to exist as peoples, nations, cultures, and societies.2 The Declaration is a
result of decades-long work by indigenous peoples in and outside the United Nations (UN): it
represents their careful political maneuvering and strategizing to bring indigenous issues onto
the agenda of the international body and indigenous ideas and understandings of sovereignty,
identity, and treaty rights into the discourse of human rights and international law.
In order to introduce these indigenous concepts into the mechanisms of international
law and human rights, and to secure protection for treaty rights and the right to exist as
peoples, Native activists and leaders had to find a way to be heard, to ensure that politicians
and organizations such as the UN, paid attention and included indigenous issues on their
agenda. Faced with international relations based on the Westphalian system, which stressed
sovereignty and territorial integrity of nation-states and considered Native American issues as
domestic matters, indigenous activists used the existing concepts and mechanisms of human

1

United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
United Nations document A/61/295, available at
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf>.
2
Robert “Tim” Coulter, “A Powerful Affirmation of Our Rights,” in Indian Law Resources Center,
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Washington, D.C., n.d.) information
booklet with a reference guide.
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rights to persuade the UN that indigenous issues were international issues, not purely domestic
concerns. The rise of the UN human rights agenda to prominence during the 1960s offered new
frameworks for Native leaders to present their grievances and demands. The human rights
mechanism within the UN also offered a way to gain access to the organization through
membership of Native organizations as Non-Governmental Organizations in the international
body. Through a global cooperation of indigenous peoples, both in and outside the UN, activists
strove to formulate and present a unified position on basic issues, such as land rights and
indigenous sovereignty, and voiced their demands in the UN and other international forums
during the 1970s and 1980s. Since 1982, when the UN Work Group on Indigenous Populations
(WGIP) was established, Native activists and organizations worked on formulating standards for
the treatment of indigenous peoples. Their work culminated in the 1992 Draft of the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was then passed to the Working
Group on the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Debates in this group
resulted in the final 2007 UNDRIP.

In this dissertation, I examine the intellectual discourses that underpinned Native
American transnational activism and indigenous global cooperation. As historian Jonathan
Rosenberg points out, when “considering reform movements, one must look closely at the way
reform leaders frame their message, for this is how they seek to gain support for their agenda.”3
Native leaders and activists have framed their demands and strategies within the political
contexts of their situation and the contemporary political language. From the beginning of
colonization, Native peoples have engaged with European political ideologies and concepts,
using, adopting, or subverting them to protect their rights and political status vis-à-vis the

3

Jonathan Rosenberg, How Far the Promised Land? World Affairs and the American Civil Rights
Movement from the First World War to Vietnam (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 12.

2

European colonial powers - Spain, England, France, The Netherlands, and Russia - and later the
United States and Canada. As their political circumstances changed and Indian nations adapted,
“many of them experimented with new forms of knowledge and expression, while striving
toward maintaining an authentically indigenous voice in the process.”4 Examining Native
Americans’ connections to indigenous peoples throughout the world and the networks and
cooperation they forged, provides us with a better understanding of the role that circulation of
ideas and peoples played in the emergence and rise of transnational indigenous activism and
the global indigenous movement and its work. It helps us better understand the actions Native
activists took and strategies they adopted, as well as how they used and modified EuroAmerican political concepts and frameworks to advance their goals. It extends our
understanding of the Red Power movement and sovereignty struggle beyond the 1970s and the
United States. And it also reveals the extend to which Native Americans saw their struggle for
treaty rights as a part of a larger, worldwide struggle of oppressed peoples for liberation.
Transnational indigenous activism is a vast topic that includes a plethora of actors from
around the world. In order to keep this project manageable and due to time and language
research limitations, this work focuses mainly on North American Native activists and
organizations and their actions, but positions them within the larger framework of Native
hemispheric and indigenous global activism and transnational diplomacy. The main time-frame
of this work is the second half of the twentieth century and the Cold War, though, in chapter
one, I present historical precedents for Native international (government-to-government) and
transnational (operating across national boundaries) diplomacy and engagement with nonNative concepts, to demonstrate the long tradition of international political engagement of

4

David Martínez, ed. The American Indian Intellectual Tradition: An Anthology of Writings from 1772
to 1972 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), xiii.
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Native peoples to better illustrate their adaptation to changing circumstances over time. As
historian David Martínez points out, writings and speeches by Native leaders and activists from
the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries demonstrate the intellectual tradition of Native
peoples, though this may not be the “theoretical tradition” of European abstract thinking. He
explains that this is not because Native Americans were not capable of abstract analytical
thinking, but rather it is because reference to oral traditions and histories were sufficient for
them and their purposes.5 However, in the mid-1970s and increasingly in the 1980s, some
Native leaders and writers throughout the hemisphere started calling for development of a
coherent, tradition-based Native ideology. This call coincided with the increased international
activism by Native Americans that brought them into more intense contact with the
international community, mostly document-based societies, that scrutinized the Native and
indigenous rights movement, its demands and its political stand more closely.
Similarly, examining the conditions under which Native peoples have historically
engaged in international diplomacy helps to illustrate the role the Cold War, decolonization and
the UN human rights agenda played in their transnational activism in the twentieth century.
Acting as sovereign political entities, Native tribes had negotiated with European colonial
powers and later the United States and Canada, pitting them against each other through the socalled play-off system.6 But as the US started gaining political dominance in North America and
the European colonial powers left, Native peoples lost valuable allies and leverage and had to
find other ways to protect their rights and ensure their survival. In their struggle, Native leaders

5

Martínez, ed. The American Indian Intellectual Tradition, xiii.
For information on Native diplomacy and the play-off system during colonial era, see Richard
White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empire, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650 – 1815
(Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The
Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Ear of European Colonization (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
Carolina Press, 1992) and Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), chapter 5.
6
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attempted to forge pan-Indian alliances and confederacies to resist European and AngloAmerican colonization. They also continued to look outside the borders of the nation-state. For
example, in the 1830s, Cherokee leader John Ross unsuccessfully attempted to secure lands for
his people in Mexico.7 After World War I, the Haudenosaunee (the Iroquois Confederacy) took
the opportunity to approach the League of Nations in hopes the organization would take up
their grievances over Canadian violations of treaty rights and recognize their sovereignty.8
However, this early attempt to get an international organization involved in Native issues was
unsuccessful, arguably due to the dominance of British and Canadian interest in the
international body.
It was not until the onset of the Cold War and decolonization in the 1960s that
indigenous issues started making headway in the international arena. The geo-political situation,
with the US and the USSR locked in an ideological competition for allies among developing and
decolonizing countries of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, created a twentieth-century global
reincarnation of the colonial play-off system. Within the context of the Cold War, American race
relations and the treatment of minorities became ready-made propaganda for the USSR that
could easily tarnish the US international image as the leader of the free and democratic world.
Placing Native issues within the framework of the Cold War opened a way to draw the attention
of the public to them. And the successful maneuvering among and lobbying of countries from
the Eastern Bloc, European neutral countries (like Sweden) and the Non-Aligned Movement

7

James Cox, The Red Land to the South: American Indian Writers and Indigenous Mexico
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 12. For pan-Indian alliances of resistance to
colonial powers, see for example Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian
Struggle for Unity, 1745 – 1815 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); Collin G. Calloway,
The Shawnees and the War for America (New York, NY: Viking, 2007).
8
Deskaheh, The Redman’s Appeal for Justice (S.I.: s.n., 1923), 5; Laurence M. Hauptman, Seven
Generations of Iroquois Leadership: The Six Nations Since 1800 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press,
2008), 124 – 142.
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countries ensured that Native issues and proposals had a place on the UN agenda.
With new possibilities, the Cold War also presented new limitations to Native activism.
Using the propaganda battle and Cold War rhetoric was limited by the nature of the propaganda
itself and the Eastern Bloc's willingness to give political support. These limitations are
demonstrated by the Eastern Bloc media coverage and treatment of Native issues, discussed in
chapter two. Further, political alliances with the international (as well as domestic) Left
presented a danger within the domestic sphere. Charges of un-Americanism and communist
radicalism, which also extended to the UN human rights agenda in the 1950s, could have
discredited any organization that tried to challenge the status quo and advance minority rights.
Accusations of communism and socialism were ready labels used by the opponents of many
activist organizations during the Cold War (as they were prior to WWII). Therefore, Native
Americans had to carefully navigate the new global and domestic political arena in order to
remain effective in their struggle for treaty rights.
Increased transnational activism, improving communication and increasing ease of travel
in the second half of the twentieth century brought Native activists into a closer contact with
other indigenous peoples. From personal connections, they established networks of
communication and cooperation, which over time grew into a global movement. Through these
networks, indigenous peoples shared their experiences, discussed strategies, created political
ideas and ideologies, and formulated their goals and aims. The UN provided a physical space for
indigenous activists from different countries and continents to meet and further fostered their
cooperation and exchanges. It also provided the mechanism through which members of the
global indigenous movement started influencing the discourse on international human rights
and law. Native organizations, such as the International Indian Treaty Council (1974) and the
World Council of Indigenous Peoples (1975), gained access to the UN through human rights

6

NGOs that were granted a consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council. Through
their work and lobbying in the UN, indigenous peoples established the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations (1982), which was tasked with creating new standards for the treatment
of indigenous peoples, the future UNDRIP.

Historiography
Works on Native intellectualism and nationalism come predominantly from literary
studies and examine works of Native writers of fiction and non-fiction. They often examine
contemporary political influences on the authors and messages these writers tried to convey,
but do not always connect these works directly with Native activism of the time. For example,
James Cox in his Red Land to the South explores the impact of Mexico’s Indigenismo on Native
writers such as Todd Downing, Lynn Riggs, and D’Arcy McNickle in the 1920s and 1930s.
Similarly, Sean Kicummah Teuton’s book Red Land, Red Power: Grounding Knowledge in the
American Indian Novel, examines the role of identity and experience on the production of
Native literature, as they were changing during the Red Power Movement in the 1960s and
1970s, by analyzing N. Scott Momaday’s House Made of Dawn, James Welch’s Winter in the
Blood, and Leslie Marmon Silko’s Ceremony. Elizabeth Cook-Lynn focuses on topics such as the
role of Native writers and intellectuals as conveyors of tribal traditions, and Robert Warrior in
his Tribal Secrets examines the political messages in the writings of John Joseph Matthews and
Vine Deloria, Jr. through the lens of intellectual sovereignty.9 By focusing on printed work, the

9
Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, “American Indian Intellectualism and the New Indian Story,” American Indian
Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter 1996), 57 – 76; James Cox, Red Land to the South: American Indian
Writers and Indigenous Mexico (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2012); Robert Warrior,
Tribal Secrets: Recovering American Indian Intellectual Traditions (Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 1995); Sean Kicummah Teuton, Red Land, Red Power: Grounding Knowledge in the
American Indian Novel (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008). See also Maureen Konkle, Writing
Indian Nations: Native Intellectuals and the Politics of Historiography, 1827 – 1863 (Chapel Hill, NC: The
University of North Carolina Press, 2004). For American Indian Literary Nationalism see Jace Weaver, Crag
S. Womack and Robert Warrior, American Indian Literary Nationalism (Albuquerque, NM: University of

7

majority of published works leave out discussions Native writers and activists held with each
other through private correspondence, newspaper interviews or conference speeches. By using
these sources, I trace these discourses among activists such as George Manuel, Phillip (Sam)
Deloris, Vine Deloria, Jr., Gerald Wilkinson, and Ramiro Reynaga and show the direct
connections of these philosophical discussions to Native transnational activism and the call of
some of these leaders for the creation of Native ideology in the late 1970s and 1980s.
The literature on Native activism in the second half of the twentieth century was until relatively
recently dominated by works on the Red Power Movement, the militant phase of Native
activism in the 1970s, concentrating on radical organizations such as the American Indian
Movement.10 Thomas Cowger’s book The National Congress of American Indians, which
analyzes the founding of the organization and its fight against the Termination policy in the
1950s; Daniel Cobbs’ Native Activism in Cold War America: The Struggle for Sovereignty; and a
recent book by Bradley Shreve, Red Power Rising, which examines the formation of the National
Indian Youth Council in the 1960s, are among the few that treat Native activism during the early
Cold War period.11 Discussion of Native activism in the 1980s is still largely ignored, which

New Mexico Press, 2006).
10
Paul Chaat Smith and Robert Allen Warrior, Like a Hurricane: The Indian Movement from Alcatraz
to Wounded Knee ( New York: The New York Press, 1996); Ward Churchill, Agents of Repression: The FBI’s
Secret Wars Against the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement (Cambridge, MA: South
End Press, 1988, reprint 2002); Steve Hendricks, The Unquiet Grave: The FBI and the Struggle for the Soul
of Indian Country (New York, NY: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2006); Peter Matthiessen, In the Spirit of Crazy
Horse: The Story of Leonard Peltier and the FBI’s War on the American Indian Movement (New York, NY:
Penguin Books, 1980, reprint 1992); Dennis Banks and Richard Erdoes, Ojibwa Warrior: Dennis Banks and
the Rise of the American Indian Movement (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004); Russell
Means and Marvin J. Wolf, Where White Men Fear to Tread: The Autobiography of Russell Means (New
York, NY: St. Martin’s Griffin Press, 1995).
11
Thomas W. Cowger, The National Congress of American Indians: The Founding Years (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1999); Bradley G. Shreve, Red Power Rising: The National Indian Youth
Council and the Origins of Native Activism (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011). Some additional
works that include the 1950s and 1960s are: Clinton Rickard and Barbara Graymont, Fighting Tuscarora:
The Autobiography of Chief Clinton Rickard, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1973); Lawrence
Hauptman, The Iroquois Struggle: World War Two to Red Power (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press,
1986); Harry A. Kersey, Jr., An Assumption of Sovereignty: Social and Political Transformation among the
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creates a false impression that after the end of the militant phase, the movement for Native
rights diminished.

Because this topic belongs to a quite recent past, autobiographies and

memoirs of Native activists are among the best sources, but can be limited in scope, due to their
nature. Most of the scholarly works also focus their analysis on the domestic scene. A more
theoretical treatment of Native activism comes from Kevin Bruyneel, who in his book The Third
Space of Sovereignty: The Postcolonial Politics of U.S.-Indigenous Relations, examines the
historical dynamics of Native-white relations. Bruyneel argues that Native American activism
have carved a “third space of sovereignty” that is neither inside nor outside the US. Rather it
spans “across the temporal and spacial boundaries” of the nation state.
In recent years, scholars have started to examine Native activism in the larger context of
international relations and the Cold War. Daniel Cobb’s Native Activism in Cold War America
places the story of the Native activists of the 1950s and 1960s within the context of the Cold
War, decolonization, and modernization and examines how the politics of the Cold War Civil
Rights movement influenced the language of tribal sovereignty. In Serving Their Country:
American Indian Politics and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century, Paul Rosier examines the
impact that international engagement of Native Americans from the nineteenth century to the
end of the Cold War had on the creation of what he calls hybrid patriotism or identity. Rosier
argues that Native Americans’ participation in the two World Wars and active engagement in
the global conflict of the Cold War was truly what formed their fight against the federal
government policies designed to undermine tribal sovereignty.12
In the recent book From Wounded Knee to Checkpoint Charlie: The Alliance for

Florida Seminoles, 1953 - 1979 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996).
12
Daniel M. Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America: The Struggle for Sovereignty (Kansas:
University Press of Kansas, 2008); Paul C. Rosier, Serving Their Country: American Indian Politics and
Patriotism in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009).

9

Sovereignty between American Indians and Central Europeans in the Late Cold War, György Tóth
examines Native American alliances with support groups, organizations, and individuals in
Central Europe, concentrating on the radical element of the Native rights struggle during the
1970s and 1980s.13 Other works specifically examining the global indigenous movement and
Native activities within the UN have also recently emerged from the political science field. For
example, Rhianon Morgan and Sheryl Lightfoot have examined the mobilization, relations and
mutual influences between the indigenous movement, the UN, and nation-states.14 And
anthropologists are now examining the role that the global indigenous movement had as a
catalyst for the creation of global indigenous identity.15
My dissertation expands on the existing literature in several ways. Cobb’s and Rosier’s
books, while using the framework of the Cold War, are mostly focused on the international
influences on Native domestic activism. By examining Native activists’ use of contemporary
international political circumstance to frame their transnational work, my work moves the
discussion of Native activism from a domestic to the international framework of international
relations and diplomacy. It also includes consideration of Native influences on the international
scene - the United Nations and its mechanisms of human rights and international law. By
including discussion of both the moderate and radical groups in the Native rights struggle this

13

György Ferenc Tóth, From Wounded Knee to Checkpoint Charlie: The Alliance for Sovereignty
between American Indians and Central Europeans in the Late Cold War (Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 2016).
14
Sheryl R. Lightfoot, “Indigenous Rights in International Politics: The Case of ‘Overcompliant’ Liberal
States,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 33., No. 1, Disrupting States: International Discourses of
Indigenous Rights and Responsibilities (January - March, 2008), 83 – 104; Sheryl R. Lightfoot,
“Indigenous Mobilisation and Activism in the UN System,” in Damien Short and Corinne Lennox, eds.,
Routledge Handbook of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights ( New York, NY: Rutledge, 2016), 253 - 267; Rhiannon
Morgan, Transforming Law and Institution: Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011).
15
Ronald Niezen, The Rediscovered Self: Indigenous Identity and Cultural Justice (Montréal, Quebec:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009) and The Origins of Indigenism: Human Rights and the Politics of
Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
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work attempts to paint a fuller picture of Native transnational activism and ideas. While Tóth’s
book provides a revealing account of Native - European alliance building in the late Cold War, its
focus on the radical groups in the Native rights movement leaves out the attempts by moderate
Native leaders to work with the UN and the role that moderate groups, advocating transnational
diplomacy, played within the international Native rights struggle. By including moderate activists
and groups in the discussion, I show that the idea of transnational diplomacy as a tool for Native
rights struggle was shared and pursued by both, not only the radical part of the movement that
Tóth’s and, to a degree, Cobb’s books indirectly suggest. Examining Native transnational
activism throughout the entire Cold War, also helps us to better understand the changes in
Native strategies, which reflected the changing circumstances on the international scene, such
as decolonization and the rise of the human rights agenda in prominence in the 1960s. It also
helps to better demonstrate Native intentional use of those circumstances and frameworks.
By examining the roles individual activists and their connections played in the
establishment of the global movement, I expand on Morgan’s and Lightfoot’s work that
concentrates on the role of the UN in the movement. While the UN played a crucial role in
providing a physical space for Native activists to meet and international mechanisms for their
agenda, it was the personal connections and networking that built the movement’s structure
and allowed for sharing ideas, experiences, and the formulation of strategies, which in turn
influenced Native positions and actions.
Further, my dissertation adds to the existing debate on the role and the impact of Cold
War on American race relations, which has been predominantly centered on African Americans
and the Civil Rights Movement. Scholars within this debate represent three views of the impact
of the Cold War on American race relations and the Civil Rights Movement. Among those who
argue the Cold War had a positive impact are Gary Gerstle, American Crucible; Philip A. Klinker

11

and Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March; and Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote.16 Those
who oppose the positive view of the Cold War’s impact include Penny M. Von Eschen, Race
Against Empire; Carol Anderson, Eyes off the Prize; and Ellen Schrecker, Many are the Crimes.17
Others, like Mary L. Dudziak, argue a middle position, pointing out that the Cold War and
international pressure brought both positive effects and limitations.18 Only recently have
scholars such as Daniel Cobb and Paul Rosier started looking at the connections between Cold
War and Native American activism. Like Dudziak, Rosier points out the limitations that the use of
Cold War rhetoric and international media presented to the activists and their goals, but neither
fully explore the issue. My research adds to the Native aspect of the debate on Cold War
influences on American racial relations and shows the Cold War indeed presented Native
Activists with new opportunities, but also imposed limitations on them. By examining the media
coverage of Native issues in former Czechoslovakia I show the limits of Eastern Bloc publicity as
an outside pressure tool. Lastly, by concentrating on non-state actors and traditionally
marginalized groups and their involvement in transnational diplomacy, I challenge the
traditional understanding of international relations as a domain of nation-state actors.

Note on Terminology
I use the terms Native American, American Indian, Native peoples, and indigenous
interchangeably. When possible I refer to Native activists and nations by their tribal affiliation.

16
Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2001); Philip A. Klinkner and Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise
and Decline of Racial Equality in America (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Alexander
Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States (New York, NY: Basic
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For Native peoples of Canada, I use the term First Nations, as it is the preferred term. I use
terms Native American and American Indian for Native peoples of the western hemisphere,
though I indicate Native peoples from countries of Latin America more specifically. In general, I
reserve the term indigenous to indicate the global aspect and implications of the designation.
However, in a work that is specifically about Native Americans and other indigenous peoples,
following strictly the divisions of the terms is sometimes impossible in regards to the narrative
flow and style.

The question of who is indigenous and how to define indigeneity is a complicated and
contested one. The expansion of international activism by Native peoples and their growing
awareness of the global nature of their historical and contemporary experiences and the
similarities of the problems they faced created a foundation for the formulation of a common
identity. The consciousness of this commonality emerged from the shared experiences with the
destruction and loss of traditional homelands, languages, spiritual systems, and subsistence
economies due to colonization, which were faced by Native peoples around the world. It also
came from the shared commitment of Native peoples to find stability and justice in order to
correct the historical deficits.19
Despite numerous discussions and attempts to formulate a definition, the term and the
category of “indigenous peoples” remain ambiguous and without a firmly set definition. As
Native peoples gained access to international organizations and have gained a “distinct legal
standing under international law,” the term “indigenous” became increasingly politicized and
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international organizations, states, and academics attempted to define who indigenous peoples
were.20 Native scholar Jeff Corntassel points out that the attempts “to formulate a single, overarching definition of this term have not been successful and may even be futile given indigenous
inter- and intra-community differences worldwide.”21 Currently, the most commonly used
working definition of indigenous peoples was formulated by Jose Martínez Cobo in his 1972
“Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, Preliminary Report.”
Cobo’s report defined indigenous peoples as those descended from original inhabitants of a
region prior to colonization; who maintained cultural differences distinct from the dominant
population; were politically marginalized with limited access to services; and who were without
a protection from unwanted “development.”22 Cobo’s definition acknowledged groups that
existed before colonization but excluded other marginalized and isolated groups. For this
reason, the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) expanded on the definition in
1986, including a provision that acknowledged the power of indigenous peoples to selfidentify.23 As Corntassel argues, even this UN working definition is “fraught with difficulties,”
but it is a starting point for a global dialog on this topic.24 This work uses the WGIP working
definition of “indigenous peoples.”

In chapter four, I discuss the transnational movement of indigenous peoples for the
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recognition of their rights. I call it the global indigenous movement. Other scholars have used
“international indigenous movement” or “transnational indigenous movement.”25 Since most of
the actors involved in the movement refer to it as “global,” I follow their lead here and use
global as well. The movement, encompassing multitudes of diverse local struggles from around
the world, includes indigenous representatives from the Americas, Asia, Africa, Australia and
New Zealand, demonstrating a truly global dimension. The goal of the movement has been to
establish standards for treatment of Native peoples and protection of their rights, with a global
reach and application, the UNDRIP. In its structure, membership, and goals, this movement is
global.26

A Note on Sources
Several years have passed since my initial archival research and finishing this
dissertation. Two collections of primary sources that I use here, the records of the Communist
Party of the United States of America, housed in the Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner
Labor Archives, New York University, and the records of the National Congress of American
Indians, housed in the National Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Suitland,
Maryland, have been reorganized. To correctly cite these sources according to their new
organization requires a new visit to the archives. Therefore I use the old collection, box and
folder numbers here. When possible to discern from the finding aids, I indicate the potential
new box and folder numbers in footnotes.
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A long tradition of Native Intellectualism and Internationalism
The advent of the Cold War did not abruptly bring about Native American
internationalism or intellectual engagement with European-based political philosophies.
American Indians have engaged in international diplomacy since the onset of colonization, using
and subverting existing language and political concepts of the colonizers to present themselves
as equal political entities, to secure treaties and to protect their lands, rights, and lives. They
negotiated and pitted the various colonial powers against each other in the so-called play-off
system. With power-shifts between the colonial powers and later the United State, Native
peoples had to adapt to their changing political circumstances and position, while attempting to
preserve their status as independent groups. To do so, they continued to engage and
appropriate Euro-American rhetoric and political concepts of statehood and modernity as
frameworks in which to represent themselves and articulate their demands. Native leaders also
looked to indigenous peoples outside the US borders for inspiration and solidarity.
This chapter presents several examples of Native American political behavior and use of
non-Native concepts prior to the Cold War to illustrate the long tradition of Native
intellectualism and internationalism. It shows how Native leaders, over time, have framed their
strategies and demands within the political context of their situations, using the existing tools
and political space to preserve their sovereignty, political and intellectual. Examining the long
history of Native political and intellectual behavior helps to better demonstrate Native American
agency in their adaptation to the outside forces of colonization over time. It also helps to better
demonstrate the role the Cold War geo-political realities and developments such as
decolonization played in creating new opportunities for transnational diplomacy and to assert
intellectual and political sovereignty.
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The Late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century
Native Americans and Euro - American Political Concepts
To protect their sovereignty and independent political position in relations with
European colonial power and later the United States, Native leaders have engaged in
international (and transnational) diplomacy as well as with European political philosophies and
concepts. They examined these and sometimes adopted or manipulated them as tools of their
resistance to colonization. Native American writers adopted English and the language and moral
concepts of Christianity to reach white audiences, to point out the hypocrisies of colonization,
and to defend the rights of their communities to exist as sovereign political entities.1
In the late eighteenth century, in the aftermath of the American Revolution, the
geopolitical situation changed and with it the position of many Native peoples, who attempted
to protect their independence and lands. For example, the Creek and Cherokee in the southeast
tried to secure their position by attempting to re-establish alliances and trade with Britain as a
strategic “counterweight to Spanish and American interests.” At the same time, the Creek also
wished to keep their trading alliance with Spain intact and to function as a sovereign, wellconnected political entity. In these efforts, the Creek and Cherokee drew upon European
concepts of a centralized nation as a tool without necessarily wanting to achieve a political
centralization of their towns.2
Euro-American individuals could serve as allies in Native political efforts as well as
possible sources of information about Euro-American political concepts and philosophies. In
1791, William Augustus Bowles, a Maryland Loyalist married into a Creek clan, representing a
faction of the Creek and Cherokee, attempted to secure alliances, trade, and political
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recognition from the British and Spanish monarchs. To achieve his goals, Bowles utilized the
European idea of a modern state (or nation) of the time, summarized in Emerich Vattel’s Law of
Nations in 1758, by applying them to the Creek and Cherokee. In his letters and petitions to the
British and Spanish kings, Bowles described the Creek and Cherokee alliance as a united nation
governed by one council, defining them in terms recognizable by the contemporary European
political elite.3 Using Vattel’s definition of a nation (or state) as a body of politic or a “society of
men united together to promote their mutual safety and advantage by means of their union,” a
society with its own affairs and interests, governed by deliberations and resolutions passed in
common and with established laws, Bowels described the formation of what he called a single
“United Nation of the Creeks and Cherokees” with a “Council that consists of Chiefs and
Headmen, with whose resolutions they govern the Affairs of the entire Nation.”4 Bowles’
description was an exaggeration of what in reality was a loose confederacy or alliance between
the two indigenous nations.5 But since the establishment of a public authority and a civil
government was one of the key features of a recognizable state, the rhetoric of the letter served
Bowels’ purpose aimed to achieve recognition of the Creek and Cherokee from the Spanish and
British monarchs and to secure their rights.
The existence of agriculture and “proper” use of land was another key aspect of a
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“civilized” modern nation in European political view and often used by the colonial powers and
the US to justify their land grabs in the Americas. As Vattel put it: “Those people, like the ancient
Germans, and the modern Tartars, who having fertile countries, disdain to cultivate the earth,
and chufe [sic] rather to live by rapine, are warning to themselves, and deserve to be
exterminated as savage and pernicious beasts.”6 While Vattel criticized the conquest of Peru
and Mexico, which he considered civilized states, he did not see any problems in colonizing
North America, based on the assumption of the link between agriculture and civilization: “Thus
though the conquest of the civilized empires of Peru and Mexico were a notorious usurpation,
the establishment of many colonies on the continent of North America, may on their confining
themselves within just bounds, be extremely lawful. The people of these vast countries rather
overran than inhabited them.”7 Since states had an “obligation to cultivate the earth,” nomadic
or semi-nomadic people could not truly legally claim the territories they inhabited and therefore
it was legal to usurp the land: “Their removing their habitations through these immense regions,
cannot be taken for a true and legal possession; and the people of Europe, too closely pent up,
finding land of which these nations are in no particular want, and of which they make no actual
and constant use, may lawfully possess it, and establish colonies there.”8 Justifying colonization
by need for subsistence derived from agriculture, Vattel insisted that “confining the Indians
within narrower limits” was not against the “views of nature” or its law.9
To counter the views of North American indigenous peoples as uncivilized and therefore
without legitimate rights to the land, Bowles had to show the Creek and Cherokee as modern
farmers. His letter stressed the progress that these nations made:
The great Objective of the nation, since the formation of the union of the two
6
7
8
9
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[Cherokee and Creek] Nations, has been to give a new aspect to the state of
Society among their inhabitants, replacing the life of hunter with that of
laborers and Farmers, placing all of their hopes in the cultivation of those things
which are connected to the arts relative to peace…10
Bowles’ rhetoric of “rapid progress in Civilization” through agriculture and the establishment of
civil government, which turn the Creek and Cherokee into a modern nation of farmers and
laborers, was a tool aimed at establishing the tribal nations’ land rights, political recognition of
these rights as well as a sovereign political status from the Spanish king.
Bowles’ letter is also an assertion of equality and sovereignty of the Creek and Cherokee
vis-à-vis the Spanish crown. In order to achieve recognition of Creek and Cherokee’s sovereignty
as well as alliance and trade with Spain, Bowles used a combination of a polite language and
acknowledgment of Spain’s power, while, at the same time, he reminded the king of the Creek
and Cherokee independence: “That although these Nations recognized themselves as
independent, they also know your power to sustain this independence…” He further pointed out
to the king of the limited position Spain had with only several forts in East and West Florida and
also reminded him that the Creek and Cherokee nations “consider themselves free to dispose of
their affairs in the manner that best suits their domestic interests.” And in the case the Spanish
king did not consider their request for alliance, they “might seem convenient to unite with your
old enemies, the Americans…”11 Bowles asserted the independent position of the Creek and
Cherokee by insisting on their right to international diplomacy and invoked the understanding of
rights of sovereign nations as it was embodied in the international law of the time: “Since then a
nation is obliged to preserve itself, it has a right to every thing necessary for its preservation, for
the Law of Nature give us a right to every thing, without which we could not fulfil [sic] our
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obligation…”12
Bowles’ letter suggests one of the possible ways in which European political
philosophies could be introduced to Native Americans. Bowles’ Native (political) partners would
have understood the importance of persuading the European colonists and monarchs to see
them as “civilized” modern nations with established civil government, agriculture, and sedentary
life style in order to be recognized as political, treaty-worthy entities - nations with land claims
and rights, entitled to the benefits and protections of international law.

By the early and mid-nineteenth century, many Native American leaders were
themselves educated, well-read, and accomplished political thinkers. They continued to utilize
their knowledge of European and Anglo-American political and legal concepts to protect their
communities. With the expansion of the white population in the early nineteenth century and
the invention of cotton gin in the south, which allowed for a rapid spread of the plantation
system, the pressure for Native lands increased.13 In the north the completion of the Erie Canal
in 1825 started an expansion of trade and a substantial movement of white settlers to the west
and the area around Buffalo and into the Seneca lands.14 In their response, Native nations
challenged the demands for their lands and consequent attempts in the 1830s and 1840s to
remove them by using the concept of a modern state and its rights. They also adapted to the
changing circumstances by reforming their political systems, incorporating Anglo-American
mechanisms, to stress their modernity and legal status, but retaining some of their political
traditions in the process. The Cherokee and the Seneca of western New York, for example,
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adopted forms of a republican representative government, but kept some of their specific
political aspects of their societies.
To prevent the continuous loss of land and to stabilize their government, the Cherokee
in Georgia re-organized their tribal political system. The new government that came to existence
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was a mixture of traditional practices
and Euro-American influences.15 In 1794 the Cherokee formed a National Council, in 1808 they
started writing a legal code in English, and in 1817 the Cherokee declared themselves to be a
republic. Ten years later, a constitutional convention took place, which established a principal
chief, bicameral national council, and courts as the Cherokee government branches.16 The
perceived inadequacy of the old political system to deal with increasing demands on Cherokee
lands led to the incorporation of Euro-American political ideas and systems into the new
government as a way to protect the survival of the tribe as a political entity, by proving the
nation’s modernity and progress in “civilization.”17
However, a change in government in itself was not enough to secure the Cherokee
rights to their homeland. The Cherokee had to persuade the Anglo-American society that these
changes reflected their modernity and supported their claim to nationhood. Contemporary
stereotypes and discourses of racial difference, viewing Native Americans as lacking the moral
and intellectual capacity to form true civil governments, presented an obstacle. In contemporary
Anglo-American views, an existence of a modern Indian nation with a republican type of
government would be considered illegal, miscegenation, a political and moral abomination.18
To challenge these views, Cherokee intellectuals, leaders, and writers, such as John Ridge, Elias
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Boudinot, and John Ross, used English as their tool and wrote addresses, essays, and memorials
to the US Congress, presenting the Cherokee as a modern nation. Thus as Konkle argues, the
early nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of “the first significant body of Native
writing in English,” which resulted in the creation of the “first systematic written Native
engagement with Eurocentrism.”19
These written addresses, memorials, as well as speaking lecture tours, are similar in
form and content to Bowle’s letter to the Spanish king, concentrated topics of evidence of the
progress of civilization and political sovereignty as signs of the Cherokee modern nationhood.
The writers claimed rightful possession of their lands, inherited from their ancestors and “never
ceded, nor ever forfeited.”20 John Ridge in his essay further asserted Cherokee sovereignty by
describing Cherokee territory as located between the neighboring states of Tennessee, North
Carolina, and Georgia, rather than within the states’ borders.21 The existence of Native
agriculture was further proof of the rightful Cherokee claims to their territory as well as
modernity. Elias Boudinot pointed out in his Address that the Cherokee improved the land
through agriculture, just as Europeans did.22 The long Cherokee occupancy of the land as well as
its “proper” use represented legal claims to the territory according to the recognized political
philosophies of the time.
The writers also used Christianity, literacy, as well as a gendered division of labor as
signs of Cherokee modernity. The nation’s conversion to Christianity and the existence of
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several different Christian denominations among the Cherokee were signs of progress in
“civilization” acceptable to Anglo-Americans.23 The writers also pointed to the existence of a
Cherokee syllabary, the bilingual newspaper - The Cherokee Phoenix, and high literacy levels
among the nation.24 In his 1826 essay, Ridge also stressed the similarities between the
Cherokee and mainstream Anglo-American society in their gendered division of labor, with
women confined to the house as wives and mothers and men working in the fields that were
privately owned and run in the manner of white southern farms. Another similarity and
contemporary claim to “modernity” was Cherokee slave-holding and the importance of racial
purity in the nation. For example, Ridge considered intermarriage with African-Americans as
“misfortune and disgrace,” while intermarriage with whites was a sign of the “march of
civilization.”25 Ridge probably hoped that the similarities between the two societies wound help
to present the Cherokee as equals to the Anglo-Americans, countering the perceived racial
difference, and would help save them from removal.
For all the similarities and signs of modernity, acceptable to the Anglo-American society,
the writers did not express a desire for assimilation. Their language and arguments indicate the
Cherokee’s insistence on their own separate identity and political status - nationhood.26 While
the new government adopted political and judicial aspects from the Anglo-Americans system, it
also retained traditional practices, such as the ability of women to hold property in their own
name, even in marriage.27 Similarly, The Cherokee Phoenix, while a sign of “civilization,” allowed
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the Cherokee to extend control over their history, traditional knowledge, and their selfrepresentation.28 The creation of the Cherokee syllabary itself demonstrated “the ability of the
Cherokees to become ‘civilized’ without becoming white.”29 It also gave the Cherokee the
ability to keep their own records and write their own history, and to remain separate from the
white society through language.30
The existence of Cherokee civil government and its recognition by the Unites States was
another point the writers and speakers used to stress their national sovereignty. They pointed
out the prior and continuous autonomy of their nation based on the existence of tribal
government from before the European arrival. The writers further reminded their non-Native
readers that Native political sovereignty had been recognized by the colonial powers and later
the United States government through the signing of treaties.31 Using their knowledge of
international laws, the writers in their memorials pointed out to the US Congress that the state
of Georgia’s attempt to extend its jurisdiction over the Cherokee was “utterly at variance with
the laws of nations, of the United States, and of the subsisting treaties between us, and the
known history of said State, of this nation, and of the United States,” insisting on a separate and
sovereign Native political status.32
Despite their efforts, their use of literacy and knowledge of political philosophies to
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secure their nation’s rights and prevent the loss of ancestral lands, the Cherokee failed to
change the dominant view of Native Americans as “racial other.” In Euro-Americans views, the
existence of a civilized modern state that was not European by definition was not possible.
Therefore “civilized” Native Americans could not “inhabit a separate autonomous space” within
the United States; they could only be incorporated within the white Euro-American society,
which meant the incorporation of their lands as well.33 This view, upheld by President Andrew
Jackson and many others, served as a justification for the eventual removal of the Cherokee
from Georgia.

The Seneca of western New York found themselves in a similar situation, with increasing
assaults on their lands, and they responded similarly, by reforming their political system. The
construction of the Erie Canal in 1825, running from Buffalo on the shores of Lake Erie to
Albany, brought about a demographic explosion to the area, and the lands around the quickly
expanding city of Buffalo became extremely valuable. One of the major players in land
speculations in western New York, the Ogden Land Company (OLC), concentrated its efforts on
gaining rights to Native lands through exploiting divisions among and within tribal communities,
and through fraudulent land sales tactics. At the same time, state officials attempted to diminish
Seneca sovereignty by extending state jurisdiction over them. Through its connections to the
Albany political machine of the Democratic Party, the OLC was able to secure preemptive rights
to purchase almost 200,000 acres of Indian lands and advocated the removal of the Seneca to
the west.34 The passage of the Indian Removal Act in 1830 helped the OLC and New York state
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officials in their efforts.
Exploiting internal divisions among the Seneca and using bribery, forgery, and alcohol,
the Ogden Company managed to get some of the Seneca to sign a treaty, ceding most of their
reservation lands in 1838. To secure this treaty, state officials attempted to bypass the general
council of the Iroquois Six Nations, arguing that unanimous consent of the tribal council was not
necessary for the treaty to be ratified.35 Like the Cherokee, the Seneca submitted memorials
written in English to the US Congress, utilizing knowledge and education they had acquired in
schools established by the Society of Friends (Quakers), and challenging the fraudulent treaty.
They also turned to the Quakers for help.36 These efforts led to a new compromise treaty of
1842, which returned the Allegany and Cattaraugus reservations to the Seneca, but kept the
lands of the Buffalo Creek and Tonawanda reservations in the hands of the Ogden Company.37
The Cattaraugus and Alleghany Seneca eventually accepted the compromise treaty. But the
Tonawanda, who never signed the original treaty in 1838, continued to protest the loss of their
reservation. In their memorials to the Congress, they pointed out that neither of the treaties
was agreed upon by a unanimous vote of the Seneca council, which was the “fundamental law
of the Iroquois, and of our nation.” In their argumentation the Tonawanda residents presented
themselves as a sovereign nation with its own “national laws,” which should be respected by the
state of New York and the United States.38 They also used the Anglo-American legal system to
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secure their land rights. In 1857, the Tonawanda “won” the right to purchase back part of their
reservation from the Ogden Company in exchange for giving up any claims to lands west of the
Mississippi River.39
Alongside the assault on the Seneca lands, throughout the 1840s, the New York State
Legislature enacted a series of laws intended to interfere and regulate the internal affairs of the
Seneca, especially those on the Cattaraugus and Allegany reservations. These laws were
presented as “humanitarian reform” to help and protect the Seneca, while in reality they were
designed to weaken their sovereignty.40 In 1845, the state legislature recognized the existence
of the “Seneca Nation of Indians” and “awarded” them, rather than recognized, the rights of the
Seneca to protect their property rights and to prosecute their violations including trespassing or
“injury to the soil.” However, the law specified the right of the New York governor to appoint an
attorney for the Seneca, who should “advise the said Indians respecting controversies between
themselves, and between them or any of them, and any other person.”41 Further, it “gave”
rather than recognized, the Seneca’s right of assembly in an annual council and to select tribal
officials, designating the number of tribal offices that could be held, and even defined the rights
and privileges of non-Senecas who would be accepted by the Seneca chiefs to live on the
reservations.42 Subsequent laws further interfered with the internal affairs of the Seneca. In
1847, the state set up qualifications for voters in tribal council elections, the responsibilities and
duties of each of the tribal offices and the tribal courts, as well as regulations for sales of timber
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and judicial proceedings.43 Extending jurisdiction over the Seneca would not only help to
control them, but would also pave a way for eventual assimilation. As Lawrence Hauptman
pointed out, by the time the compromise treaty was concluded in 1842, Indian removal policy
had been viewed in an increasingly negative light. Rather than to spend money on removing
Native peoples, the state and federal officials planned to absorb Native nations into the AngloAmerican society as taxpaying citizens.44
To counter the State of New York’s assimilation attempts and prevent future assaults on
their lands, the Seneca responded by reforming their political system, and incorporating AngloAmerican political ideas in its new incarnation. In 1848, the Cattaraugus and Allegany Seneca
adopted a republican form of government and a written constitution. Asher Wright, a
missionary among the Seneca, described this reform as an attempt “to resist every future effort
to remove them from their paternal inheritance [lands].”45 However, historian Laurence
Hauptman argued that this “Seneca revolution” was initiated and led by the Society of Friends in
their attempt to bring the Seneca under the New York state jurisdiction, and to the eventual
absorption into the main stream Anglo-American society.46 While Hauptman’s assumption of
the involvement and goals of the Quakers in Seneca affairs is certainly plausible, the language of
the Seneca constitution itself offers another level of reading. In the light of Native struggle to
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preserve their political autonomy, the document reveals a mixture of Native and non-Native
influences, as well as the Seneca assertion of their national sovereignty, in the available, very
limited political space.
The Constitution reflects Euro-American political thought, Christian ideals, rhetoric of
1840s revolutionary Europe, but it also shows continuation of Native traditions. The
introduction of Euro-American political concepts among the Seneca may have come through the
Quacker’s schools. A Seneca resolution adopted in December 1848 described the role of the
schools among the nation: “they were the first to introduce the means of our culture and
improvement and laid the foundation of our education and civilization, by which means we have
become wiser and enlightened, and been enabled to see and understand our rights…”47
Younger members of the nation certainly played a role in the 1848 government reform. A letter
from one of the Seneca chiefs commented on the role of younger generation in the
governmental change of 1848:
Not a few of the younger Indians had by this time received some education,
their dormant intellectual faculties had been awakened – they had become
enabled to see and understand their real situation, and were convinced that
their ancient form of government was not adapted to the necessities for the
nation in its present improved condition. … They therefore resolved to reform
their political Institutions.48
Through the younger generation, educated in missionary schools, the Friends could have
asserted their influence and, as Hauptman argues, pushing the nation for the governmental
change as a step toward their ultimate goal of Seneca assimilation. Yet it would be a mistake to
assume that the Quakers’ pupils accepted all their education without questioning its concepts.
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The phrase “to see and understand our rights” could also be read as the Seneca understanding
of their rights as a nation and an independent political entity.
The rhetoric used to describe the old government in the document mirrors the rhetoric
of the revolutionary movements in Europe of the time. The old Seneca chiefs were described as
“irresponsible, self-constituted aristocracy,” a language that invokes images of 1848
revolutionary Europeans demanding their rights and freedoms from the ruling nobility.49
Revolutionary ideas and rhetoric could easily reach Seneca reservations through their contacts
with the Quakers, many of whom were involved in the numerous social reform movements of
the time, from abolition of slavery to Free Soil movement, opposition to the U.S. war with
Mexico, and women’s rights. These movements intersected and became international in their
nature. This “transatlantic Quaker reform circle,” as scholar Nancy Hewitt calls it, documented
the developments of reform movements on both sides of the Atlantic, exchanging ideas and
strategies.50 Many American reformers initially saw the European revolutions of 1848 as an
extension and reach of their own 1776 spirit. The European revolutionary language, circulated
through the transatlantic reform circle, and used by the Seneca had political currency among
American reformers at the time, which would have helped the Seneca to reach white audience
and supporters for their cause.51
It is possible that through the Friends’ international network, news of the revolutionary
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stirrings in Europe and its political ideas and rhetoric reached the Seneca and entered their own
political discourse. Lucretia Mott, a social reformer and women’s rights advocate, saw such links
quite clearly. After visiting the Cattaraugus reservation with her husband in summer 1848, she
published an article describing her travels. Mott observed that “They [the Seneca], too, are
learning somewhat from the political agitations abroad; and, as a man is wont, are imitating the
movements of France and all Europe, in seeking larger liberty –– more independence.”52
Personal contacts between the Quaker reformers and the Seneca likely served as a way to
introduce political philosophies and revolutionary rhetoric of contemporary Europe to the
Seneca and may have influenced the outcome and the rhetoric of the Seneca political reform.
While Mott and perhaps most of the Friends perceived the Seneca as seeking freedom
from their old government, the Seneca themselves most likely translated the revolutionary
ideals of Europe into their relations with New York State and federal government. They
attempted to protect their political autonomy and freedom (albeit limited), carefully
maneuvering in a limited political space to ensure the survival of their communities. Forced by
circumstances to accept political changes and to reform their political system, the Seneca
managed to safeguard, at least to a degree, their national sovereignty within the provisions of
their new constitution.
The new Seneca constitution shows a delicate balance between the reality of Seneca
life, physically engulfed by the State of New York and the United States, and the Seneca
assertion of national sovereignty. While some of the language of the constitution is ambiguous
and allows for the extension of New York State jurisdiction over the Seneca, at the same time, it
also asserts the Seneca nation’s claim to sovereignty and their right to exist as a political entity.
The opening of the constitution acknowledges the political power of the United States and the
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State of New York, reflecting the legal constraints under which the Seneca found themselves in
the late 1840s. Section 14 stated that the Seneca Council’s laws should not be “inconsistent with
the Constitution of the United States or of the State of New York.”53 At the same time the
writers attempted to carve out some legal space to assert their sovereignty. Section 19 specified
that only the laws passed by New York “for the protection and improvement of the Seneca
Nation of Indians” continued to be valid “except so far as they are inconsistent with the
provisions of this Constitution or Charter.”54 With this step, the Seneca attempted to create a
legal buffer to protect their sovereignty in an increasingly limited judicial space.
The Seneca further asserted their national sovereignty by defining the terms of
citizenship and national property. Section 16 defined the rights to occupancy for “any member
of the ancient Confederacy of the Iroquois” and further laid out the Seneca council’s right to
pass regulations for granting citizenship to non-Senecas.55 This section can be seen as a possible
response to the New York State law from 1845, which “allowed” the chiefs to admit non-Seneca
to their reservation with the granting of the same privileges as the Seneca.56 The state law
forced the idea of granting citizenship to members of other tribes, but the writers of the Seneca
constitution carved out a legal space, in which the Seneca council determined the rules and
regulations for such an act. Thus the constitution safeguarded at least a degree of Seneca legal
and political sovereignty. Further, by employing the concept of citizenship, the Seneca
presented themselves in modern political terms recognizable by Anglo-American society. Thus
the claiming of modernity and nationhood for themselves served as a tool for recognition of
Seneca political sovereignty.
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The concept of national property defined in section 18 further shows the Seneca’s
insistence on being recognized as a nation. The section declared several saw mill operations,
already in existence as national property, and the profits from these operations were to be
appropriated by the newly established Council for the nation’s purposes.57 At the same time the
writers of the document clearly showed support for private property ownership: “nothing in the
charter shall be construed as prohibiting the erection of Mills and other works for
manufacturing or other purposes by any private individual upon his own premises… and all such
erections by individuals shall be respected as strictly private property.”58 The concept of
national property allowed the Seneca to continue the tradition of holding some of their property
in common and to distribute the profits of such enterprises through the nation as the council
deemed fit. At the same time, the Seneca encouraged private businesses and guaranteed the
protection of private property, a concept embraced by the United States. Through their
openness to capitalist ventures and private property, the Seneca claimed political and economic
modernity for themselves, while keeping some of their specific traditional values and practices
intact, at least to a degree.
In the consideration of their circumstances and the danger of losing their lands, the
Seneca looked outside their own society for inspiration. The resulting constitution and new
government was a mixture of Native traditions and Euro-American political ideas. The Seneca
adopted European political philosophy and the republican form of government used by the
United States in order to protect their own survival and independence, while preserving some of
their traditions.59 If the ultimate goal of New York officials and the Society of Friends was
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assimilation and absorption of the Seneca into the Anglo-American society, then the existence
and official recognition of the Seneca’s new government and Constitution, with however limited
rights and sovereignty, would be a step countering such a goal. The existence of the document
and its language represent the adaptation of the Seneca to their changing circumstances by
using Euro-American political concepts and co-opting them for their own purposes.
The Cherokee and Seneca faced continuous attacks on their sovereignty and rights. In
their resistance and defense of their right to political existence, both nations utilized tools of the
white society – the existing rhetoric and political concepts. Cherokee and Seneca intellectuals
and leaders wrote memorials to US Congress and embarked on speaking tours to challenge
racial stereotypes. Both nations reformed their governments, negotiating non-Native political
ideas and systems with their own political traditions. The result was a compromise with a
distinct Native voice, born out of a struggle to survive in an increasingly tightening political
space.

Attempts to find a political and economic middle ground that would allow Native
Americans to incorporate Euro-American ideas with their traditions to formulate strategies and
mechanisms to ensure their survival as peoples became harder as the nineteenth century
progressed. To the dominant settler-society, private property, capitalism, industrialization, and
Christianity represented civilization and desired progress, while the lack of these automatically
meant “savagery” and intellectual inferiority.60 The contemporary discourse on racial
difference, fueled by ideas of Social Darwinism and combined with unfavorable views on
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communal property, considerably complicated Native attempts to create and maintain their
own economic and political systems that would reflect the needs of their communities and allow
them to resist cultural and political (if not outright physical) annihilation.61
Native Americans had to contest with the views that their societies’ communalism
represented a hurdle to white American industrial progress and a threat to Anglo-American
civilization and empire-building. With the westward expansion of the United States, the
pressure on Native lands and resources increased. Native Americans continued to defend their
lands and rights, but defending tribal territories held in common became harder in the face of
an increased rhetoric of Americanism and corporatism, which linked Indians resisting the loss of
their lands with the “alien” ideologies of the new immigrants and the industrial workers of the
East organizing for safer working conditions and better wages. While some Gilded Age thinkers
pondered the distinction between “communism,” meaning communal ownership, and
“Communism,” meaning the European political theory argued by Karl Marx, in the end both
modern European communism and indigenous tribal communism were regarded as “antithetical
to the American way” of life and therefore dangerous by the majority of American society. In
the minds of white America, the “red savage” was linked with communal property and AngloAmerican industrial “civilization” with private property and capitalism.62 The discourse of racial
difference, combined with stereotypes of un-Americanism and communism, prevented many
Anglo-Americans to consider an alternate socio-economic and political system as legitimate.
Such attitudes considerably complicated Native American attempts to search for a middle
ground that would allow them to adapt to their changing conditions, but on their own terms.63
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Native intellectuals, writers, and tribal leaders had to be careful in framing their demands and
goals in the face of Americanist rhetoric that challenged their very right to a sovereign existence.
Native American nations responded to these changing circumstances in various ways.
Some adopted the changes that came in the late nineteenth century and tried to secure their
independence and sovereignty by incorporating economic and political ideas of main stream US
society. Others attempted to withdraw from the reach of the United States in order to secure
the survival of their communities. For example, the Cheyenne attempted to keep a separation
between themselves and the whites by limiting the railroad companies from laying tracks
through their territory. They desired to preserve their sovereignty by distancing themselves
from the US to remain a self-sustaining imperium in imperio.64
Other Native nations tried to adapt by incorporating the language of progress and
industrial development into their survival strategies. They used the rhetoric of “Christian
civilization” to gain sympathetic ears and support among whites for their version of capitalism
and industrial development, based on a mixture of their tribal socio-economic traditions and the
practices Euro-American society. For example, in 1870, the Cherokee and Creek proposed to
build their own railroad and asked the federal government for help, justifying the project as a
way to expand “Christian civilization” to the tribe. However, they proposed to build the railroad
themselves, indicating this “civilization”” and “progress” would be made on their own terms.
Their request was denied by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of that time, Ely S. Parker
(Seneca), who, despite being Native American himself, could not imagine a possibility of a
“hybrid methods of market integration” between the white capitalist system and the proposed
one – a Native nation not completely separate from the Anglo-American society and its
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economic system, but also not completely incorporated into them.65 Because of the limited
views of white Americans (and some Natives), who could not conceive of an Indian nation with
communal character functioning as a corporation, the Creek and Cherokee attempts failed. They
were caught in a Catch 22 moment. In the reigning Anglo-American view they could not be
civilized until the Anglo-American society brought them a railroad, the symbol of progress and
civilization. Yet without its civilizing effect, the Cherokee and Creek could not build their own
railroads.66

Internationalizing One’s Struggle, Indigenous Transnational Connections
Transnational diplomacy and ties to places and indigenous peoples outside the borders
of the settler-states have long played a role in Native political behavior and intellectual
discourse. Like the Creeks in the late eighteenth century, who looked to European monarchs and
their colonies in the Caribbean for support and trade to secure their political position, the
Cherokee in the 1830s, facing the threat of removal, looked beyond the borders of the United
States to seek out other options, solutions, and inspiration. In 1835, John Ross wrote to Señor
de Costello y Lanza, charge d’affaires of Mexico, in an attempt to reserve land for the Cherokee
within Mexico’s contemporary borders.67 Ross’ interest in Mexico as a solution to the
Cherokee’s problems was likely influenced by historical and kinship ties to the area. Scholar
James Cox points out that some Native Americans saw indigenous Mexico as a part of a larger
shared homeland by Native people in the southeast and southwest. Cherokee oral tradition
situated the Cherokee origin in Latin America and described their migration through Mexico to
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southern North America. Such historical, cultural, and kinship ties likely influenced the Cherokee
view of Mexico as a possible haven from the threats of Anglo-American colonization.68
Neither was Ross the first Cherokee leader to look toward Mexico as a potential
homeland for his people. Early reports suggest that in the first half of the eighteenth century, as
a protest to land cession, a group of Cherokee left the southeast and settled in northern New
Spain. Other Cherokee groups were reported to have moved to today’s Texas in the early
nineteenth century. In 1822 a self-supporting Cherokee community under the leadership of
Richard Fields lived in today’s Texas, thriving economically and keeping peaceful relations with
their white neighbors.69 Thus Ross likely had precedent in looking to Mexico as the answer to
the Cherokee problems and a place that would allow the nation to preserve their political
autonomy.70 Ross’ political actions demonstrate the Cherokee’s insistence on their political
sovereignty as well as international approaches to their problems, and the utilization of
historical cultural ties. As a leader of an autonomous political entity, Ross turned to another
sovereign state to negotiate a solution, which would allow his people to remain autonomous,
rather than to let the United States dictate the Cherokee where to live.
Despite the failure of Ross’ attempt, Mexico remained as a potential solution to
Cherokee problems throughout the nineteenth century. Facing allotment policy and eventual
assimilation at the century’s end, a faction among the Cherokee in Oklahoma looked abroad
again abroad to Mexico as for a place that would promise the survival of indigenous peoples.
Between 1895 and 1908, Indian Territory and Oklahoma local newspapers reported on plans by
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several tribal-nations to secure lands in Mexico and to move there. In 1910, a leader of a section
of the Keetowah Cherokee called the Nighthawk Keetowah Society went to Mexico and with an
old document tried to claim land there for his people. The attempt was unsuccessful, but it
demonstrates the resolve to remain separate from Anglo-American society through a voluntary
removal to a place perceived as a traditional homeland.71 It also exemplifies the ready use of
international approaches by Native Americans, in this case specifically the Cherokee, to solving
any crises that they were facing.

Native American transnational diplomacy also included charitable actions, based on a
nation’s ability to recognize similar historical (and contemporary) experiences of other peoples
with their own. An awareness of and empathy with other peoples with histories of colonization
allowed Native leaders and intellectuals to position their situation within a transnational
context. The actions taken by the Choctaw and Cherokee nations during the British Potato
Famine in the late 1840s serve as an example of Native American international awareness and
the intellectual universalizing of indigenous struggles.
The news of the famine probably reached the Choctaw and the Cherokee through their
connections with the Society of Friends and its international network, which facilitated the
exchange of information, eyewitness accounts, and the delivery of financial aid to the famine
victims in the struggling nations.72 Upon learning about the situation, the Choctaw and
Cherokee collected money and sent their contributions to Ireland and Scotland.73 The Anglo-
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American press hailed the actions of the Native nations in religious terms of “truly Christian
benevolence” and praised the work of Christian missionaries for bringing the Cherokee to a
“higher and purer species of civilization, derived only from the influence of our holy religion, by
which we are taught to view the sufferings of our fellow beings, wherever they exist, as our
own…”74
While Christian charity undoubtedly influenced the Cherokee decision to help with the
famine relief, the fact that the Irish and Scots were themselves colonized peoples, may have
played a role as well.

Family ties between the Cherokee and Scottish immigrants also

determined the destination of the collected funds from the Cherokee nation. In a report from a
Cherokee meeting regarding the relief for Scotland, published in the Christian Observer, John
Ross explained the Cherokee decision to send their money to Scotland rather than Ireland with
the long history of intermarriage between them and Scottish settlers: “…the very considerable
number of the descendents of Scotchmen among the Cherokee, is calculated particularly to
awaken our sympathy towards that people…”75 In his letter to the editor of the Cherokee
Advocate, Ross further asked “Have the Scotch no claim upon the Cherokee? … Have they not a
very especial claim? They have.”76
Besides family ties, the Cherokee also shared an experience of land dispossession and
removal with some of their Scottish relatives. The histories of the “tribal” societies of the
Scottish Highlanders and Native Americans were by no means identical, but they were parallel.
Both peoples had experienced subjugation by capitalist powers, having their resources
incorporated into new economic systems, marginalization, dependency, and dislocation as
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capitalism displaced tribalism.77 From the mid-eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth
centuries the economy and land use of the Scottish Highlands shifted from small farming to
commercial sheep farming. Many small farms were consolidated into large pastures and the
original landholders were evicted. The landless relocated to seacoast, industrial English towns,
and abroad. This process intensified after 1815, which doubled Highlanders immigration to
America.78 Some of the relocated Highland Scots found their way into Native American nations,
such as the Cherokee, where they settled and intermarried, only to be relocated again in the
Indian Removals of the 1830s. As historian Collin Calloway points out, “the children of
Highlanders walked the Trail of Tears as Cherokee.” The experience of the Highland clearances
by the Scots and the Trail of Tears by their children became a defining aspect of their identity.79
A nineteenth-century Gaelic poem, composed in North America, indicates these shifting
identities. Its original words “You are Indians, sure enough” were changed to “We’ve turned into
Indians, sure enough.” As Calloway argues, this shows the parallels of land dispossession that
the Scottish Gaels saw between themselves and the continent’s Native peoples.80
The Cherokee themselves also recognized these paralleled histories of land
dispossession, subjugation, and loss of sovereignty. A Cherokee newspaper article (most likely in
the Cherokee Advocate) indicates the author’s awareness and knowledge of the issues of
Scottish subjugation:
Although we may never receive any pecuniary benefit or aid in return, we will
be richly repaid by the consciousness of having done a good act, by the moral
77
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effect it will produce abroad and by the reflection that we have helped to allay
the sorrows of the land rendered illustrious by the deeds of Wallace and Bruce
and the songs of Scott and Burns.81
The allusion to William Wallace and Robert de Bruce, historical leaders in the Scottish struggle
for independence, and Sir Walter Scott and Robert Burns, writers and icons of Scottish
nationalism, made by a Cherokee writer only ten years after the forceful removal of their nation
from Georgia, cannot be a simple coincidence. It suggests not only the author’s knowledge of
Scottish history, but also an awareness of the contemporary Scottish political position vis-à-vis
England, and the understanding of the parallels with Cherokee historical experiences and recent
struggles. Alluding to other peoples’ recognizable figures or symbols of their struggle for
sovereignty, the writer indirectly reminded their readers of their own similar situation, and thus
positioned their own people’s struggles in a historical and international context.82

Native Intellectualism and Transnationalism in the First Half of the 20th Century
By the beginning of the twentieth century, Native Americans found themselves in very
different circumstances from those of a hundred years prior. Military resistance was no longer
possible nor would it make sense, and Native communities understood they would live with and
among the Anglo-American society that had engulfed them. At the same time, they refused to
surrender to the assimilation programs of the Indian Office.83 The early twentieth-century’s
Progressive Era was a time of “American self-criticism and reform,” which opened up some new
opportunities for Native Americans to reach white audiences to plead the case for their survival
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as peoples. At the same time, Anglo-American desire for reform had its limitations, as not all
reformers were concerned with racial justice, and those who were tended to decide and speak
for instead of with the people they were trying to help.84 Anglo-American attitudes continued
to be influenced by contemporary views on race and Native Americans. These views had
changed between the 1880s and the 1920s, but they remained paternalistic and based on a
discourse of racial difference.85 An increasingly nostalgic view of the American Indian as part of
the nation’s frontier past limited the opportunities of Native Americans to claim the present and
future as modern nations in the eyes of the dominant society.86
To achieve the needed changes and reforms, it was necessary for Native Americans to
communicate with white audiences to express their perspectives and to influence the state and
federal policies.87 To that purpose, Native leaders and activists continued to use Euro-American
concepts and ideas, adopting or subverting them for their needs. For example, the education of
Native children, designed to assimilate them into the dominant society, equipped Native
students, future activists and leaders, with the tools and knowledge they needed to challenge
white society’s stereotypes about Native Americans, and the government Indian policy. Further,
the boarding school environment with its “inter-tribal composition of the student body” also
provided seeds for pan-Indian identity and future activism.88 Graduates of the education
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programs founded the first modern pan-Indian organization, the Society of American Indians
(SAI), in 1911.89 While its members held differing opinions on the question of assimilation and
citizenship, they agreed that the problems facing Native tribes had to be dealt with and solved
by Native Americans themselves. They spoke out against Native racial stereotypes and
generalizations, and lobbied for improved education in Indian schools, among other topics. To
do so, they adopted established Euro-American rhetoric and used it to articulate their objections
and views, making them appeal to contemporary values. The establishment of SAI and its work
shows the use of Euro-American tools by Native activists. As Robert Warrior pointed out, SAI, as
the first pan-Indian organization, also represented “coming together of Native intellectuals in a
specific political project.”90
These Native intellectuals and writers used English, the language of their colonizers and
a tool of assimilation, to challenge racial stereotypes, to criticize the reservation system and its
corruption, and to call for reforms in education, the legal status of Native Americans, and for
religious freedom. At first, Native writers were often published in church publications, but from
1913 the American Indian Magazine, published by the SAI, offered an additional venue for
Native writers to reach like-minded readers.91 Through printed articles and books, Native
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Americans attempted to reclaim their tribal histories and present them from Native points of
view, in order to counter the contemporary racial stereotypes, and to claim modernity for their
tribal communities. Writers such as Tuscarora leader Elias Johnson and Delaware writer and
activist Richard C. Adams wrote histories of their nations, in which they presented the tribes as
civilized and modern, responsible for their well-being, and capable of making complicated
political and economic decisions, the opposite to the popular stereotypes of wilderness and
savagery.92 Native activists and writers used English not only to communicate with white
readers, but to also communicate with each other. By the early twentieth century, English
became the lingua franca of modern pan-Indianism.93

Education: From a Tool of Assimilation to a Tool of Resistance
Beneficiaries of the education programs themselves, SAI members recognized its
importance for the future of Native nations. Francis La Flesche (Omaha) saw the benefits of
formal education as a possible way for Native Americans to achieve acceptance in AngloAmerican society: “…while the school uniform did not change those who wore it … it may help
these little Indians be judged … by what they say and do.”94 Arthur C. Parker (Seneca) espoused
a similar view, arguing that Indians must “step upward where he can be seen and he must speak
where he can be heard. He must use a language and a logic that appeals above the tumult and
wins attention. He can do this through education…”95
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SAI members and Native activists agreed on the importance of education as a tool to
improve Native American lives, but they differed in their views on the ultimate goals that
education should provide and the ways to achieve them. Some, such as Oneida attorney
Dennison Wheelock or Winnebago educator and Presbyterian minister Henry Roe Cloud, argued
for integrated education in white schools. For Wheelock, separate Indian schools were not only
inadequate, but also demeaning to Native children.96 Roe Cloud believed that only a Christian
education beyond the grammar school would provide the necessary moral foundation to deal
with the problems of Native communities and eventually lead to US citizenship.97 In his view,
only a higher education that would introduce the students to the principles of the Republic and
the dangers to American democracy would prepare new Native leaders to tackle the economic,
educational, political, religious, and social problems facing Native communities. “They must be
men who will take up the righteous cause among their people, interpret civilization to their
people, and restore race confidence, race virility. Only by such leaders can race segregation be
overcome. Real segregation of the Indian consists in segregation of thought and inequality of
education.”98
Reformers, such as Laura Kellogg (Oneida) and Arthur C. Parker (Seneca), called for an
education that would include Native traditions and culture. In their view, Native Americans had
a lot to offer to the rest of the society, to enrich US civilization. Kellogg argued: “… I do say that
there are noble qualities and traits and a set of literary traditions he [the Native American] had
which are just as fine and finer, and when he has these, for the sake of keeping a fine spirit of
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self-respect and pride in himself, let us preserve them…”99 Parker went even further in his
argument and called for “an Indian path to sophisticated learning.”100 In his view, the ordinary
American university did not offer the quality of education Native Americans needed, because it
did not “produce as high a quality of men as it should.”101 Instead he supported Fayette
McKenzie’s idea to establish an Indian university.102 In Parker’s view, Anglo-American education
and universities led to a Native imitations of whites, instead of a “real unfolding of self and of
native genius.” Parker’s goal for Native students was to “understand the ways of the white race
and follow in general the path of enlightenment, but at the same time, Native Americans should
not become an imitation of the whites.”103
Laura Kellogg’s activism exemplifies the middle position that Parker called for; utilizing
Anglo-American education, combined with original Native thought and traditions, to promote
the betterment of Native communities. Educated in a private boarding school only 60 miles from
her home with mostly non-Native women, Kellogg became actively involved in local tribal issues,
namely the Oneida land claims. She firmly believed that Native Americans did not have to leave
their reservations and get absorbed by main stream society in order to survive.104 Kellogg
proposed a plan to transform reservations into self-sustaining communities, called Lolomi, a
Hopi word meaning “perfect goodness be upon you.” The name symbolized her ultimate goal:
the transformation of reservations into a self-sufficient, self-governing industrial villages and
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communities, protected “by means of Federal incorporation.”105
In her proposal, Kellogg combined Native traditions with non-Native socio-economic
systems. Specifically, she used the socio-economic system of the Mormon community in Utah.
She pointed out that like the Mormons, the reservations of her time had no money for
investment, but through economic system of credit, fixed wages and future shares in stock,
Native societies would be able to stay intact, develop economically, and function as selfsufficient and politically autonomous entities. For this plan to work however, Kellogg argued
that a degree of homogeneity would have to be achieved, because it was the homogeneity of
the Mormon community that allowed for their success and survival.106 Echoing the general
ideals of Progressive Era reformers, Kellogg also emphasized efficiency in her proposal.107 Her
writing illustrates the ways in which Native Americans could use Anglo-American education to
advocate for the improvement of their communities, while allowing those communities to carry
out reform on their own terms and to preserve their traditions and identities.

Native American Legal Status and the Concept of Self-Determination
SAI members and tribal leaders in the early twentieth century also worked to resolve
the often ambiguous legal status of Native Americans as wards of the United States. The vaguely
defined legal status of “ward” was detrimental to Native communities and their self-sufficiency,
because without the approval of the Indian Office, Native Americans could not do anything from
leasing and selling their lands to acquiring credit to start their own farms. Besides the economic
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aspect of Native American legal status, the numerous and unclear official categories of Native
Americans - non-taxed wards, taxed allotted citizen-wards, non-citizen Indians, and citizen
Indians, made it difficult to determine the definite status of American Indians and their
communities.108 With the unclear status and unclear definition of rights and responsibilities,
Native Americans were in a state of legal limbo; they were “…considered non-entities. They are
not anything to themselves and not anything to the world…”109
While Native leaders and activists agreed on the need to abolish the warship status and
the Indian Office, they differed in their views and definitions of what the new status should be.
They argued in favor of concepts that ranged from acculturation and full US citizenship to
autonomous legal status and tribal nationhood. In their discourse they used Euro-American
rhetoric and political concepts to frame their arguments.
The principle of self-determination in President Wilson’s Fourteen Points was one of the
concepts that influenced the debates among Native leaders. Many of them celebrated the ideal
of equality among nations and the respect for the rights of the “small people.” However, not all
interpreted self-determination in the same way. Some of the SAI members, such as Zitkala-Ša
(Gertrude Bonnin, Lakota) and Charles Eastman (Dakota) saw the goal of self-determination
through the lens of US citizenship, rather than as political sovereignty. In her 1919 editorial,
Zitkala-Ša focused on the promise of the Versailles Conference for the “little people,” who were
to be granted “the right of self determination. … Small nations and remnants of nations are to
sit beside their great allies… and their just claims are to be duly incorporated in the terms of a
righteous peace.”110 Her vision of self-determination was based on an idea of universal
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humanity, freedom, and incorporation rather than political sovereignty. Her point of universal
humanity and freedom is clear from the connections she made between diverse minority groups
presented at the peace conference at Versailles. She saw American Indian nations more along
the lines of African-Americans and their call for equality rather than parallel with the Irish and
their call for political sovereignty: “The Red man asks for a very simple thing – citizenship in the
land that was once his own, - America. … There never was a time more opportune than now for
America to enfranchise the Red man!”111 Similarly, Charles Eastman also saw the Paris Peace
Conference as a tremendous hope for the “little people,” a beginning of a “new order” and
“new international relationship,” which would end the “old rule, the old ambitions for world
domination by discovery and conquest.”112 In his writing he emphasized individuality and the
rights of minorities:
I believe this to be an opportune moment for the ‘little people’ of the earth to
plead for a better observance of their individuality and rights by the more
powerful and ruling nations. For we must admit that every race, however
untutored, has its ideals, its standards of rights and wrong, which are sometimes
nearer the Christ principle than the common standards of civilization.113
Both Zitkala-Ša and Eastman compared Native Americans and their situation to that of
other nations, including the Irish, but did not see a future possibility of political sovereignty as a
solution to Native issues. Eastman defined even the question of Irish independence as a racial
problem and applied this vision to the situation of Native Americans. Like many of his SAI
colleagues, his envisioned path to American Indian freedom from the Indian Office was through
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U.S. citizenship:
When the vexed Irish question and other knotty problems come up at the peace
table, we may be reminded that we too, here in America, have our race
troubles. How can our nation rise as the champion of the “little people” until it
has been fair to its own? “We, too, demand our freedom!” cry those modern
Greeks, the North American Indians. … All we ask is full citizenship. … We do not
ask for territorial grant or separate government. We ask only to enjoy with
Europe’s sons the full privileges of American citizenship.114
Despite the international comparisons they made between Native Americans and other
subjugated peoples, now asking for political independence, it was hard for some Native
intellectuals to imagine a system that would grant Native Americans their political sovereignty.
Eastman, Zitkala-Ša, and other boarding school graduates, such as Arapaho Episcopal minister
and the first president of SAI Sherman Coolidge and Arthur C. Parker, did not see as possible the
existence of separate Indian nations within the United States.115 They interpreted the concept
of self-determination and the promise of the Versailles Peace Conference as a way to full US
citizenship.
Other Native leaders, however, saw the promise of self-determination in terms of tribal
nationhood and a right to determine their own socio-political and economic development. They
created their own visions of Native existence based on political and economic autonomy
incorporated in the larger United States. They exercised their intellectual sovereignty and
conceived of alternative solutions to the conundrum of Native legal status, insisting on its
autonomy vis-à-vis the United States, using the concept of nationhood and rights derived from
treaties as the basis for their claims.116
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The Crow Act of 1920, passed by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, was a
culmination of a decade-long struggle by the Crow nation to protect their tribal lands in
Montana.117 A new generation of young educated Crow politicians played an important role in
the political maneuvering and tactics designed to prevent a large sale of tribal lands for white
settlement. In September 1919, Robert Yellowtail, one of the young Crow politicians, delivered a
speech in front of the committee, in which he clearly defined the Crow as a separate political
entity and a modern nation with the right to self-determination. He started by pointing out that
Native Americans had a set of inalienable rights, among which were the rights to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness, including the right to “choose the manner” in which they should
seek this happiness.118 Echoing the definition of a modern state in Vattel’s Law of Nations,
Yellowtail further stressed the tradition of community and political organization of the American
indigenous, stating that by the time the Europeans arrived to America, Native Americans were
“in well-organized organizations, living in accordance with well-established customs…”119 In his
speech, Yellowtail first established the historical tradition of political and social organization
among Native Americans separate from the European one and then asserted the rights and
continued sovereignty and nationhood of contemporary tribal nations and their rights:
I hold that the Crow Indian Reservation is a separate semisovereign [sic] nation
in itself, not belonging to any State, nor confined within the boundary lines of
different personal backgrounds, experiences, and education of the individual activists and leaders. Unlike
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any State of the Union, and that until such proper cessions, as has been agreed
to and as expressed in our covenant, have been duly compiled with no Senator,
or anybody else, so far as that is concerned, has any right to claim the right to
tear us asunder by the continued introduction of bills here without our consent
and simply because of our geographical proximity to his State or his home, or
because his constituents prevail upon him so to act … This Nation [the United
States] should be only too ready, as an atonement for our treatment in the past,
to willingly grant to the Indian people of this country their unquestionable and
undeniable right to determine how much of their own lands they shall retain as
their homes and how much they shall dispose of to outsiders.120
Representing a modern nation with a political system of representative government,
Robert Yellowtail demanded recognition of his nation’s autonomous legal status, utilizing
President Wilson’s idea of self-determination.121 After a short reflection of the Crow
contemporary political status as a ward of the United States, which rendered them un-free to
think, act, or expand, without asking for permission first, Yellowtail made a claim to the right of
his people to determine their own future, according to Wilson’s policy: “… your President but
yesterday assured the people of this great country, and also the people of the whole world, that
the right of self-determination shall not be denied to any people, no matter where they live, nor
how small or weak they may be, nor what their previous conditions of servitude may have
been.”122 Even though Yellowtail had his doubts that Wilson had Native Americans in mind
when writing his policy of self-determination, he expressed hope that the policy would be
applied to his people as it was to other small nations:
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I and the rest of my people sincerely hope and pray that the President, in his
great scheme of enforcing upon all the nations of the earth the adoption of this
great principle of the brotherhood of man and nations, and that the inherent
right of each one is that of the right of self-determination, I hope … that he will
not forget that within the boundaries of his own nation are the American
Indians, who have no rights whatsoever – not even the right to think for
themselves – that in his great wisdom he may say to Congress, “… let us
henceforth give to these people also a share of this new birth of freedom which
is about to dawn the world over”.123
Robert Yellowtail was not asking for full sovereignty and complete separation from the
United States by demanding the right to self-determination for his people. At the end of his
speech, he actually asked for the granting of American citizenship to Native Americans.
However, his definition of citizenship was based on the idea of freedom from the US
government’s Department of the Interior and its Indian Office: “… American citizenship, testing
100 percent pure, means nothing else than freedom, and freedom in the broadest and most
comprehensive sense of the word.”124 Unlike Zitkala-Ša or Charles Eastman, Yellowtail did not
ask for US citizenship with recognition of a separate ethnic and cultural identity; he rather he
asked, as Paul Rosier puts it, for a “hybrid citizenship,” which would grant the Crow the freedom
to maintain their cultural and political space, separate from the United States and based on
mutual obligations based in treaties.125 Yellowtail’s education, his work experience as a lawyer
in California, as well as his involvement in tribal politics and the developing new political system
of the Crow nation, enabled him to imagine an alternative path to both, full assimilation and
complete separation from the United States. Using Wilson’s universalist discourse, Yellowtail
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was able to translate the vision of the Crow’s own political ideals into terms which American
politicians would understand.126

Native Transnational Activism in the Early 20th Century
During the 1920s and 1930s, new opportunities for Native transnational activism
emerged. The establishment of the League of Nations promised a potential international arena
for indigenous peoples to voice their grievances. In the 1930s, attempts at a hemispheric
approach to Indian policy by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier gave some Native
activists a chance to travel and meet Native peoples outside the United States. Native activists
and leaders took these opportunities and used them to advance their peoples’ causes.
In 1924, the United States passed a statue that granted universal US citizenship to all
Native Americans. The Haudenosaunee, however, refused citizenship and sent a note to the
United States government, stating that “they were not then, had never been, and did not intend
to become American citizens.”127 Members of the Six Nations located within the boundaries of
Canada adopted the same attitude towards Canada’s attempt to enforce Canadian citizenship
on them and to dissolve the Iroquois League as a political entity. After unsuccessful negotiations
with Ottawa, the Six Nations turned to the international community. On the urging of their New
York State based attorney George Decker, the Six Nations decided to present their case to the
Permanent Court of International Justice.128 They also decided to seek entrance to and
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recognition from the League of Nations.
To gain access to the League of Nations required a clever strategy, using the League’s
rules, since the Six Nations were not officially recognized as a nation-state by the League, and
therefore they could not directly submit a petition under Article 1 of the Covenant of the League
of Nations to be accepted as a full member. To get around this issue, Decker and Levi General
(Cayaga), better known by his title Deskaheh, devised a plan to use Article 17 of the Covenant in
order to gain access to the League and to push for sanctions against Canada for its treatment of
the Iroquois League.129 They invoked Article 17, under which the Six Nations as a non-member
state could bring up charges against Canada (a member state) and its actions:
In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is
not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League,
the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the
obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon
such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the
provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications
as may be deemed necessary by the Council.130
The Article also allowed for a future invitation of the Six Nations to the League and thus would
have functioned as a back door for the Iroquois to eventually gain full recognition of their
independence.131
To secure the League of Nations’ attention to the Six Nations case, Deskaheh had to also
gather support and to show that the Iroquois plight was not a Canadian domestic issue. On
Decker’s urging, Deskaheh gave series of lectures in Europe, explaining the Six Nations’ legal
status as a sovereign nation state.132 In these lectures and two published pamphlets, Deskaheh
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used the current internationally accepted definition of a state and described the Iroquois League
as a nation state, historically organized and self-governed for centuries, living within its own
domain, and internationally recognized by all the European powers that had established
colonies in North America.133 His main claim to international recognition of the Iroquois League
was rooted in a 1784 treaty between the Six Nations and the British King George III, which
“never having been abrogated by either party, remains in full force and effect,” and the
Canadian government’s recognition of the Six Nations’ special legal status prior to World War
I.134
To further stress the international nature of the Iroquois case, Deskaheh charged the
Canadian government’s actions to be a violation of the “recognised [sic] law of Nations, the Six
Nations never having yielded their right to independence in home-rule to the Dominion of
Canada,” and thus the government’s actions were a threat to international peace as described
under Article 17 and 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.135 By asserting that Canadia’s
actions threatened international peace, Deskaheh presented the Iroquois as an independent
nation state rather than a domestic ethnic minority. He asked that the League recognize the Six
Nations’ right to home-rule, freedom of transit across Canadian territory to and from
international waters, and he called for the protection of the Six Nations under the League of
Nations.136 Using internationally accepted criteria for defining a sovereign state and the rules of
international law, Deskaheh argued for the recognition of the Iroquois as an independent nation
state and a future right to a seat in the League of Nations.137
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Deskaheh’s efforts drew large audiences, but had little immediate effect on the
proceedings of the League of Nations. To push the case on the League’s agenda, Desakaheh
needed an ally who could counter the political power of Great Britain and Canada, who both
opposed his project. He worked to secure support from several countries, including Estonia,
Panama, Persia, Brazil, and Ireland, which - given their own position, would be likely to unite
behind the Six Nations and support their claim. Even though he was successful in getting Persian
Prince Arfa-ad-Dovleh to speak on behalf of the Six Nations to the League of Nations Council
President, the chief was unable to have the Iroquois case placed onto the League’s agenda. The
League of Nations in the early 1920s was dominated by British imperial interests and the British
and Canadian governments exerted pressure on states sympathetic to the Six Nations.138 With
the absence of a strong political opponent to the Canadian and British governments, Deskaheh
and the Six Nations stood a little chance of having their case heard.
Deskaheh also internationalized his people’s struggle against the Canadian government,
by drawing parallels with other colonized peoples’ quest for independence. When he received
word from his daughter that he would be most likely arrested upon his return to Canada, he
wrote to Decker, comparing himself to Gandhi: “…so it looks to me I will be treated just like
Gandhi the India[n][;] they sent him to jail for 12 years, but they release[d] him and now he is
free, because his people had the power stronger than the British colonies, so they discharged
him.”139 Like Gandhi, Deskaheh believed and advocated for peaceful resolutions to conflicts.140

in the war effort made the creation of the League of Nations possible, Deskaheh stated that the Six
Nations now “look to the League of Nations for the protection we so much need, to prevent complete
destruction of our Government and the obliteration of the Iroquois race which would soon follow.”
Deskaheh, Chief Deskaheh Tells Why He Is Over Here Again (London, UK: Kealey’s Ltd, 1923), 7.
138
Hauptman, Seven Generations of Iroquois Leadership, 125, 136 – 137.
139
Chief Deskaheh to George Decker, June 6, 1924, quoted in Hauptman, Seven Generations of
Iroquois Leadership, 124.
140
Hauptman, Seven Generations of Iroquois Leadership,142.

59

Instead of violence, the Six Nations looked to the international community in hope that the ideal
of self-determination would apply to them as it did to nations in Europe.
Deskaheh’s mission to the League of Nation did not achieve the desired results, but it
represents an example of the intellectual traditions of Native American internationalism. His
mission influenced and inspired others who continued to fight against unilaterally imposed
national citizenship and the reduction of Native political sovereignty. Clinton Rickard, a
Tuscarora Chief, formed the Indian Defense League of America (IDLA) in December 1926 as a
response to the 1924 United States Indian Citizenship Act and the Immigration Act. He
represented the Iroquois people who did not want U.S. citizenship, not even in the form of a
dual citizenship. Rickard feared that political integration was a step toward ultimate assimilation
into the Anglo-American society, and that it would mean the loss of government-to-government
relation with the United States. IDLA was successful in its fight against the Immigration Act that
restricted indigenous peoples from other countries to enter the United States. Rickard’s work
and IDLA’s lobbying helped to pass an amendment that exempted indigenous peoples from the
Act’s restrictions.141

International travel and contacts with other indigenous peoples outside the United
States also provided a source of support and inspiration to Native leaders and activists. For
example, several Native writers in the 1920s and 1930s, including (but not limited to) Todd
Downing (Choctaw), Lynn Riggs (Cheorkee), D’Arcy McNickle (Confederate Salish and Kootenai),
Ruth Muskrat Bronson (Cherokee), and John Joseph Mathews (Osage), traveled to and
connected with indigenous peoples in Mexico and Canada. Influenced by their experiences, they
compared and contrasted their own situation with those abroad and in their work positioned
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indigenous issues within an international framework. They cultivated links with indigenous
peoples in both countries, which enabled them to share their experiences with colonization,
their struggle for recognition of indigenous political identity, and their ideas for political
strategies and actions.142
Post-revolutionary Mexico and the idea of indigenismo offered an inspirational vision of
a possible Native future. Mexican national discourse in the 1920s and 1930s was influenced by
the government-launched movement of indigenismo, which celebrated the mestizo and
indigenous cultures of Mexico as vital part of the country’s national identity and consciousness.
While officially indigenismo celebrated indigenous peoples, in reality the actual contribution of
Native-Mexicans to it was negligible; indigenous peoples became its the objects rather than
active players. Paradoxically, Indigenismo ultimately served to “erase the presence of
contemporary indigenous identity in Mexico.”143 Further, indigenismo was not incompatible
with the actual racism and continuous subjugation of indigenous Mexicans. In 1926, the
Mexican government waged war and bombed the Yaquis in Sonora, who were defending their
territory and community. Despite these realities, Mexico’s indigenismo discourse created a
public space in which indigenous Mexicans could make political demands.144

It was this space

and the possibilities it offered that attracted writers like Downing, Riggs, and McNickle. Critical
of indigenismo’s shortcomings, they nevertheless appropriated its idea and used it to voice the
possibilities it offered to Native peoples. Using Mexico, its indigenous peoples, Native history,
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and their cultural and spiritual traditions the authors communicated a clear critique of
colonialism and imperialism and they offered possible strategies for resistance and community
survival and revitalization.
Analyzing the works of Native writers such as Lynn Riggs, Todd Downing, and D’Arcy
McNikle,written in the 1920s and 1930s, James Cox demonstrates the writers’ appropriation of
the indigenismo concept to formulate strategies for survival and renewal of their communities.
For example, while the early plays of Lynn Riggs, many of them set specifically in Cherokee
Indian Territory, present a strong sense of doom for the community, his later plays A World
Without and The Year of Pilár, set in Mexico, written after his visit to Mexico in the 1920s,
present an explicit message of revolutionary indigenous liberation. In the latter, Riggs stages an
actual indigenous revolution and liberation, showing his view of the opportunity that
indigenismo could offer to Native peoples – the ability to achieve indigenous autonomy. His
indigenous characters follow the same change. They go from “citizens without a state” in his
earlier plays to indigenous Mexicans reclaiming their land. By looking at Mexico and advancing
the promise of indigenismo, Riggs explored other peoples’ colonial histories in order to show
possible solutions and paths to a better future of Native Americans in the North.145
Cultural and social markers such as traditional philosophies, languages, and kinship ties,
aspects elevated by indigenismo discourse to a place of prominence in Mexico, played a crucial
role as survival strategies in Native writing of the 1920s and 1930s. In Downing’s novel The Cat
Screams, for example, the knowledge of a Native language serves as a tool of resistance to a
neocolonial system and assimilation brought about by foreign employers and North American
tourism.
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blood relations, connected Native peoples in Mexico and the United States through their
struggles.147 In his non-fiction work The Mexican Earth, Downing showed these connections
through shared history, homeland, traditions, the land and its products, specifically maize. The
message of his book is one of indigenous cooperation rooted in historical kinship, which should
encourage indigenous solidarity. Downing imagined, as Cox put it, an “indigenous American
transnation that vitiates settler-colonial borders and prepares the political ground for the
creation of an indigenous transnational coalition.” He argued not only for indigenous
cooperation, but that Native Americans should assert themselves as a single ethnic bloc vis-à-vis
the United States and other settler-states.148
The cultural and historical relation Downing explores in his writing connected Native
peoples from the US and Mexico and provided a possible survival and renewal strategies. They
also helped to point out the ongoing colonization by both settler-states. Analyzing Leslie
Marmon Silko’s 1991 novel Almanac of the Dead, Shari Hundorf pointed out that “hemispheric
histories of conquest both expose the ongoing colonial violence that constitutes American
republics and context their contemporary geopolitical boundaries.”149 These ties between
Native cultures and peoples, crossing the settler-state boundaries, also carried with them the
potential of restoration and renewal of Native communities, as expressed in the works of
Downing and Riggs, in the 1920s and 1930s, and decades later in Silko’s Almanac.
Land and specifically Indian Territory served as an expression of a separate identity and
indigenous nationhood. As Cox points out, Rigg’s characters in Green Grow the Lilacs and Russet
Mantle assert their distinct identity by describing the United States as a foreign country: “…
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you’d think us people out here lived in United States! Why, we’re territory folks … Whut’s the
United States? It’s jist a furring country to me. And you supportin’ it! Jist dirty ole furriners, ever
last one of you!”150 Similarly, the description of major characters in Riggs Russet Mantle and
Downing’s The Cat Screams, make a clear distinction between the indigenous and non-Natives,
with the latter being portrayed as “aliens to this landscape” – foreigners to Indian Territory.151
Read in the light of the Indian Citizenship Act enacted a decade before, Riggs’ and Downing’s
works could be also seen as a refusal of US citizenship and an adherence to a distinct Indian
identity as well as a reflection of the influence of indigenismo on Native thought and art. While
the Mexican national identity discourse granted, at least to a degree, Native peoples a place in
modern Mexican society with their identity intact, the place of Native Americans in the US
American identity was uncertain and insignificant.152 Encouraged by what they saw in Mexico,
the writers asserted Indianness in their writing.
It is hard to estimate the actual impact these works had. As James Cox points out, these
authors were a small and selective group of indigenous writers, who found inspiration in postrevolutionary Mexico, but they were still prolific and represented “a compelling part of the
literary, political, and intellectual history of mid-twentieth-century American Indian writing.”153
For example, Downing’s novels found a broad, international audience with at least thirteen
editions or translations throughout Europe. At least two of Riggs’ plays were discussed by critics
as contenders for the Pulitzer Prize.154
The writers’ experiences with Mexican indigenismo also influenced their views and
carried over to their political activities. For example, Todd Downing’s view of indigenous
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languages as a strategy for resistance and revitalization informed his activism in the second half
of the twentieth century. He helped establish and run the Choctaw Bilingual Education Program
– a language revitalization initiative. The program taught its students the importance of their
own language, but also a positive self-image as indigenous people, and their kinship and
historical connections to Mesoamerica.155
In the 1920s and 1930s, new opportunities for international reach and cooperation
among Native peoples came from the Commissioner’s of Indian Affairs John Collier focus on
hemispheric approach to indigenous issues. Collier encouraged intertribal communication, and
pan-Indianism throughout the Western Hemisphere by sponsoring regional, national, and
international conferences. In his view, contacts between the indigenous peoples of North and
South America to discuss common problems were beneficial to finding solutions to them. In
1939, Collier appointed several Native leaders, including D’Arcy McNickel and Ruth Muskrat
Bronson, as delegates to a conference on North American Indians in Canada, sponsored jointly
by the University of Toronto and Yale University.156
Collier’s approach led him to seek cooperation with officials, scholars, and social
scientists in Mexico as well, eventually leading to the establishment of the Inter-American Indian
Institute. The establishing conference, The Conference on Indian Life, took place in Pátzcuaro,
Mexico, in April 1940. Representatives from nine Native American communities from the North
attended the meeting, including D’Arcy McNickle and Osage author John Joseph Mathews.
While at the conference, both authors met with prominent people in federal Indian policy in
Mexico, but they also initiated contacts with indigenous peoples. Mathews, for example, noted
in his diary about his participation in traditional dances, Posada. Such activities created an
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occasion to connect with Native peoples in Mexico and discuss indigenous issues as well as
indigenismo with them.157
The experiences with other indigenous peoples from their participation in the
conferences encouraged many of the attendees to pursue inter-tribal approach to shared
indigenous problems and cooperation in forming strategies to deal with them. Many of the USbased conference participants, including McNickle and Bronson, continued to meet and in 1944
they founded the National Congress of the American Indians (NCAI). The three major areas the
NCAI was to address were “sovereignty, civil rights, and political recognition of all Indians.”158
The new organization defined their area of activity broadly, which allowed it to appeal to
reservation as well as urban Indians, the younger as well as the older generations. The NCAI
became a “watchdog” for Native issues within the US, concentrating mostly on domestic
problems, and lobbying the Congress on legislation involving Native Americans. However, the
organization kept ties to indigenous peoples outside the United States and cooperated with
groups such as the Canadian National Indian Brotherhood, and later the World Council of
Indigenous Peoples, thus continuing the practice of hemispheric discussions of indigenous
issues.159
Collier also included the younger generations in his hemispheric approach to indigenous
issues. The commissioner initiated an exchange program between Native students from Mexico
and the United States. The program attracted support from officials in both countries and had
positive feedback from participating students. Collier hoped it would foster better contacts
between the indigenous peoples of both countries through the positive experiences and ideas
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the students would bring back to their tribes. By summer 1941, at least one group of Native
American students had visited Mexico, and the officials were trying to secure funding for
indigenous Mexican students to come to Albuquerque, New Mexico.160
Collier’s sponsored trips helped to expose the visitors to diverse attitudes toward the
United States and its non-indigenous population. Such attitudes likely resonated with the Native
participants, as they had with the Native writers, and their own experiences as internally
colonized people. A letter received by the Commissioner’s office in June 1941 offers a hint of
what such attitudes were. The writer, Emma Reh, expressed surprise about the apparent antiAmericanism that she encountered among the “mestizo class, of the middle class of Mexico.”
The overall feeling she described was one of bitterness and the belief that “when Germany won
[World War II] the American dollar would fall, and then we [Americans] would not be at as much
advantage.” Reh concluded that “Mexico for the first time now felt in a bargaining position.”161
The attitudes that Reh described are reminiscent of those found in Downing’s and Riggs’
indigenous characters: displeasure and resistance to the neo-colonialism by the United States of
Mexico via tourism.
Reh’s experience among indigenous Zapotecs presented her with a different outlook on
the dynamics of indigenous – non-indigenous relations. She described her reception by the
Zapotec families she met in warm terms and as if it was making up “for the above hurt.” Her
interaction with the Zapotecs show how language could serve as marker of separate identity for
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the Native peoples in Mexico.162 Reh described in her letter the attitudes she encountered
during her visit with two Zapotec families:
…I started to go and said I was sorry that I did not speak Spanish better. “That’s
all right,” said the father. “We Zapotecs don’t speak Spanish very well, either,
you know. We’re in the same boat. Both of us are foreigners to the Mexicans.
… Mrs. Pearson, my companion, said “Tell the old woman I am sorry I can’t
speak Spanish.” And the old grandmother laughed very happily, put her two
index fingers together, and said, “You, I, equal.” That was about all the Spanish
she knew.163
The Zapotec speakers in these interactions used their indigenous language as the dividing line
between their identity and that of the non-indigenous Mexicans, who they saw as foreigners.
Similar views echoed in Downing’s and Riggs’ writings and it is likely that they would have been
understood by the visiting Native American students as well. Such incidents would have been a
stimulating “food for thought” to people with similar colonial experiences, and provided a larger
– international - framework, in which to consider one’s position.

Appropriation of Rhetoric
Native attempts to create political and socio-economic alternatives that would preserve
Native American sovereignty or at least semi-autonomy, continued to draw criticism and
resistance in the early twentieth century as they did in the late nineteenth. Communal land
ownership was one of these often criticized aspects. In the post-war atmosphere and especially
during the Red Scare following the massive strikes of 1919, which sparked panic and fear of a
Bolshevik revolution and anarchy spreading in the United States, communal ownership of land
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and resources by specific groups of American society sounded dangerous. Defenders of Native
political autonomy and communal land ownership faced the danger of being labeled unAmerican and communist. For example, during the 1919 negotiations with the Crow nation, the
Senate’s Indian Affair Committee forced an unprecedented ultimatum on the Crow, which
required the tribe to end all communal land ownership on the reservation and parcel the land
out to tribal members in exchange for a guarantee that the Committee would not pass any
measures concerning the reservation lands.164 In its report from September 1919, the
Committee even blamed the Native population decline since the 1880s on the Crow’s
“communistic tribal system,” calling for it to be abolished as soon as possible.165 Anything
communal or resembling ‘communism’ was seen as dangerous and detrimental to progress and
the American way of life.
Some Native leaders and activists turned the rhetoric of communist danger pointed at
them around and used it to attack the Indian Office and its policies. Laura Kellogg challenged the
assumption that tribal communalism prevented economic progress by arguing that it was the
Indian Office that had created Russia-like dictatorships on reservations in the first place. In her
words, the Indian Office came to hold the same kind of power as “that [of] Russia ten years
before the war, when at the height of her despotic power, was not more depleting than the
Indian Bureau.”166 It was the Indian Office’s policies that had forced Native Americans to
idleness and prevented any change and progress by infiltrating the tribal councils with their
sympathizers and influencing their vote on Indian policies:
They pack the Councils, they out vote the Indian in policies where tribes are
supposed to have any prerogatives left. Our Lenines [sic] and Trotskys are no
164
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accidents. They have been systematically made. … There is no liberty of speech
on the reservations, and the Bureau has power to stop any propaganda among
them. When, therefore, people ask me why we have no leaders, I want to
answer by asking, ‘Why is Kerensky not leading the Russia today?167
Kellogg probably used this rhetoric to protect her proposal for the Lolomi program, which
included communal land ownership, from similar attacks. By stressing the destructive influence
of the Indian Office and its Bolshevik-like system, Kellogg showed that her proposed system of
communal ownership was not communism, rather a modern communal approach, balancing
personal freedoms with the sharing of burdens and rewards within the tribal community, and
thus did not present any danger to mainstream American society and its economic and political
system.168
John Collier’s policies also drew opposition and criticism, which used similar rhetoric. His
proposed Indian Reorganization Act policy (IRA, 1934), which claimed to have the goal of
strengthening tribal self-governance and the preservation of Native cultures and traditions, was
opposed by politicians especially from the western states, who were concerned about the
policy’s impact on land and mining interests.169 Traders, ranchers, and farmers feared
competition from future Native cooperatives that would be established on reservations under
the IRA. Missionaries and supporters of full assimilation argued that the law would reverse the
“progress” Native Americans had made toward “civilization.”170
Native American response to Reorganization also included criticism and rejection. While

167
Kellogg, “The Lolomi Program of Self-Governance,” in Martínez, ed., The American Indian
Intellectual Tradition, 172.
168
Kellogg, “The Lolomi Program of Self-Governance,” in Martínez, ed., The American Indian
Intellectual Tradition, 179 – 180.
169
Kenneth R. Philp, John Collier’s Crusade for Indian Reform, 1920 – 1954 (Tucson, AZ: The
University of Arizona Press, 1977), 141 – 143.
170
Philp, John Collier’s Crusade,” 143-5, 151, 155; David W. Daily, Battle for the BIA: G. E. E. Lindquist
and the Missionary Crusade Against John Collier (Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press, 2004), 7374, 79, 105. On detailed analyzes of the missionary – BIA relations and the threat Collier’s reforms
represented to the position of filed missionaries see chapters 3 and 4.

70

many supported the idea of self-determination, others felt that the IRA threatened their land
rights and would make forced assimilation easier to enact. While the policy represented a
departure from assimilation, it also remained paternalistic, forcing Native nations to adopt a
structure of government modeled after the US. Several tribal nations, such as the Crow and
Seneca, rejected the IRA, because they had already altered their tribal governments and
adapted them to modern necessities, thus claiming the proposed law would not benefit them.
Others opposed the BIA and its paternalistic policies in general, while some embraced
assimilationist ideals and felt uneasy about the law’s focus on tribal communal ownership.171
Native American opponents of the Indian Office and the IRA adopted the rhetoric of unAmericanism and communist threat, used by their non-Native counterparts, even though their
end goals differed.172 The leading voice among the Native opposition was the American Indian
Federation (AIF), founded in 1934 specifically to oppose the IRA and to lobby for the abolition of
the BIA. It represented individuals and tribal nations of diverse views and opinions. The
organization’s harsh critique of the BIA and its goal to abolish it attracted support from groups
as diverse as advocates of Indian treaty rights, such as Alice Lee Jemison (Seneca), and strong
assimilationists, such as Joseph Burner (Creek), the organization’s president.173 The AIF tapped
into established discourse and employed an “extremist right wing language of protest that was
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as much rhetoric and tactic as ideology.”174 Its members testified at Senate committee hearings
and conducted mailing campaigns. Their petitions charged Collier with “maladministration, misuse of public funds, sedition and communism,” atheism, and connections to the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), which the AIF considered to be radical and dangerous.175 In his letter to
Congress, protesting the proposed Senate Bill S. 2047, sponsored by the ACLU and concerning
purchases of land for Native Americans in Oklahoma, Burner claimed that the new bill was trying
to reintroduce “those Communistic sections of the Wheeler-Howard Act from which these
Indians [in Oklahoma] were excluded.” He continued:
Again we repeat that the American Civil Liberties Union is a Christ-mocking,
Communist-aiding organization and that the program which is being put into
effect among the Indians is but a part of a larger program of World-wide
revolution, the destruction of Christianity and the establishment of
Communism. Again we repeat that the issue today in American is Atheism and
Communism vs. Christianity and Americanism.176
Collier’s international connections and attempt at a hemispheric approach to Indian
issues only fueled AIF’s campaign to discredit him. In a petition circulated in 1935, Bruner
charged Collier with using public money to bring “Mexican citizens of Old Mexico to the United
States to tell us how to run OUR GOVERNMENT.”177 In Bruner’s view, using foreign experts,
such as Turkish biologist Dr. Esherf Shevky, or Mexican educator and anthropologist Dr. Moisés
Sáenz, introduced radical socialist ideas into the government and threatened Native
Americans.178 Such rhetoric of un-Americanism and communistic tendencies, combined with a
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perceived threat by foreigners, easily tapped into wide-spread mainstream US concerns about
communism and stereotypical perceptions of anything resembling communalism as communist
threat.179
In defense of his policy, Collier employed similar smear campaigns and red-baiting. The
Department personnel infiltrated the AIF and reported on its activities. Government officials
used hyperbolic rhetoric to highlight the organization’s connections to extremist right-wing hate
groups. In their efforts to secure support to defeat the IRA, some of the AIF leaders established
cooperation and financial links with American pro-Nazi groups, including the German-American
Bund, the James True Associates, or Pelly’s Silver Shirts of America. Even though an FBI
investigation into the AIF concluded that the organization was not a subversive one, rather the
issue of Native Americans was appropriated by the pro-Nazi groups and was used to their own
ends, by 1940 their existing links and the support AIF members received from these groups were
enough to publicly discredit the organization.180 With the beginning of World War II and
especially after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the organization’s links to American proNazi groups, exploited by Collier in his campaign, undermined its legitimacy and its membership
diminished.181
Native American socio-economic traditions continued to be seen by mainstream U.S.
society as un-American. In their attempts to protect their rights and ensure the survival of their
communities, Native activists such as Laura Kellogg and the members of AIF appropriated the
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rhetoric of their opponents and used it to support their own positions and arguments. Kellogg’s
criticism of the Indian Office as a Russian-like dictatorship was probably designed to deflect
possible attacks on her Lolomi plan, which included communal land ownership. The AIF’s
campaign against Collier and the IRA painted them as un-American and therefore undesirable
and dangerous to Native America, stressing the need for the abolition of the Indian Office. They
also used support from various political organizations without adopting those organizations’
views and goals. In turn, those groups appropriated Native issues for their own agendas, a
pattern that was repeated during the Cold War in the international arena.

Conclusion
From European contact through the colonial and republic eras into the twentieth
century, Native Americans engaged in transnational diplomacy and with Euro-American political
philosophies and concepts. They examined them and, when necessary or advantageous, they
used those concepts, such as nationhood or self-determination as frameworks to formulate
their own political positions and demands. They communicated those demands in an
established rhetoric to reach white audiences. With increasing threats to their ability to survive
as peoples, Native leaders and activists sometimes adopted aspects of Anglo-American political
mechanisms. Reform of tribal governments, such as those of the Seneca or the Cherokee in the
nineteenth century or the Crow in the early twentieth, while following the model of the United
States in general, reserved space for Native political traditions as well. As sovereign political
entities, Native Americans also looked outside the borders of the US to other states and other
Native peoples for political support or inspiration. Recognizing their similar historical
experiences with colonization and subjugation, they draw parallels, offered support, and
formulated political strategies for the survival of their own communities. The establishment of
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the League of Nations at the end of the First World War and new, though limited, opportunities
to meet Native peoples outside the United States in the 1920s and 1930s, helped expand Native
transnational activism and the frameworks for their demands and reform proposals. Such
connections to Native peoples outside of the United States laid the first foundations for a future
formulation of a pan-indigenous identity. By the time the Cold War started, Native Americans
could draw on a long tradition of transnational activism and political discourse to meet their
new challenges.
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A Handy Tool or a Limited Sideshow: The Native American Rights Struggle and the Media
“Mr. President, I’ve heard that a group of American Indians have come here because
they couldn’t meet you in the United States of America. If you fail to meet them here,
will you be able to improve - to correct it and meet them back in the United States?”
A Moscow State University student to President Ronald Reagan, 1988.1
“Thus it was that Indians were forced to adopt the vocabulary and techniques of the
blacks in order to get their grievances seriously considered by the media.”
Vine Deloria, Jr.2

The question posed by the Moscow University student to President Reagan during his
1988 visit in the city points to an existing awareness of Native American issues among people in
the Soviet Union and, by extension in the Eastern Bloc, by the late 1980s. Popular culture with
its romanticized portrayal of Native Americans had likely made people aware of the historical
existence of American Indians within the American past.3 Media coverage of Native protests
helped engender awareness of contemporary Indian peoples and their issues. Sporadic at first,
press coverage of Native Americans in the Eastern Bloc increased in the 1970s with the advent
of the Red Power Movement, a more radical phase of Native activism that utilized direct action
protests.
Within the context of the Cold War’s ideological propaganda battle between the United
States and the Soviet Union, media coverage of American racism and discrimination threatened
the international image of the United States, which posed as a champion of freedom and
democracy. Maintaining this image was an important part of the US competition with the USSR
for allies in developing countries, especially the newly independent nations of Africa and Asia.
Native Americans recognized the potential of international and domestic media coverage of
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their issues as a tool to educate a broader public about their problems, raise support, and
increase pressure on American politicians.
However, as the second quote by Native activist and intellectual Vine Deloria, Jr.,
indicates, attracting the media’s attention to Native issues had its challenges. Native Americans
faced a competition from the Civil Rights Movement in both the domestic and the international
press. Before a direct action protests by Native Americans, African-American sit-ins and marches
had dominated the Eastern Bloc news. Newspaper articles on Native Americans were few and
far between, and often discussed general human rights violations without distinguishing Native
American demands for treaty rights and sovereignty (separation) from African American
demands for equality in individual civil rights and desegregation (inclusion). This lack of
distinction came from limited knowledge on the part of journalists, but also from the fact that
Eastern Bloc newspapers used Native Americans as a tool in their general anti-US propaganda.
Although the coverage could be useful to Native Americans, it did not always translate into
official political support. This created a space in which American politicians could improve the
country’s international image by enacting general civil rights reforms, while ignoring Native
sovereignty.
To counter the limitations of the domestic and international mainstream media and to
exert more control over the message, Native Americans also deployed their own radio
broadcasts and newspapers. Native media, representing Indian voices, aimed to inform Native
peoples of current events affecting Indian Country and to educate the non-Native public. With
the potential of raising awareness of Native issues and gathering support from a non-Native
readership at home as well as abroad, Native media served as another tool of political pressure.
This chapter examines the media’s potential and it limitations in the struggle for Native
rights as a tool to raise awareness, influence public opinion, and pressure US policy-makers to
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uphold Native treaty rights. To illustrate the challenges and limitations of Eastern Bloc media as
a tool for Native Americans, I use periodicals printed in former Czechoslovakia between 1953
and 1989. I exclude articles published in the Slovak language media due to research time
restrictions. Some of the main Czech language newspapers and magazines also circulated in
Slovakia, and Slovak articles covering the takeover of Wounded Knee in 1973 show a similar
approach and presentation of the events as do Czech articles, suggesting similarities in the
coverage.4 Among the periodicals published in the Czech language are also included two
international magazines. Новое время / Nová doba [New Times] was a Soviet magazine
translated and published throughout the Eastern Block. It also had an English edition available in
the United Kingdom and the United States. Otázky míru a socialismu: teoretický a informační
magazine komunistických a dělnických stran [Problems of Peace and Socialism: Theoretical and
Informational Magazine of Communist and Worker’s Parties] was a periodical with an
international editorial staff representing Communist Parties from about sixty five countries,
including those from Western Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa.
These sources offer a sample of the Eastern Bloc media treatment of Native issues
however, further comparative study is needed to fully understand the connections and trends in
Eastern Bloc media treatment of Native issues and their use of Native Americans in their larger
anti-US propaganda as well as the differences in the treatment of the same topics in the US and
Western European media. For example, in his book on the Cold War alliances between
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Germanic Central European and American Indian activists, György Tóth utilizes Aribert
Shroeder’s survey of West German coverage of Native Americans from the 1960s to 1980s to
examine the attitudes toward Native issues in a country politically allied with the United States.
He points out the attempt at objectivity through reliance on a mixture of US reportage,
international press services, and West German correspondents stationed in New York,
Washington, D. C., and San Francisco. However, despite this attempt at objectiveness, West
German writers only partially filtered out biases coming out of US coverage, not to mention
their own entrenched stereotypes.5 Further, exceptions to the general tone of Eastern Bloc
reporting on Native issues existed. As Tóth points out, an article printed in the Hungarian
Communist Party’s Youth Magazine predicted a failure of the Wounded Knee occupation and,
while expressing solidarity with American Indians, suggested that the activists “return to their
place once again on the pages of juvenile literature and the displays of museums – and in the
minds of children who still believe in humanity.”6
Native American media might not have reached the same circulation as main-stream
domestic and international media did and thus their impact would have been limited.
Newspaper articles printed in one small communist country alone would not have had much of
a direct influence on US policy-makers. Taken separately, these would have been only limited
sideshows in the struggle for Native rights. But combined with US domestic media, coverage
from other Eastern Bloc countries and the Soviet Union, all influencing public opinion, and the
desire of the United States to protect its international image, they helped to increase awareness
of Native issues and put a pressure on US politicians.
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The Utility of Discrepancy: US International Image, the Reality of American Race Relations, and
the Media
As the United States emerged from World War II as the nominal leader of the free world
and an ostensible guarantor of democracy and equality, opposed to the totalitarian Soviet
Union, its domestic race relations became an international issue.7 In the emerging ideological
competition with the USSR, the United States based its position on the belief that the "liberal,
democratic, capitalist order ... represented a more open and humane society than that of
Communist states."8 However, the country’s continuing racial discrimination, violence, and
segregation contradicted the United States' self-representation in the global arena. The
contradiction between the United States’ proclaimed values of democracy and freedom and its
de facto racial and political discrimination was not lost on foreign visitors and journalists.
Dignitaries from other countries observed and sometimes experienced segregation and
discrimination first hand.9 Journalists from socialist countries regularly scrutinized the reality of
American life to point out the hypocrisy of the American government. Articles dealing with some
such aspect of American society or politics appeared more or less daily in Czech media during
the Cold War. The topics featured in Czech periodicals ranged from domestic political events,
such as elections and major policies, to the economy and economic inequality, poverty, and
political repression during times such as the Second Red Scare, the protests against the war in
Vietnam in the 1960s, racial violence and discrimination, as well as the US unwillingness to ratify
the United Nations Genocide Convention. Czech journalists explained the latter as the result of
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the violent nature of American race relations.10 The discrepancy between the presented image
of the United States and the country’s social reality became ready-made propaganda for the
Soviet Union, and a possible tool for American domestic ethnic minorities to pressure US policymakers.
The extent, scope and focus of the Eastern Bloc media coverage of American society and
politics changed throughout the Cold War, reflecting the latest news and socio-political
developments, but its overall message remained the same – to warn other nations about the
hypocrisy of the US by pointing out the contradictions between its rhetoric and reality of life. As
the Soviet newspaper Izvestia stated, it was its responsibility to report the "tale of the American
racists, who abuse human dignity and stoop to the level of animals," because it was "impossible
to remain silent when these gentlemen attempt to act as the worlds mentors."11 Such negative
reporting was threatening to US efforts to win political allies among newly independent nations
emerging from decolonization in Africa and Asia. Countries in which national liberation
movements strove for racial equality tried to discern where the United States stood on these
issues. They paid close attention to the American government’s policies and responses to the
growing demands for desegregation and equal rights by ethnic minorities. American civil rights
became a symbol of discrimination and the search for justice, visible on the international
scene.12
In 1957, a case in Alabama, Jimmy Wilson v. State of Alabama, generated world-wide
outrage and media reports. Wilson, an African-American handyman, was sentenced by an allwhite jury to death for allegedly stealing $1.95 from his employer, an elderly white woman. The
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international response, critical of the jury’s ruling, and the international pressure it generated
on the US eventually saved Wilson’s life.13 Discrimination and racial violence in the US
continually appeared in Eastern Bloc newspapers. Czech journalists reported on events such as
desegregation of schools and the violence against black students in Little Rock, Arkansas, or the
attacks on the Freedom Riders in the early 1960s. The PBS documentary “Freedom Riders”
features a clip from Československý týdennik [Czechoslovakian Weekly] commenting on the level
of violence that met the Freedom Riders in southern states.14
Reports like these cast doubts and suspicions over the sincerity of the US’s commitment
to its values of democracy, freedom, and equality. American politicians recognized the risks that
continued discrimination against ethnic minorities posed to U.S. international relations, already
in 1947. That year, the President’s Committee on Civil Rights reported:
The subject of human rights, itself, has been made a major concern of the
United Nations … domestic civil rights shortcomings are a serious obstacle [to
winning the hearts and minds around the world for the US] … Those with
competing philosophies have stressed and are shamelessly distorting our
shortcomings. They have not only tried to create hostility toward us among
specific nations, races and religious groups. They have tried to prove our
democracy an empty fraud, and our nation a consistent oppressor of
underprivileged people.15

Aware of the negative impact, officials within the Eisenhower administration, such as Secretary
of State Dean Acheson and Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman, called for improvements in
minority rights in order to counter Eastern Bloc propaganda.16 Eleanor Roosevelt in her essay
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“To Arms, Indians! The Congressmen Are Coming!” highlighted the shift of this formerly
domestic issue to a concern of international importance and its impact on U.S. politics:
In recent month the Russians have been particularly watching our attitude
toward native Indians of our country. So the question of what we do about our
Indians, important as it used to be for the sake of justice, is enhanced in
importance now because it is part of the fight which we and other democracies
must wage, day in and day out, in perfecting our governmental household so
that it will not be vulnerable to attack by the Communists.”17
Ten years after the President’s Commission on Civil Rights report, US Ambassador to the United
Nations (UN), Henry Cabot Lodge, reflected on the impact that the news about the Little Rock
riots had on US foreign relations: “More than two-thirds of the world is non-white and the
reactions of the representatives of these people is easy to see. I suspect that we lost several
votes on the Chinese communist item because of Little Rock.”18
Reinforcing the notion of the US government’s hypocrisy, international reportage on the
Civil Rights Movement claimed that violence directed against African American activists was
committed with the full knowledge of the government.19 When Jimmy Carter assumed the
presidency in 1977 and launched his Human Rights Campaign, journalists criticized him for
pointing a finger at Eastern Bloc countries for their "supposed" violations of human rights while
turning a blind eye to the existence of political prisoners, racial discrimination, violence, or the
continued genocide of Native Americans through forced sterilization of Native women in his
own country.20

Serving Their Country, 158, 162; Daniel M. Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America: The Struggle for
Sovereignty (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 21 – 22.
17
Eleanor Roosevelt, “To Arms, Indians! The Congressmen Are Coming!” quoted in Rosier, Serving
Their Country, 109, 135 - 136.
18
Lodge to Eisenhower, September 25, 1957, quoted in Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 131. For the
international effects of the violence against the Freedom Riders see chapter 5 of her book.
19
Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 118 - 119.
20
Gus Hall and Henry Winston, “Look Homeward, Jimmy Carter,” translation published in Rudé právo
[Red Right], August 5, 1978, p. 6; Dušan Rovenský, “Lidská práva po Americku: Svědectví conference v
New Orleansu, Rudé právo, 17. srpen, 1978, 7 [“Human Rights According to America: Testimony from a
Conference in New Orleans,” Red Law, August 17, 1978, 7]; Vincent Duval, “Podívej se na sebe,

83

The international interest in American race relations and their possible negative impact
on US foreign relations created a powerful tool for minority leaders and activists. Native
Americans quickly understood that by positioning the question of their treaty rights and selfdetermination within an international context and the ideological battle between the East and
West, they would effectively make their issues more central to winning the Cold War and
thereby increase their chances to achieve reforms. Accordingly, Native leaders and activists
argued that a just treatment of American Indians would show the world how serious the United
States was about honor and justice.21 William Rogers, Jr., and Helen Peterson, members of the
National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), pointed out that justice for Native Americans was
important not only to "answer every charge thrown at us by communistic, totalitarian Russia,"
but also to win "the confidence of emerging native peoples and other nations all over the
world."22 Because if people in developing nations looked closely at the lives of Native
Americans, how could they take American offers of helping them improve their lives seriously?23

In the 1950s, the federal government launched the new Indian policy of Termination, a
return to the old goal of assimilation of American Indians into the mainstream society, which
threatened the sovereignty of Native Americans and their survival as peoples. Native activists
utilized the existing Cold War rhetoric and the domestic press to combat the new policy. The
goal of Termination was to terminate the federal trust status of Native nations and to end the
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government's responsibilities to them. With the special political status of Indian tribes gone, the
government planned to transfer its responsibilities and jurisdiction over reservations to state
and local governments and to distribute tribal assets to tribes or their individual members,
effectively dismantling the reservation system.24 To contend the policy, Native leaders and
activists framed their opposition within the space of the ongoing ideological competition
between the US and the USSR. They tapped into the existing Cold War rhetoric and pointed out
the dictatorial nature of the policy, which was in stark contrast to the ideals of democracy and
freedom, supposedly upheld by the United States. To prevent the application of the policy,
activists stressed its undemocratic nature, by likening the federal government and the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) to a communist dictatorship, even suggesting that the BIA was worse: “Stalin
could learn a lot about how to run a dictatorship just by watching the Indian Bureau."25
Native leaders and activists understood the importance of public opinion in political
battles and the need for their issues to be heard and understood by the larger public. In 1954,
the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) called an emergency conference to address
the threat of the new policy. The organization hired a professional public relations specialist to
ensure a wide distribution of information about the policy, its impact on Indian tribes, and the
conference itself. In the following media campaign, over four thousand newspapers, radio, and
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TV stations reported on the event and the issues. Even the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) covered the event. The NCAI also showed its appreciation of the journalists’ work in 1958,
when they nominated Robert McCormick, an NBC reporter, for a Peabody Award for his
documentary "The American Stranger," which examined the conditions on several reservations
and the impact of the federal termination policy.26
Educating the public and raising awareness through media coverage remained an
important part of Native activism throughout the second half of the twentieth century. The
presence of journalists proved essential during the early 1960s fishing rights protests in the
Pacific Northwest, where the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC), with the help of popular
actor Marlon Brando, brought media attention to this local issue, transforming it into a national
one.27 Brando’s involvement set up a precedent for celebrities to bring publicity to Native
American protests. During the occupation of Alcatraz, 1969 - 1971, celebrities such as Jane
Fonda visited the island, attracting most of the press’ attention.28 Such publicity also helped
influence the government’s actions regarding the protests. As historian Sherry Smith points out,
the Nixon’s administration collected news articles and editorials on the event and understood
that given the domestic political climate they had to move with caution and care. In summer
1970, a special assistant to President Nixon Leonard Garment cautioned restrain: “…we do not
want a Kent State on Alcatraz.” It was not until June 1971, when the number of the occupiers on
the island declined as did public support for the takeover that the government moved to
forcefully remove the remaining activists.29
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Getting Canada’s mainstream media to report on Native issues was not any easier than
that of the United States. While activists in Canada did not have to compete with the Civil Rights
Movement for media spots, as did their counterparts in the United States, First Nations often
faced a complete freeze-out by the press. As historian Peter McFarlane points out, when an
issue arose in Indian Affairs, reporters would seek information from white politicians and
bureaucrats and their white opposition, rather than asking Native leaders their opinions. Native
leaders and activists had to work to get the attention of the press.30 Once they did however, the
media proved to be a useful tool. George Manuel, a Shuswap activists and co-founder of the
National Indian Brotherhood (NIB) and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP), used
the domestic and international press to pressure unresponsive DIA officials and challenge
government policies on a regular basis.31 One example of the successful use of the media comes
from the mid-1960s. The residents of Cowichan on Vancouver Island, unable to get the DIA to
honor its housing obligations, invited the press to tour the community and witness the living
conditions there. The story spread throughout Canada and “shocked the whole country.”
Because of this publicity, the DIA minister visited the reservation himself and the Department
launched a major housing program in the community in response to the national exposure of
the conditions on the reservation.32 Through media, Native Americans were able to influence
public opinion and gather support for their causes.
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International Media and Native Voices
Publicity and increased domestic visibility through mainstream media was crucial for the
Native rights struggle. John Tally, a member of Oregon AIM chapter, expressed clearly the need
for media attention to Native issues, during a 1974 American Indian Movement (AIM)
conference:
We have all seen the new blackout about Indian protests — one of the things
we have to strengthen is our media output. We need better communications.
This is a large country with many people. We have to be heard and seen on TV,
radio, newspapers and magazines. Some people in this country are not even
aware of our struggles…33
Domestic publicity was important, but given the geopolitical relations and competitions of the
Cold War, international coverage of Native issues would allow for Native activists to be visible
on a larger scale and create outside pressure on US politicians to address Native grievances.
Foreign journalists, especially those from the Eastern Bloc, used stories of mistreatment and
discrimination of Native Americans in their anti-US propaganda. As already discussed, such
negative reports on US race relations influenced the US image on the international stage.
However, the international press coverage of US race relations had its limitations as a
political tool for Native Americans. While criticism coming from the eastern side of the Iron
Curtain provided leverage for ethnic minority leaders and activists by threatening America’s
international image and foreign relations, these reports were dominated by the Civil Rights
Movement. As historian Mary Dudziak pointed out, the dominance of this white/black paradigm
in the debate obscured other minorities and their problems.34 This was especially true for
Native Americans, who were fighting for collective treaty rights and tribal sovereignty, not just

33

“11 June 1974 Meeting of International Workgroup on Treaties,” 2, Roger A. Finzel American
Indian Movement Papers (hereafter as Finzel AIM Papers), Box 2, Folder 21, Center for Southwest
Research, University Libraries, University of New Mexico.
34
Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 14.

88

for individual civil rights. International criticism of the United States, focused on African
Americans, offered American politicians an escape route. A general civil rights reform would
have appeased their critics, but would also allow the government to sweep Native treaty rights
and sovereignty "under the rug" and continue with their assimilationist Termination policy.
Further, the rhetoric used to justify the Termination policy often referred to the goal of ending
segregation and discrimination. As long as media coverage concentrated on the integration of
African Americans and other ethnic minorities, the question of Native American sovereignty
could be ignored and assimilation enforced.
The conflation of Native problems with African-American issues probably came from the
broader goals of the anti-US propaganda, which sought to stress racial discrimination and the
failures of the capitalist system rather than the details and specifics of each group. It also came
from the journalists’ lack of deeper knowledge about Native Americans. There has been a longstanding fascination with Native Americans in Europe, but that did not guarantee full
knowledge. Most of the existing awareness came from romanticized nineteenth-century
European and Anglo-American cultural productions and forms, such as the novels of James
Fenimore Cooper or the German writer Karl May, and the European visits of Buffalo Bill’s Wild
West Show at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century.35 These represented the
historical, romanticized and essentialized American Indian, not the twentieth-century Native
sovereignty activists and tribal leaders.
To ensure the effectiveness of foreign media as a tool for Native issues, Native
Americans had to clearly separate their problems and goals from those of African Americans, as
they had to with the US domestic press. In order to do so, they had to capture the attention of
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foreign journalists.36 Quiet work within the political system, such as lobbying and testifying in
congressional hearings, rarely attracted the media. Massive public protests, such as marches
and takeovers of landmarks, provided exciting stories for readers, and functioned like a magnet
for journalists. Articles about Native Americans printed in Czech newspapers and magazines
during the early Cold War show the potential and limitations of the international media
coverage of Native issues. It was not until the onset of the militant phase of Native activism, the
Red Power Movement of the late 1960s and 1970s, that international media coverage of Native
topics increased and became an almost regular occurrence.37

The 1950s
The sporadic appearance of articles featuring Native issues during the 1950s restricted
the discussion to only a few general themes of racial and political discrimination and poverty.
Among the plethora of articles dealing with the American domestic situation printed in Czech
periodicals during the decade and averaging around 130 per year, the indexes list only eight
articles dealing either directly or indirectly with American Indians.38 Only about four of these
reported specifically on Native Americans, while the rest discussed more general questions of
racial discrimination in the country, using American Indians only as an example of the problem.
While media coverage needs to be neither nuanced nor completely accurate to serve as political
propaganda or to generate political pressure for change, too much simplification or a lack of
understanding of the situation could potentially impose limits on the effectiveness of the media
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pressure on American politicians to deal with specific grievances, in this case Native demands
for treaty rights and sovereignty. The low number of articles dealing with Native Americans also
points to the inability of Native Americans to influence the story in any way.
The articles regarding Native Americans mostly appeared in combination with reports
on African Americans, commenting on the problems of racial discrimination and violence. Such
writing cast Native Americans as one of the several minority groups facing racism, perhaps with
a different history, but ultimately striving for the same goal – equal civil rights. In 1958, the daily
Rudé právo [Red Right] reported on the activities of the North Carolina Ku Klux Klan, which
targeted local Lumbee residents in Robeson County. While the initial focus of the article was on
Native Americans and the Klan's terror against them, the author concluded the article with a
discussion of renewed violence against African American students in Little Rock, Arkansas. The
article thus conflated the two groups, creating an impression that stricter laws against racial
violence and a change in social attitude would solve the problems of both groups.39
The articles generally simply listed Native Americans alongside other minority groups to
serve the goal of anti-US propaganda by illuminating larger issues of American political hypocrisy
and racism. In 1954, an article in the Soviet magazine Nová doba [New Times] used the history
and contemporary situation of American Indians to criticize the United States' refusal to ratify
the United Nations’ Genocide Convention. The author, in a short paragraph, described the
deplorable conditions on reservations as a result of the politics of genocide practiced by the
United States, which, in his view, sentenced Native people to eventually die out. After this brief
paragraph, the article moved on to other examples, such as the resistance of the South to the
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education.40 Articles such as these served as a way
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to embarrass the United States internationally and to generate outrage about the American
government’s hypocrisy and its practices toward ethnic groups. But they were limited in their
impact as a tool for Native Americans to publicize their demands to uphold treaty rights and
tribal self-determination.
Even reportage-type articles written specifically about Native Americans and their issues
failed to make distinctions between the status of tribal nations and African Americans and their
demands. These articles usually offered fuller accounts of the history of Native – white relations
and colonization, and discussed in more detail contemporary conditions on reservations, citing
statistics for infant mortality, diseases, average income, unemployment, and the loss of land
over time. These details, however, usually served to illustrate the more general themes of
capitalist greed and racism.
A chance meeting of a group of “poor-looking people,” local Indians, walking along the
road under the supervision of two policemen in Tennessee, prompted Soviet journalist D.
Kraminov to find out more about their situation. His article details a case of land dispossession
by a local mining company and even briefly alludes to the Termination policy, but it does not
provide any concrete information about the policy or Native resistance to it. Despite the specific
details of the case, the article’s focus is on criticizing racism stemming from the notion of
American exceptionalism: “In the view of many [white] Americans, Indians, Mexicans, Puerto
Ricans, Jews, Slavs, and many other non-US born Americans are second-class people." To stress
his point, Kraminov presented other examples of American racial discrimination, including the
1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (McCarran-Walter Act), and pointedly paralleled American
exceptionalism with Hitler's racial theories, suggesting that there was not that much of a
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difference between the two.41 Rather than using the specific Tennessee example to provide
deeper analysis of the status of tribal nations and the problems they were facing, the article
positioned Native Americans within the broader issue of racism, alongside other minorities.
While Kraminov’s writing might have generated sympathy and an emotional response, it only
served the goal of general anti-US propaganda.
The lack of deeper analysis of Native identities and rights could have come from a
general lack of knowledge on Kraminov’s part, but also from the communist - Marxist
perspective which categorized society in classes rather than along ethnic - racial lines. While
Marxism – Leninism allowed for a token ethnic self-determination in theory, in reality any
expression of cultural or ethnic nationalism was discouraged.42 Further, bringing up nationalistic
aspirations of ethnic groups in the United States in a Soviet periodical, could have potentially
stirred nationalistic sentiments within the USSR and Eastern Bloc countries, which would not
have been welcome by their communist dictatorships.43
Some awareness of the special political status of Native Americans vis-à-vis the United
States did exist among Eastern Bloc journalists in the 1950s, although their understanding of it
seems to have been limited. In his report on a visit to the Tuscarora of New York state in 1959,
Přemysl Tvaroh discussed the threat of Native land loss and the removal of the tribe due to a
proposed Niagara power station project, which required the flooding of over 500 acres of
Tuscarora land. He briefly mentioned a treaty with the federal government, which was supposed
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to guarantee land to the tribe. Although Tvaroh alluded to the treaty, he did not elaborate on its
meaning for Native political status within the United States. Yet the author reported the
Tuscarora view of themselves as a nation. Tvaroh quoted the Tuscarora chief "Black Cloud"
(Chief Elton Green) as saying: “It is good. ... Both our nations have their own languages,” but he
did not elaborate on either the significance of the chief's identification of his people as a nation
or the legal meaning of the treaty for the tribal political status.44 While the article indirectly
suggests that the position of Native Americans might be somewhat different than that of other
US ethnic minorities, it does not provide enough information for the reader to fully understand
the differences between American Indians and African Americans, or the current problems
posed by the federal Termination policy. It leaves the general impression that Native Americans
might be looking for equality and a right to survive as culturally distinct peoples, but not
necessarily as political entities.45
The suggestion that Native Americans were not just one of many US minorities
demanding equality and civil rights appeared in only one article. Like the others, this article’s
aim was to criticize capitalist greed and American racism. To do so, author Abe Čapek offered
the usual historical overview and statistics on the contemporary situation, but also pointed out
the perpetuation of racial stereotypes of Native Americans by Hollywood and "bourgeois
writers," who portrayed Indians as traitors, barbarians, and people who were dying out. In
contrast to the bourgeois racist society, the author praised American communists who stood up
for Indians and emphasized that “it is necessary to end their [Native American] discrimination

44

Přemysl Tvaroh, “U náčelníka Tuscarorů," Rudé právo, 14. Červen, 1959, 4 [Přemysl Tvaroh,
“Visiting the Tuscarora Cheif,” Red Rights, June 14, 1959, 4]; Laurence M. Hauptman, The Iroquois
Struggle for Survival: World War II to Red Power (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 151.
45
Second article by Tvaroh, describing his visit to Native communities in the Southwest explicitly
states that Native Americans wanted to become “full-fledged” citizens, while keeping their specific
(cultural) identity. Přemysl Tvaroh, “Na západě USA, II: Mezi Indiány,” Rudé právo, 28. červen 1959, 4 ["In
the West of the USA, part 2: Among Indians," Red Right, June 28, 1959, 4].

94

and that in the future democratic America they [Native Americans] will have the right to selfdetermination."46 By mentioning self-determination, Čapek suggested that Native Americans
were not just one of many minorities, but might have a different political status from African
Americans or Mexican Americans. However, he did not elaborate.
Silence about Native activism in the 1950s’ articles further shows the limits of Eastern
Bloc reporting and reporting in general. The few articles that talked about Indians taking a stand
were mostly tied to public protests or visible opposition to violence, but did not mention
political organizing. The article about racial violence perpetrated by the KKK against Native
communities in North Carolina mentioned the resolve of the local Native residents to resist the
Klan’s attacks. In his discussion of the planned Tuscarora reservoir on Niagara, Přemysl Tvaroh
briefly mentioned the Tuscarora resistance, led by "Mad Bear" (Wallace "Mad Bear" Anderson)
against the company's surveyors.47 Only one article about non-confrontational activism
appeared in Nová doba [New Times] in 1959. Yet, even in this case the piece reported on an
event, a conference of Native Americans, which took place at a Seminole reservation in Florida.
According to the article, the delegates discussed the need for cooperation among the Indian
nations of the Americas in their fight for social and economic rights and against the policy of
assimilation practiced in the USA and Canada.48
Several factors may have influenced the nature of the reportage about Native
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Americans. Native activism in the 1950s did not employ direct action protests and thus did not
draw much attention from the media. Limited contact between American Indians and foreign
journalists prevented Native leaders and activists from influencing the scope and content of the
coverage, as well as the opportunity to educate the journalists about the political status and
demands of Native peoples. Even the visits to Native communities that reporters like Přemysl
Tvaroh made for their articles, which could have shed more light on the issues at hand, were
few and far between. It is also possible that the authors themselves deemed fuller analysis
unnecessary for the purpose of their writing goal, anti-US propaganda.
Sources suggest a degree of autonomy and control over the final product on the part of
the journalists. In the early 1960s, Tvaroh’s articles were published as a book. While there is no
specific information on the rules under which he worked, a comment about the journalist’s trip
through the United States suggests time and money may have been the deciding factors
influencing the nature of his reportage-type articles.49 Zdeňek Porybný, a Czech correspondent
stationed in the US in the 1980s, confirmed the relative freedom of topic choice for his stories.
The news agency influenced these articles mostly in terms of travel approvals. While, according
to Porybný, news topics of a political nature came out of the situation and developments in the
host country or were a direct assignment from the news agency, the selection of topics for
reportages was up to the individual journalist. Porybný also stated that the news agency did not
interfere with the final product either; what was printed were his own words as he wrote
them.50
Regardless of the reasons, the limited discussion of Native activism did not allow for a
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more complex analysis of Native demands and the underlining question of sovereignty. Even the
articles that delved deeper into the situation of indigenous peoples in the USA did not report on
activities such as litigations in courts and lobbying in Congress, done by organizations like the
NCAI, in their attempts to avert the Termination policy. Without this fuller discussion, Eastern
Bloc readers were predominantly left with impressions of general violations of human rights,
racial discrimination, and Native Americans as helpless victims. Such criticism could have been
easily appeased by general human rights and civil rights reform in the United States, which
would allow for the continuation of the Termination policy.

The 1960s
With the emergence of the Red Power and its more radical use of direct action protests
during the 1960s, the visibility of Native issues started to slowly increase, domestically as well as
internationally. However, they continued to be overshadowed by other topics. The domination
of the Civil Rights Movement in media coverage became even more prominent during this
decade. The periodicals indexes list only about five articles on Native Americans, while articles
discussing racism toward African Americans amount to over 300.51 The increased use of civil
disobedience and public protests by the Civil Rights Movement, as well as the violent backlash it
generated, caught the attention of the international media. News about sit-ins, the Freedom
Rides, and marches, as well as violent attacks and assassinations, kept the number of articles in
the double digits annually throughout the 1960s. The 1963 bombing in Birmingham, Alabama
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brought the number of articles about American racism and African Americans to a hundred just
that year.52 With such attention to the Civil Rights Movement, the occasional article discussing
Native Americans was easily lost in the coverage, putting the focus firmly on individual human
and civil rights rather than tribal sovereignty and nationhood.53
An article from 1961 demonstrates the focus on African Americans, even though the
title “Indiánům a psům vstup zakázán” [”No Entry for Indians and Dogs”] suggests a report on
Native Americans. The article presents the findings of the Committee for Civil Rights, citing
general racism in American society, with two examples of discrimination against African
Americans and one about discrimination against Native Americans.54 As in the previous decade,
the focus of the news firmly on individual civil rights and African Americans, U.S. politicians
could appease their critics by enacting general civil rights reform, while ignoring indigenous
collective rights and sovereignty.
The tone and scope of the articles remained mostly the same in the 1960s as in the
previous decade. Most of them presented Native Americans as victims of capitalist greed and
racial discrimination. The authors continued to offer their readers short historical overviews and
a description of contemporary conditions on reservations, describing in some details poverty,
unemployment, the lack of economic opportunities, education and health as examples of more
general problems in American society. Even though most of the 1960s articles were reports
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talking about specific tribal nations, the messages generally sounded the same - racial
discrimination and segregation in “concentration camps” (the reservations), overall
backwardness (caused by colonization and white America), and a disregard for basic human
rights.55 In general, authors continued to depict the overall prospects of Native Americans as
rather grim, one even perpetuating the view of Indians as groups that were "dying out."56
While news coverage continued to be drawn to dramatic events and confrontations,
news about peaceful political activism of Native Americans made it to the coverage at least
twice. Two articles mentioned the NCAI and its political work, but the organization was not
named fully. Though the authors commented on the organization’s relations with high political
figures, they did not take the opportunity to explore fully the issues that the Congress worked
on or its goals. Like in the 1950s, the limited space that the authors allowed for such news led to
a simplification of the issues and the perpetuation of the notion that civil rights reforms and
economic aid programs would solve the problems of all minorities, Native Americans included.
Native political activism, when mentioned in the early 1960s, also served as an example
to support general criticism of the United States. In a Nová doba [New Times] article, the author
quoted a speech by Attorney General Robert Kennedy at the annual meeting of the NCAI in
1963, in which he acknowledged the discrimination that Native Americans had been
experiencing. The author pointed out that when government officials and right-wing
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newspapers talked about the Indians’ situation, it meant that it had to be truly awful.57 But the
author did not pursue the opportunity to show the work that Native Americans were doing in
order to improve their situation, concentrating instead on the white politicians.
Even an article specifically discussing a meeting between President Johnson and Native
Americans did not elaborate on the possible implications of such events for Native American
political status. The theme of the article, as of the meeting, was economic aid to Native
Americans and their inclusion in Johnson's War on Poverty. The author perpetuated the view of
Native Americans as helpless victims seeking general civil rights and economic opportunities,
rather than as nations working toward their sovereignty. Furthermore, the author diminished
the work of the Native activists by stating that while the "Indian Congress" now demanded
reforms and the creation of economic opportunities for Indians, these were all things already
suggested by President Kennedy.58 The impression the reader gets from such depiction is that
Native Americans, while actively trying to improve their situation, were only following in the
footsteps of white politicians. Such limited description and simplification hints at the writers’
lack of deeper knowledge of Native activism, which restricted the potential for a more complex
discussion about the issues at hand. The focus on economic problems and their possible
solutions excluded the issues of Native sovereignty and treaty rights from the discussion as well.
This is perhaps not surprising, given the general communist belief that economic inequalities
were the root of all of society’s problems. Again, as in the early Cold War, such narrow reporting
left the readers with the impression that general civil rights reform, economic help, and the
combating of racism would solve these Native problems.
With the emergence of the Red Power Movement and its adoption of a more radical
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direct action protest, the Eastern Bloc media coverage of Native Americans slowly started to
change. As early as in 1962, Emil Šíp referred to a "new movement among the young generation,
visibly influenced by de-colonization fight" and aiming at "self-determination and unification of
all Indians, based on common culture, so-called pan-Indianism." However, he did not elaborate
on the goal of self-determination, its historical background, or its feasibility with the current
political situation in the United States. Šíp only expressed his belief that this movement "might
play a significant role one day."59 His prediction proved correct. Two years after his article was
published, the so-called "fish-ins" in the Pacific Northwest commenced. They were direct action
protests by local Native fishermen, joined by the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC) and later
by the Survival of American Indian Association (SAIA), and inspired by the tactics of the Civil
Rights Movement.60
By the end of the decade, the Red Power Movement grew and radicalized and started to
attract more attention from the media. With this attention came closer contact between Indian
activists and journalists, and opportunities to educate the media about the complexities of
Native issues. The takeover of Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay in 1969 quickly attracted the
international press. Within days, the story of Indians capturing the "most famous island in
America" and "demanding that the government give them title to it" was covered around the
world.61 Reporting in Czech newspapers about these events remained limited though. Shortly
after the beginning of the occupation, an article reported on the blockade of the island and
briefly explained the demands of the occupiers.62 In 1971, the newspaper Svět práce [World of
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Work] published an article in which the author took a deeper look at the immediate and longterm reasons and goals of the occupation: the return of Alcatraz Island to Native Americans and
the overall situation of Native Americans in the U.S. While the article’s description of the
situation was similar to pieces published in the previous decade, it contained more specific
information, including a discussion about the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie and its legal
interpretation.63

With the rise of the Red Power Movement came increased coverage of Native issues by
the media. Yet this did not always guarantee an accurate picture of Native American issues in
the media. Native activists tried to present their demands themselves and influence their
portrayal, domestically as well as internationally. They set out to carve out a space that would
allow them to control the representation of their culture and traditional knowledge as well as
their views of contemporary issues. Through written and spoken word, Native periodicals and
radio programs, they challenged the stereotypical depictions that persisted in the mainstream
media. Native media created a space “of participation within the national media discourse” and
became a “defiant form of political activism” and a way of “cross-cultural communication.”64 By
exerting control over the production and content, Native Americans appropriated the media,
technology and space “as a way for decolonizing the intellect.”65
Native media production in the 1960s continued an already established trend. Like the
Society of American Indians in the early twentieth century, Native organizations had published
their own newsletters and newspapers as a way to keep other Native peoples informed about
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developments in Indian Country and to educate the non-Native public. The NCAI had has
published its own newspaper Washington Bulletin, later called the NCAI News Sentinel / Bulletin,
since the early years of the organization and The Native Voice was a monthly periodical
published by the Native Brotherhood of British Columbia, an organization founded in 1931.66
The National Indian Youth Council launched its own newspaper in the 1960s under the name
Aborigine, which was later changed to Americans Before Columbus (ABC). The United Native
Americans published Warpath, and the Mohawk Nation started their publication of Akwesasne
Notes in 1969. Many of these publications reports included news on Native peoples outside the
United States, such as Central and South Americas, Europe, New Zealand, and Australia.67
Native controlled media offered an alternative view to that offered by US main stream press,
influencing public opinion domestically as well as internationally.
Similarly, radio programs produced by Native Americans had mostly US reach, though
some extended to Canada as well. In the 1960s, Suzan Shawn Harjo, a life-long Native activist
and Executive Director of the NCAI (1985 - 1989), produced with her husband Frank Harjo
programming on Native issues for New York WBAI radio. Their program “Seeing Red” focused on
contemporary Native issues, peoples, and their culture and history, discussing topics such as
public health and the health needs of the New York Indian community, or the need for a Native
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cultural center in the city.68 Harjo’s programming brought together Native cultural traditions,
Native and non-Native actors, and presented political issues in an artistic way. When transcripts
of the Nixon Watergate tapes became available, Harjo lined up actors such as Tammy Grimes,
Colleen Dewhurst, Sam Shepherd, and John Lithgow to read the transcripts on the air. After the
publication of Dee Brown’s book Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee, the Harjos approached
Native actors and people from the New York Native community to read a chapter of the book a
day on the program “Continued Tomorrow.”69 Through their programming, Suzan and Frank
Harjo brought Native concerns to a wider audience, and highlighted current events in Native
communities as well as the different aspects of the movement for Native rights. Participation by
Native actors and members of the local Native community created a forum for Native voices to
discuss pressing matters. The programs reached beyond Native listeners and generated a wide
audience within New York City, and through the Pacifica Radio network stations on the West
Coast, in Texas, and also in Canada.70
In the case of the Mohawk newspaper Akwesasne Notes Native media also reached
outside the borders of the US and the Western Hemisphere, and contributed to the circulation
of Native voices internationally. With editorial offices located on both sides of the United StatesCanada border, the production of Akwesasne Notes represented in itself a transnational
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dimension of Native American struggle for treaty rights and sovereignty.71 Its early coverage (at
first collected and reprinted articles from other newspapers and magazines, but over time
increasingly their own editorials), mostly focused on the struggles of Native peoples within the
United States and Canada.72 However, articles discussing the situation of Native peoples in Latin
American countries regularly appeared in the newspaper as well.
The Akwesasne Notes reached beyond the Western hemisphere in its coverage as well
as in its distribution. The newspaper informed its readers about the struggles of other
indigenous peoples and anti-colonial and liberation movements around the world, most notably
the Vietnamese war for independence.73 Articles criticizing the military draft in the United
States, atrocities committed in Vietnam, and the US military racial attitudes toward the
Vietnamese, often drew parallels with the historical experiences of Native Americans, and
offered a transnational critique of US domestic and foreign policy.74 Such articles intellectually
connected the Vietnamese and Native Americans through their shared experiences of
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colonization and discrimination. In late spring 1972, the newspaper reprinted a photo by Huynh
Cong "Nick" Ut depicting Vietnamese children running away from a napalm attack. The caption
underneath it read:
This is Vietnam, 1972. It could be Cheyenne, Lakota, or Pomo country, a century
or less ago. These are children who have been bombed with Made-in-USA
napalm. They are not white children. We’re sorry if the horror of the photo
troubles anyone. For Indians, it will stir up old memories. For Western, Christian,
civilized man, it is a reminder to haunt – an imperative to deal with racism and
to root it out wherever it may be found. The area where these children live is
known to the U.S. troops as “Indian Country.”75
Editorials paralleling Native historical experience with the Vietnamese and other colonized
indigenous peoples represented several aspects of Native American assertions of their
perspectives and knowledge. Articles about the shared experiences of colonized peoples served
as vehicles for criticism of US policies, domestic and international, but also as emotional and
intellectual connections between colonized peoples, bringing them closer together.
The parallels that this article drew, reminded the readers of the history of US race wars
and the continued US racism that Native Americans (and the Vietnamese) were facing. In
critiquing US foreign policy, the author effectively critiqued the government’s domestic Indian
policy as well. Eastern Bloc journalists drew similar parallels to show American hypocrisy, by
comparing American race relations with the US treatment of nations elsewhere in the world. In
an article about the Trail of Broken Treaties in 1972, a Native American protest march from the
West Coast to Washington, D. C., the author described the support Native activists received
from the younger generation of Americans, who thus showed what they thought “about the
discriminatory policies [of their] government. Be it toward Indians or nations in Indochina.”76
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Using the domestic situation of Native Americans, the author criticized US involvement in
Vietnam. By drawing these parallels, the article pointed out the discrepancy between the
American rhetoric of democracy, equality, and freedom and the government’s actions. It also
served as a warning to other nations not to expect a fair treatment from a country that did not
live up to its own ideals.
The existence of the Akwesasne Notes carved out space for Native voices and opinions
within the existing media landscape, domestically and internationally. With distribution to
European countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain and elsewhere, the newspaper reached
beyond the Western Hemisphere, informing and educating readers around the world about
Native traditions, history, philosophy and contemporary life. Letters to editor came from
readers in Italy, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, West Germany, East Germany, Switzerland,
Bulgaria, Poland, Great Britain, France, Australia, and Dominica, suggesting the international
reach of the newspaper.77 This self-representation challenged the US and Canadian dominant
narrative about their national governments’ treatment of the Native peoples and their counter
image as democratic and egalitarian societies.
Readers’ responses indicate the important role the Akwesasne Notes played in
expanding public knowledge and self-representation by Native Americans. Several writers
commented on the limited amount of information about Native Americans available in their
respective countries and the importance of the Akwesasne Notes as a conveyor of Native voices.
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A German group of Akwesasne Notes readers, including one person from Switzerland and one
student from Haiti, considered the newspaper “the most-informative and all-embracing Indian
publication. Our press here relates Indian problems only from white sources. This is
understandable because it fits into the schemes of integration, progress, and development dear
to our people here.”78 A Swedish professor preparing a course on modern Native American
movements for the University of Copenhagen in Denmark indicated that he would use the
newspaper as one of his sources for the course, because it offered “the traditional thoughts and
modern action” of Native Americans.79 A Norwegian reader living in Maine informed the
newspaper that after reading its issues, he sent them to his family and friends in Norway, so
they could learn about Native cultures and contemporary situation: “They are enjoying learning
the real thing about the American Indians. The white Americans, of course, make damn sure no
information gets out leading foreign people to believe that the Indians are anything but what
one sees in old cowboy movies. I have a nephew in high school who brought the paper to school
and they virtually read it to pieces.”80 The availability of Akwesasne Notes on both sides of the
iron curtain, however limited, enhanced opportunities for people in Europe to learn about
Native Americans and their views. It created opportunities for Native self-representation,
influencing public opinion directly by Native voices, and gathering of a potential support for
Native causes.

The 1970s
While the rising number of direct action protests by the Red Power activists attracted
domestic and international attention, the coverage of events, such as the occupation of Alcatraz
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or the Trail of Broken Treaties in Czech language periodicals, remained sporadic and limited in
the early 1970s.81 The change came with the occupation of Wounded Knee in the spring of
1973. With this event Native Americans certainly captured the attention of the world and the
number of articles in Czech periodicals rapidly grew. Foreign journalists visited the village when
possible, and sometimes spent several days there, interviewing the protesters or observing
traditional ceremonies. Woody Kipp, one of the AIM activist at Wounded Knee, recalled in his
memoir that some of these correspondents came to Wounded Knee before the federal
government shut down the road access to the village. Others gathered information in the
surrounding area, while a few were presumably guided into the occupied hamlet at night via
paths used by the occupants and their supporters to bring in supplies.82 For example, Soviet
journalist Iona Andronov spent three days at Wounded Knee, interviewing the activists and
residents. He wrote a report based on his experience, published in Nová doba in March 1973.
The cover of the issue featured a photograph by Dagens Nyheter of an AIM activist, holding a
gun, looking straight into the camera as if challenging the photographer, another instance of an
assertion of Native rights and perspective in the media.83
Native activists, such as AIM member Carter Camp or Vine Deloria, Jr., credited the
presence of the foreign press during the occupation as a deterrent to violence and repressive

81

The limited number of articles could be due to the internal situation in Czechoslovakia at that
time. There are at least three articles on Native Americans in Czech newspapers printed between 1969
and 1972, however it is much lower number than one would expect such events to generate. This can be
due to the political situation in the country after the invasion of Warsaw Pact troops in 1968, which may
have resulted in lower number of journalists stationed in the U.S.A. “Blokáda Alcatrazu,” Lidová
demokracie, 26. listopad, 1969, 2 [“Blockade of Alcatraz,” People’s Democracy, November 26, 1969, 2];
“Obránci Alcatrazu: Indiáni bojují o ostrov,” Svět práce, 27. leden, 1971, 9 [“Defenders of Alcatraz: Indians
Fighting for an Island,” World of Labour, January 27, 1971, 9]; “Severoameričtí Indiáni opět na válečné
stezce,” Lidová demokracie, 18. listopad, 1972, 10 [“North American Indians on a Warpath Again,”
People’s Democracy, November 18, 1972, 10].
82
Woody Kipp, Viet Cong at Wounded Knee: The Trial of a Blackfeet Activist (Lincoln and London:
University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 129.
83
Iona Andronov, “Ještě jedna americká tragédie,“ Nová doba, č. 12 (28. Březen 1973), 20 – 22 [Iona
Andronov, “One more American tragedy,” New Times, No. 12 (March 28, 1973), 20 – 22].

109

police and military action against the occupiers. In his memoir, Dennis Banks recalls Carter Camp
telling a reporter: “I tell you, if it were not for you people, this government would have
slaughtered us as it did in 1890.”84 With international reporters present inside the Wounded
Knee compound, the U.S. government could not afford to launch a decisive military action
against the activists. Nixon’s officials were aware of the possible negative impact that a military
action, broadcast around the world, could have. An internal government communique stated: “if
Indians are killed, we can surely expect sharp and widespread foreign condemnation of this U.S.
Government action. It would come at a particularly unpropitious time, giving Arab governments
an excuse to fog up the terrorist issue."85 A year after the occupation, Vine Deloria, Jr.,
assessed: "With the attention of the world concentrated on Wounded Knee, the Nixon
administration could ill afford to allow its jet planes to sweep the village and release their
bombs, as rumors were predicting."86 In the case of Wounded Knee, the presence of the
international media functioned as a safety check and pressure on the government to negotiate
with the occupants.87
Native activists took note of the potential deterrent effect of international media
presence. In his recollection of a local event in Maryland in 1975, Billy Redwing Tayac, Chief of
the Piscataway Indian Nation and a long-time AIM member, highlights the usefulness that
Native activists assigned to foreign journalists. Southeast of Washington, D.C., across the
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Potomac River from George Washington’s Mount Vernon, is the Piscataway National Park.
Located near a site of the seventeenth-century main village of the Piscataway Confederacy, the
park includes the Piscataway old burial grounds, Moyone. In the mid-1970s, the Piscataway had
to ask permission to access the grounds to hold ceremonies. To protest the restrictions of access
to the park as well as the removal of Piscataway human remains, the tribe staged a series of
protests and pursued the issue in court. During 1975, the Piscataway decided to pull down a
block house that stood on the burial grounds. They asked AIM for help and informed the park
authorities of their intent. As a precaution, Chief Tayac also contacted a Soviet journalist
stationed in Washington, D.C., invited him to the event and asked him to bring a camera. The
next day, when the police present at the event realized there was a Soviet journalist on the
scene with a camera, they let the protesters proceed to the park and take down the structure.88

The occupation of Wounded Knee and the trials of AIM leaders Dennis Banks and Russell
Means that took place the following year continued to draw the attention of the international
press to Native issues. Andronov, who spent three days in Wounded Knee, followed the Banks
and Means trials in 1974, publishing three articles on them.89 These events also created
opportunities for closer contacts between journalists and Native activists, a chance for the
journalists to gain a better understanding of the problems that Native peoples faced.

88

Billy Redwing Tayac, phone conversation, June 3, 2010, and interview by the author, June 21,
2010, Port Tobacco, Maryland; Cindy Williams, personal communication, June 2015.
89
Iona Andronov, “Indiáni a americká spravedlnost,” Nová doba, č. 3 (21. leden 1974), 14 – 16 [Iona
Andronov, “Indians and American Justice,” New Times, No. 3 (January 21, 1974), 14 – 16], “Parodie
soudnictví,“ Nová doba, č. 18 (8. květen 1974), 24 – 25 [“Parody of Judiciary,” New Times, No. 18 (May 8,
1974), 24 – 25], and “Soud skončil, boj pokračuje,” Nová doba, č. 39 (30. září 1974), 22 – 23 [“The Trial
Ended, the Fight Continues,” New Times, No. 39 (September 30, 1974), 22 – 23]. Czech periodicals also
followed the story: “Proces proti předákům Indiánů,” Lidová demokracie, 9. leden 1974, 2 [“Process
Against Indian Leaders,” People’s Democracy, January 9, 1974, 2]; “Indiáni před soudem,” Lidová
demokracie, 7. únor 1974, 2 [“Indians at Court,” People’s Democracy, February 7, 1974, 2]; Oldřich
Navrátil, “Kdo je souzen v Sao Paulu?” Tribuna, r. 6, č. 24 (12. červen 1974), 16 [Oldřich Navrátil, “Who is
Tried in Sao Paolo?” Platfom, Vol. 6, No. 24 (June 12, 1974), 16].

111

As the articles printed in Czech language periodicals show, the tone and scope of the
reporting on Native issues and causes also changed in the 1970s. While many articles continued
in the style of the previous decades, some started to present more complex discussions about
topics such as self-determination, political sovereignty, and treaty rights. For the first time,
journalists started to discuss in more detail the complicated legal status of Native Americans. An
article in response to the Trail of Broken Treaties in 1972 analyzed the history of white - Native
relations, treaty-making, and its legal impact on the political status of American Indians. The
author specifically pointed out that Native tribes were considered to be sovereign states, at
least until 1871, in order to explain the demands of the Trail participants - the right to selfdetermination and the renewal of treaty-making. The author clearly presented Native
Americans as peoples with a special political and legal status, not as one of many US domestic
minority groups asking for equal rights.90
During the siege of Wounded Knee, the weekly Kostnické jiskry: evangelický týdeník
[Constance Sparks: Evangelical Weekly] published an article that paid closer attention to the
declaration of the Independent Oglala Nation by Russell Means on March 13, 1973. The author
discussed the history of Native political behavior and the existence of tribal federations and
alliances, such as Pontiac's and Tecumseh's, or the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois or Six Nations)
Confederacy. While in the author’s mind most of these tribes and their alliances were not actual
states, his article presented indigenous nations as political entities and sovereign actors. He
even asked if there would still be a space for an independent Indian state within the US.91 While
the author's polemic ignored the diversity of Native Americans and their political systems and
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presented them as a single group, it separated them from other ethnic groups seeking equal
rights.
The title of the article, “Wounded Knee – indiánské Lidice,“ references the Czech village
of Lidice, which was leveled and its inhabitants massacred in retaliation for the assassination of
Reinhard Heydrich, a high-ranking Nazi officer and the acting Reich-Protector of the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, in June 1942. Niebauer’s article opens with a short
history of the Ghost Dance Movement and the 1890 Wounded Knee Massacre, which helps the
readers understand the historical and symbolical importance of the place. The parallel the
author draws in the title would not only have caught the interest of the readers, but would have
undoubtedly created an emotional response to the article and a sympathetic view of the plight
of American Indians.
Articles discussing the question of Native American legal status, the importance of
reservations, citizenship, assimilation, and the need to secure self-determination continued to
appear in the press through the 1970s. Czech anthropologist Evžen Strouhal published an article
in 1975, detailing federal Indian policy from the 1780s to the Termination era and the changes in
Native American legal and political status vis-à-vis the federal and state governments. Strouhal
clearly explained the importance of the continued existence of reservations as guarantors of
Native sovereignty, and he pointed out Indians’ refusal to assimilate and their desire to remain a
specific national group. He saw application of self-determination for Native Americans as a real
possibility, but only if a factual, not only formal, self-determination could be legally guaranteed
to them.92
An article reprinted from the West German newspaper Die Zeit in 1974 went even
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further and discussed Native Americans’ refusal of US citizenship. The author analyzed the white
majority's attitude of cultural superiority, which prevented them from perceiving the possibility
of a separate (political) existence for Native Americans. The article pointed out the irony of the
situation: the white majority offered Native Americans something the African Americans have
demanded for a long time and never got — assimilation — while it forced on African Americans
what the Indians wished for — separation.93

To demonstrate Native Americans’ aversion to

U.S. citizenship and their self-definition as a nation, the writer quoted Navajo chairman Peter
McDonald: "We are a forming nation. Like other developing nations with rich natural resources,
which will be gone one day, we are aware that we need to use our natural wealth to create job
opportunities for our citizens and to secure economic self-sufficiency for our nation.” As the
author pointed out, these were not the words of someone who would consider himself to be a
U.S. citizen.94
The pictorial depiction of Native Americans that accompanied some of the articles also
changed in the 1970s. Pictures featured with articles in the 1950s and early 1960s in general
conveyed a message of demise and hopelessness. They either showed Native Americans in
traditional regalia, invoking a proud past of their peoples, or they featured poverty stricken
dwellings and Native men and women engaged in house work or manual labor.95 In the
coverage of the late 1960s and the 1970s, Indians were no longer passive victims with a grim
future. Rather they were proud people standing up for their rights. Pictures showed Native
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Americans in action and as warriors - marching, on horseback, or with guns in their hands.96 The
visual portrayal of Native Americans as warriors was yet another stereotype, the warrior ethos,
albeit this one was an active one.
Direct action protests drew the attention of the press. However, when protest actions
ended, the media looked elsewhere for material. After the flurry of articles in March and April
1973, coverage in Czech periodicals declined in May with the end of the siege. Native issues
were soon overshadowed by the Watergate scandal. Native Americans appeared again in 1974
with the trials of AIM leaders Dennis Banks and Russell Means for the Wounded Knee
occupation.97 Discussions of indigenous issues in Czech periodicals then continued throughout
the 1970s, though not with the same intensity as during the Wounded Knee events, but on a
semi-regular basis. The increased coverage of Native issues due to direct action protests in the
1970s created more space in the periodicals for specific facts and more complex discussions.
While many of the articles still had some inaccuracies (e.g., wrong dates, mis-identification of
people), they offered more informed views of American Indians as peoples with specific set of
rights and demands, different from other minorities. With such awareness and increased
understanding of Native issues, readers within the Eastern Bloc countries, but also the rest of
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Europe, would not have been easily duped by some generic civil rights reform, which would not
address specific demands by Native Americans.

The 1980s
With the decline of militant actions in the late 1970s and 1980s, the coverage of the Red
Power Movement in Czech language newspapers started to decline as well. But unlike in the
1950s and 1960s, Native issues retained a semi-regular presence in Czech periodicals, with
higher number of articles between 1984 and 1986.98 The focus of the reporting also changed.
Some articles brought information about specific reservations and tribal nations with detailed
descriptions of their situations. However, most of the articles focused on the case of Leonard
Peltier, an AIM member sentenced to two consecutive life sentences for allegedly killing two FBI
agents in a shoot-out on the Pine Ridge reservation in 1975.99 Regardless of the details these
articles provided, they used Peltier as an example of US violations of human rights and legal
discrimination against Native Americans in their anti-US propaganda.100 Discussions of tribal
sovereignty and self-determination mostly disappeared. Only a few articles discussed treaties
and treaty rights or the continued pressure on Native Americans to assimilate.101 While the
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101
“Ušetři jelena, slož Indiána,” Nová doba, č. 43 (21. říjen 1985), 17 [“Safe a Deer, Kill an Indian,”
New Times, no. 43 (October 21, 1985), 17] - an article discussing white backlash over Native hunting and
fishing rights; “Desetitisícům Indiánů v USA hrozí deportace,” Rudé právo, 6. září 1986, 6 [“Ten Thousand
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1980s articles presented more details than those from the 1950s and 1960s, they again used
Native issues as fodder for their anti-US propaganda, criticizing US violations of human rights
and political oppression. The shift in coverage shows the limitations of media as a pressure tool.
It worked as long as the media had reason to pay attention and something interesting to write
about. The moment protests and confrontations subsided, the press moved its attention
elsewhere.
Another limitation to the use of media, especially in the Eastern Bloc, as a pressure tool
was its obvious political bias. While articles in the Czech periodicals in the 1980s continued to
cover the case of Leonard Peltier and criticize the US government for its violations of human
rights, they were quiet when similar or more severe violations were committed by a leftist
government. Unlike with the struggle of Native Americans in the US and Canada, the conflict
between the Miskito, Sumu, and Rama indigenous peoples on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua
and the Nicaraguan leftist government did not attract much attention from Eastern Bloc
journalists. In Czech language periodicals, which followed the developments in Nicaragua from
the onset of the Sandinista revolution in 1979 throughout the 1980s, the focus was on the
struggle between the revolution and counter-revolution. Only about five articles specifically
mentioned the indigenous Miskito people, and even then it was within the framework of the
ongoing counter-revolution or the Contra war against the Sandinistas.
The Sandinistas and their opposition to the Somoza régime appeared in Czech language
periodicals in the spring of 1979, with a sharp rise in the number of articles in the summer of

Indians in the USA Threatened by Deportation,” Red Right, September 6, 1986, 6] – an article discussing
land conflict on the Navajo and Hopi reservations in 1986; Vladimír Razuvajev, “Indiáni chtějí zůstat
Indiány,“ Nová doba, č. 36 (6. zárí 1988), 20 – 21 [Vladimír Razuvajev, “Indians Want to Remain Indians,”
New Times, no. 36 (September 6, 1988), 20 – 21] – an article discussing racial stereotypes, discrimination,
and constant pressure to assimilate.
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that year, as the revolution gained momentum and succeeded.102 The focus of the articles
following the summer of 1979 was the revolution and its leaders, the successes of the economic
and social policies implemented under the new leftist government, and Nicaragua’s relations
with other socialist countries and régimes.103 By the end of 1980 and during the spring of 1981,
Czech language periodicals, namely the Czech version of the weekly Новое время [Nová doba /
New Times] and Czech daily Rudé právo [Red Right], started to bring news about the
counterrevolutionary insurgency against the Sandinistas, and the involvement of the United
States in attempts to destabilize the new Nicaraguan government. Even though the conflicts
within Nicaragua at the time included the indigenous peoples of the Atlantic Coast, the articles
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presented the developments only in the context of the east - west conflict or in the terms of
revolution and counter-revolution.104
When “Indian” or specifically the “Miskito” appeared, they were presented as an
integral part of the east - west / revolution - counterrevolution conflict. Most of the information
on the situation of the Miskito, Sumu, and Rama in these articles came from officials in the
Nicaraguan government, with no space allowed for indigenous voices. In June 1983, an article in
Nová doba, discussing the nature of US propaganda against the Sandinista government,
mentioned the use of a photograph, showing “burned out houses in an Indian village,” as
evidence of the Sandinistas’ violence against Nicaragua’s indigenous peoples. But the article did
not even allude to the role that Nicaragua’s Native peoples may have had in the conflict.105 Two
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months later the daily Rudé právo published an article specifically about the Miskito people.
Based on information presented by Nicaraguan Minister of the Interior Tomas Borge at a press
conference in Managua, the article lamented the “barbaric acts” committed by the CIA and
Honduran military circles against the Miskito, while trying to use the Native peoples for
subversive actions against the “Nicaraguan democratic revolution.”106 Native resistance to
Managua and the conflict with the government, when mentioned, was presented only as the
result of Contra and CIA propaganda among the Miskito, Sumu, and Rama peoples. Native
views, demands for rights, and claims to indigenous identity were dismissed, as pseudosolutions offered by imperialism and bourgeois scholars and as nothing more than a propaganda
tactic by the Contras.107
The absence of the Miskito, Sumu, and Rama voices from these articles and the quick
dismissal of the conflict and Native demands as orchestrated by the Contras and CIA, shows the
political bias and selectivity of the Eastern Bloc media. It also underlines the fact that Native
Americans and their issues were subordinated to the Eastern Bloc’s ideological project; they
were used first and foremost as part of their larger anti-US propaganda.

Conclusion
Despite their shortcomings and limitations, the US domestic and international media
coverage of Native issues increased awareness among ordinary people and politicians,
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domestically and internationally. Within the context of the Cold War, this increased media
coverage served as a tool of political pressure on the US government. With an increased
awareness and knowledge of Native issues internationally, foreign observers were able to better
discern empty political rhetoric, which made it harder for US politicians to maintain a positive
image of the United States’ treatment of its minorities without substantive reform in Indian
policy, as the exchange between President Reagan and a student at Moscow State University in
1988 shows. During the president’s visit, a student asked if Reagan would meet with a Native
American delegation, who were in Moscow to raise awareness of the discrimination and
violation of human rights in the US. Protecting the positive image of the country, the president
said he would gladly meet with the delegation and continued to explain how democratic the US
was, since it “gave” American Indians millions of acres of land for reservations, where they could
continue to live their traditional life.108
Reagan’s speech generated many responses from Native Americans, American
politicians, and domestic and foreign journalists. Not appeased by the rosy picture of American Indian relations the president tried to present, many US and international journalists
immediately contacted the NCAI for comments.109 Shortly after his speech, an article in a Czech
newspaper juxtaposed Reagan’s denial of violations of human rights with the findings of the
Center for Constitutional Rights in New York, using cases of jailed Native activists, such as
Leonard Peltier as examples of continuous political discrimination in the US.110 In an open letter
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to President Reagan, Governor of the San Ildefonso Pueblo Louis Naranjo, Jr. expressed his
belief that the Russian students who met Reagan “know more about American treatment of the
Indians than your remarks indicate that you do.”111 Naranjo was probably right in his
assessment of the students’ knowledge. Given the expanded coverage of Native issues in the
Soviet magazine New Times alone since the occupation of Wounded Knee in 1973 and a visit
from Leonard Peltier’s wife Stephanie to Moscow in 1986, it would be hard to believe the
students were not familiar with at least the history of Anglo-American and Native relations and
their contemporary situation.112
While media coverage and propaganda threatening the international image of the
United States proved to be a useful tool of outside pressure for general civil rights reforms, it
was not enough in itself to generate direct political support for the case of Indian sovereignty. In
this sense, the international media coverage was only a limited sideshow. Native Americans had
to reach out and cultivate connections with individuals, groups, and international organizations
for actual political support. They reached out to organizations monitoring human rights, such as
Survival International, support groups of interested citizens in Europe, other self-determination
movements, such as the Welsh nationalists, and organizations of world governance such as the
United Nations.113 But the increased media coverage of Native issues raised awareness of
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Native Americans and generated interest, which helped to establish transnational contacts and
alliances of support. For example, in the late 1980s, Soviet citizens staged a demonstration in
front of the US Embassy in Moscow and signed petitions in support of freeing Leonard Peltier.114
Indian support groups and letter writing campaigns also emerged from Akwesasne Notes
readership in Central Europe.115
Raised awareness and improved understanding of Native issues was also crucial for
Native Americans’ attempts to gain access to the United Nations. At the 1977 International NonGovernmental Organizations (NGO) Conference on Discrimination Against Indigenous
Populations, the first UN international conference specifically on indigenous peoples, Lee
Swepston of the International Labor Organization (ILO) commented on the importance of
information and knowledge, and urged human rights NGOs to engage in studies to increase the
awareness and effectiveness of their work: “You, the NGOs, can investigate, publish and make
sure the ILO receives your studies.”116 For most of the NGOs, this conference was the first time
meeting with indigenous peoples. One of the goals of the conference was for these NGOs to
“inform ourselves about the sufferings and aspiration of people who are the victims of racial
discrimination.”117 Five years later, Romesh Chandra, president of the World Peace Council and
president of the 1981 International NGO Conference on Indigenous Peoples and the Land,
commented on the improved understanding of state governments of indigenous peoples and its
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impact on their activism: “Are we here, in the hallowed precincts of the United Nations, because
the peoples of the world understand the cause of the indigenous peoples better? Do the
governments of the world understand our cause better today? Yes.”118 In this aspect, domestic,
international, and Native media coverage functioned as a useful tool.
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Challenging the “Magic Taboo” of Domestic Matters: The Native American Rights
Struggle and the United Nations
“… So what I am trying to say is that you must not place much hope in the legal system that
perpetuated these wrongs, that imposed these wrongs, as being willing to now suddenly turn
around and do justice because it is the same legal system that originally accomplished these
injustices and it is for this reason that in addition to a national movement, what seems to me to
be most important is to bring these treaty disputes between nations to the level where they
belong, that is, to the level of global concern, world concern.”
Richard Falk, 19741

At a 1974 National Congress of American Indian (NCAI) Convention, Philip (Sam) Deloria,
director of the National Indian Law Center, commented on the obstacles faced by Native
activists trying to bring indigenous issues onto the United Nations (UN) agenda. According to the
United Nation Charter, the international organization cannot interfere in domestic issues of
member states. And the UN considered Native Americans and their concerns to be a domestic
issue. Deloria called this obstacle the “big magic taboo” and argued that Native nations had to
challenge it and find a way to gain access to the international organization.2 Three years later,
the UN Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Conference on Discrimination Against
Indigenous Populations in the Americas, took place in Geneva, Switzerland. This event was a
result of careful strategizing and a use of existing political concepts and international law by
Native Americans, their allies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). It also marked the
beginning of a continuous presence of Native Americans and other indigenous peoples in the UN
and on the international political scene.
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Native Americans had approached the UN since its foundation in 1944. But these early
attempts were mostly isolated, direct approaches, demanding international recognition of
Native sovereignty. As such, they ran into the “magic taboo” of domestic matters. The UN,
functioning according to the rules of the Westphalian system of nation-states, their sovereignty
and territorial integrity, would not consider Native petitions, which potentially would put in
question the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a member nation-state. The US domestic
political situation and a lack of a unified view among Native Americans of the utility of the UN as
a tool for their rights struggle also limited the potential success of these attempts. The change
came with political developments during the 1960s and 1970s, specifically decolonization in
Africa and Asia, and the rise of the UN human rights agenda, which offered new frameworks and
ways for Native leaders to conceptualize and present their demands in a global context. They
modified their strategies and approached the UN via the human rights agenda and as NGOs
rather than sovereign nations. This change in tactics, espoused by the moderate as well as
radical activists and organizations, helped to open the door for indigenous peoples to the UN.
Once in, they have filled the available political space and worked from within to modify the
existing concepts of human rights and international law to include indigenous collective rights
and sovereignty.

Early Attempts and Limitations, 1940s - 1950s
Native Americans have worked to establish access to the UN from the organization’s
establishment in 1944. A delegation of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations from both sides of the
US - Canada border, traveled to the UN’s founding conference in San Francisco. A year later,
another Native delegation approached the organization. Canadian violations of treaty rights
precipitated these initial contacts. Wishing to be recognized among nations, one of the
delegation reportedly arrived vested with the authority to petition for a UN seat for Native
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Americans. Haudenosaunee elders also attended the foundation ceremony of the UN building in
New York City on October 24, 1949. A picture in Basic Call to Consciousness, published by
Akwesasne Notes, identifies the delegation members as David Hill, Clinton Rickard, Harry
Patterson, Angus Horne, Thomas Beauvais, and Lone Wolf.3 These early attempts to establish
connections with the international organization and to use it as a tool of outside political
pressure on the settler-states of Canada and the US, to achieve recognition of Native treaty
rights were limited by several factors. These included the North American domestic political
situation, the lack of a unified view among Native Americans about the utility of the UN and the
lack of an overall unified strategy, and the nature of international relations and the functioning
of the organization itself.
The domestic political atmosphere in the post-war United States, influenced by the
emerging Cold War, shaped and often limited political activism and the international reach of
minority groups and organizations. The anti-communism of the 1950s and the Second Red Scare
extended to the United Nations and its attention to human rights. As historian Carol Anderson
points out, American politicians like Joseph McCarthy equated the UN campaign for human
rights standards with the USSR and a subversion of US-led democracy. Thus, going “outside the
nation-state” to an international organization like the UN could have been politically viewed by
conservatives as a betrayal of “American values” and used to discredit any activist or
organization. As Anderson argues, the possibility of setting a precedent that would allow the UN
to investigate racial discrimination in the United States could have tarnished the American
international image, and something US politicians feared.4
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In an atmosphere of political conformity and paranoia about the spread of communism
in the United States, anti-communist rhetoric and even rumors of affiliation with left-leaning
organizations became a useful strategy to discredit political opponents. In the early Cold War, it
was easy to equate dissent with sedition and calls for a change with subversion. While
preparations for the American Indian Chicago Conference were under way in the early 1960s,
several Native leaders, namely the principal chief of the Cherokee Nation and executive officer
of Phillips Petroleum W. W. Keeler and Cherokee General Council Earl Boyd Pierce, expressed
concerns about the political affiliation of one of the Conference organizers, anthropology
professor at the University of Chicago Sol Tax.5 During preparatory meetings for the
Conference, Pierce went even further in his campaign against Tax, and started spreading rumors
about the professor’s supposed connections to communist organizations. Keeler’s and Pierce’s
attacks came from their concerns about the Conference’s goals and possible impact on Native
Americans. While the event’s proponents attempted to “harness the language of international
development as a means for advancing [Native] self-determination,” its opponents feared the
Conference would serve in the long run as a component of communist designs to create “an
overall Governmental State.”6 Such fears of communist takeover became the foundation of
propaganda aimed to discredit activists and organizations who dared to challenge the sociopolitical status quo, and to drive away their potential supporters.7
Even organizations working with and within the American political system, like the
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National Congress of the American Indians (NCAI), faced accusations of left-leaning tendencies.
Because of their opposition to Termination and their support of tribal sovereignty, the
organization was often labeled as being on the “pink side.”8 The NCAI had to carefully navigate
the rhetoric and political situation in order to protect its reputation and to remain an effective
lobby organization for Native rights. Any association with organizations or people deemed
subversive, especially during the McCarthy era, could have meant a political death. In 1955, the
NCAI amended its Constitution stating that “No individual or organization with known
subversive activities or affiliation shall be admitted to membership,” and assured the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) that there was “nothing in our program, policy or philosophy that in any way
leans towards the communistic theory of government.”9 Further, the NCAI regularly checked
the government’s official list of subversive organizations, when they considered individual
membership or cooperation with other organizations.10
Even careless pronouncements made in jest carried potential danger to activists and
organizations in an atmosphere of heightened anti-communism. In 1959, Louis LaFontaine, tribal
chairman of the Turtle Mountain Chippewa, visited the USSR Embassy to see if the Russians
would be interested in buying hand-made products from his nation. Upon leaving the Embassy,
he was approached by a journalist who wanted to know the purpose of LaFontaine’s visit. As a
joke and to “get [the journalist] out of [his] hair,” the tribal chairman said: “Oh, I asked the
Russian Embassy for a million dollar loan.”11 LaFontaine’s response became a news story in
which he was deemed the “Sioux brave,” speaking for the Chippewa, who asked the Soviet
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Embassy for a multi-million dollar loan to develop industries on their reservation. In other
reports, LaFontaine intended to sell oil-rich land in North Dakota to the Russians.12 A journalist
also approached the NCAI Executive Director Helen Peterson for comments. To defuse the
situation, the NCAI released a statement, stressing Native loyalty to the US and criticizing
LaFontaine’s action (as reported in the news) and the media furor it created as irresponsible and
“an insult to the intelligence and patriotism of the Indian people.” Peterson further classified the
event as “publicity stunt” and stressed the daily work the organization and other Native leaders
were doing “through proper channels” with their Congressional representatives for the
betterment of Native Americans.13 In an atmosphere of political paranoia, the Red Scare and its
hysteria of un-Americanism, the NCAI felt the need to counter any possible event or
development that could hinder the organization’s work as advocate for Native rights and the
preservation of the “unique relationship with the United States” and the “special responsibility
which the United States has assumed toward [Native Americans] under their treaties.”14

Disagreements among Native leaders over the utility and appropriateness of using the
UN for the Native American rights struggle during the early Cold War limited Native attempts to
establish effective connections with the organization and prevented the formulation of a unified
international strategy. While it seems that some Native Americans preferred to settle their
disputes with the U.S. government domestically, others were willing to take their grievances to
the international community or at least use a threat thereof as a pressure tool. In 1950,
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protesting the continuous draft of Hopi men into the US military, representatives of the Hopi
nation sent a letter to President Truman, suggesting they would use the UN as an outside
pressure tool. In the letter, quoted in The Washington Post, the Hopi tribal leaders stressed the
sovereignty of their nation and the fact that there was no treaty between them and the United
States that would allow it to induct Hopi men into US military service. Further, they stated that if
the United States did not cease such impressment, the “Hopi sovereign nation shall be forced to
go before the United Nations.”15 The Hopi preferred to settle the dispute over their sovereignty
domestically, but were prepared to use the tactic of outside pressure - a threat of damaging the
US image as a champion of democracy and freedom on the international scene, by taking their
case to the UN.
The NCAI, on the other hand, did not consider the UN an appropriate place for
redressing Native grievances. When Robert Moses and the New York State Power Authority
(SPA) decided to flood about 550 acres of Tuscarora lands in order to build a power station on
the Niagara River in the late 1950s, the Tuscaroras fought the SPA in federal courts, appealed to
the president, physically blockaded roads to prevent surveyors from entering their reserves,
generated publicity in newspapers to raise awareness and support from non-Natives, and
protested in front of the White House.16 When the domestic strategy failed, the Tuscaroras
turned to the UN. Wallace “Mad Bear” Anderson, one of the activists, argued that since the US
failed to honor the treaty and Iroquois sovereignty, the matter became an international issue to
be taken to the UN.17 Anderson presented a petition protesting the US violation of treaty rights
to the organization and several foreign countries in 1959. However, Joseph Garry, president of
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the NCAI at the time, condemned the actions as a “publicity stunt.” The NCAI supported the UN
as an organization to ensure world peace, but they did not see it as “an appropriate forum” for
indigenous issues and grievances.18
While the political polarization of the Cold War and the East - West propaganda battle
between the US and the USSR created favorable conditions to use the international community
as an outside pressure tool for the Native American rights struggle, some Native leaders were
not willing potentially to aid the anti-US propaganda of the Soviet Union by taking Native
grievances to the UN. The need for economic development on reservations and challenges in
achieving economic support for those developments led some Native and non-Native
organizations to launch an attempt to establish an American Indian Point IV Program, modeled
after President Truman’s plan for technical and scientific assistance for developing nations.
Using the ideological competition between the US and the USSR, the reformers positioned their
demand for economic aid as a Cold War imperative - if the US wanted to win the contest with
the USSR for allies in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, it had to show the world
that it treated its indigenous peoples with justice and honor.19 Some even considered directly
approaching the UN and the World Court in Geneva to secure economic aid. However, others
were afraid that such steps would play into the Soviet propaganda against the US.20

The nature of international relations and the functioning of the UN itself presented a big
challenge to Native American attempts to gain access into the organization. Based on the
Westphalian system of nation-states, their sovereignty and territorial integrity, the UN did not
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have a mechanism in place to officially recognize representatives of tribal nations and regarded
indigenous issues as domestic matters.21 The Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1, Article
2, specifically states: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter VII,” which concerns peace and security undertaking.22 Native Americans thus had to
find a way to circumvent Article 2 in order to get the UN involved on their behalf.
Members of the Haudenosaunee delegation to the UN establishing conference in 1945
were aware of the limitations a direct approach to the organization presented. Even though
their ultimate goal, as reported by the New York Times, was a recognition of their treaty rights
and sovereignty, they knew they would have “no legal standing at the conference” and decided
to approach the organization through the committee set up to deal with the problems of
minority groups.23 Native American representatives, including Clinton Rickard (Tuscarora) and
Ray Fadden (Mohawk), prepared to come back to the UN the following year, to address treaty
rights violations. The Haudenosaunee continued to approach the UN on a regular basis through
the 1950s and 1960s, protesting Canada’s and the United States’ treaty violations and their
attempts to assume jurisdiction over the Six Nations Confederacy.24 Focusing on the violations
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of treaty rights as violations of Native sovereignty did not necessarily pose a direct challenge to
the Westphalian system and the territorial sovereignty of the United States and Canada, since
the problem could be directed to mechanisms dealing with minority issues.
Despite these continuous attempts, Native Americans made no headway in the UN. The
organization’s understanding of indigenous peoples as domestic matters of UN member nationstates prevented the organization from taking any action. During the Termination policy in the
1950s, which threatened the existence of the Florida Seminole and the Miccosukees, who were
seen as part of the Seminole by non-Native Floridians, the Miccosukee attempted to secure
their recognition as a distinct peoples. During the 1950s the Miccosukee increasingly asserted
their cultural and political independence from the Seminoles, and demanded a recognition of
their rights to perpetual and exclusive use of land in the Everglades, where they lived, and
protection of their fishing and hunting rights.25 The Miccosukee attempted to solve their
situation domestically first, by directly approaching President Eisenhower and seeking a
government - to - government relationship, by-passing the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). They
also testified at the Termination hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs. After
the hearings ended, the Subcommittee concluded that the Seminole were not ready for
termination and further recommended the creation of two Native groups in Florida, the
Seminole and the Miccosukee. In 1957, the Miccosukee organized into a separate nation and
entered negotiations to lease land in the Everglades. However, the negotiations and the federal
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recognition stalled and the Miccosukee turned to the international community for support.26
In November 1958, the Miccosukee approached three western nation-states with whom
they had historical treaties guaranteeing the protection of the Miccosukee lands: Great Britain,
France, and Spain. While the French and Spanish Ambassadors politely accepted Miccosukee
buckskin documents presented to them and promised these would be delivered to the heads of
their states, they did not promise any support. Great Britain’s Foreign Secretary Edward Youde
refused even to accept the buckskin, arguing that “the affair was an internal problem of this [US]
country.”27 With the failed attempts, the Miccosukee turned to the UN. In January 1959, Buffalo
Tiger, Howard Osceola, and attorney Morton Silver visited the United Nations, “in case they
have to fight Uncle Sam in the forum of the world organization,” but with the same result.28
Despite the Miccosukee’s best attempts to assert their sovereignty based on historical treaties,
and while only asking for support in their land negotiations, not a separation from the US, these
European states and the UN, bound by the Westphalian system of international relations, would
not hear their case. The Miccosukee finally got their recognition and land lease in the
Everglades, but only after visiting Fidel Castro in Cuba and receiving an official recognition of
their nation from him. The trip that took place in 1959 was a public embarrassment to the
United States and prompted the country to take action to improve its international image by
granting the Miccosukee their recognition.29 Nevertheless, this recognition by Cuba did not
change the United Nation’s view of indigenous concerns as the domestic matters of recognized
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nation-states.
In spite of the limitations imposed by the Wesphalian system and upheld by the UN and
European nation-states, the international community remained a viable tool of outside political
pressure, especially with the presence of socialist countries, eager for ammunition for their antiUS propaganda. And Native activists continued to make use of this. For example, during the
1960s fishing rights protests in the Pacific Northwest, the Nisqually nation appealed to the UN
and several European countries, emphasizing the international aspect of treaty rights.30
However, these early attempts did not have the desired effects. They were made by individual
tribal nations, concerning local problems, and thus easily dismissed as internal issues within a
nation-state. Following years of disappointed attempts, Native Leaders had discovered the need
to show a unified position and to articulate new strategy to approach the UN that would use
existing frameworks to present Native rights in a larger, global context in order to open the door
for Native peoples to the organization.

A Decade of Changes, the 1960s
While the strategies of the 1950s achieved little international intervention in Native
concerns, domestic and international developments during the 1960s directly and indirectly
influenced Native activism and offered new frameworks within which Native leaders could
position their demands for treaty rights and self-determination. These developments included
increasing challenges to the political and social consensus of the 1950s, including the
politicization of American youth, decolonization in Asia and Africa, and the strengthening of the
UN international human rights agenda as an integral part of international law.31 By the end of
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the decade, when Native Americans increasingly started to look to the UN and to reformulate
their international political strategies, the stage was set for them to succeed in bringing Native
grievances into the international arena.
Domestically, the 1960s were a period of reforms and challenges to the political and
social status quo. The African-American and Mexican-American civil rights movements, growing
activism among American youth and university students, the counterculture, the New Left, and
the anti-Vietnam War movements, as well as President Johnson’s War on Poverty and the Poor
Peoples’ Campaign, questioned the validity of established norms and created an atmosphere for
reform. The politicization of American youth and their use of direct action protests also included
Native Americans.32 The GI Bill opened door for many Native Americans to university education.
Increased presence of Native students at universities led to the establishment of clubs and
organizations, where members discussed major problems in Indian Country, such as the
Termination policy, treaty rights, assimilation, and poverty.33
Many Native students also participated in summer Workshops on American Indian
Affairs, initiated by University of Chicago anthropologist Sol Tax in 1956 and continued by D’Arcy
McNickle into the 1960s. These workshops, specifically focused on cultivating a new generation
of leaders among Native youth and students, played an influential role in the politicization of
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Native youth.34 The participants discussed the concepts of self-determination, sovereignty and
treaty rights, the need for a reform of federal Indian policy (Termination), and cultural
preservation. They recognized that regardless of tribal membership, Native peoples faced
similar problems that could be best confronted through a united, intertribal (pan-Indian)
effort.35 Many of the workshop participants went on to become tribal leaders, artists, or
activists, including the founders of the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC).
International political developments, such as decolonization, numerous liberation
movements around the world, and the rise in prominence of the UN human rights agenda
influenced Native activists and leaders and provided them with an avenue to position their
demands within a larger, global context. The decolonization process influenced D’Arcy McNickle
and his approach to the Native American rights struggle. In the 1950s, McNickle started the
American Indian Development (AID) organization, through which he wanted to extend “the
process of decolonization to the United States,” and, in 1960, he committed AID to sponsoring
the summer Workshops on American Indian Affairs.36 From the beginning of the Workshops,
the organizers stressed the colonial nature of the relations between Native Americans and the
US government, drawing parallels with other colonized peoples around the world.37 Several of
Sol Tax’s graduate students, including Cherokee Robert K. Thomas, served as instructors in the
Workshops. In the early 1960s, Thomas became the chief planner for the Workshop, expanding
the curriculum to engage with colonialisms abroad more directly.38 For example, for the
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Workshop’s final exam in 1963, Thomas specifically asked the students to compare the structure
and consequences of colonialism in India, Kenya, Ghana, New Zealand, or the Philippines with
the situation of American Indians or other minority group in American society.39
The Workshops’ focus on decolonization and ethnic pride helped to fuel a renewed
sense of Native nationalism and promoted inter-tribal discussions.40 New organizations such as
the NIYC or the Survival of American Indians Association (SAIA) represented this renewed
nationalism and adopted direct action protests and more radical direction in the movement for
Native rights.41 The international aspect of the Workshops expanded the contexts in which
Native participants considered their situation, challenges, and options. In her final essay in 1962,
Sandra Johnson reflected on Native identity and cultural persistence within the larger
international context of the Cold War, comparing non-Indians’ possible response to a forced life
under Soviet communism: “Many would cry, ‘Better dead than Red.’ And yet, another battle
between the Reds and the Whites is being fought within our own borders. Given this different
context it may be easier for white citizens to understand our cry which would sound more like,
‘Better Red than dead.”42 By the late 1960s and early 1970s, indigenous Native leaders started
recognizing the commonality of their struggle for protection and recognition of indigenous
rights with other indigenous peoples.43 They started to debate new ways and strategies to bring
Native treaty rights onto the international scene and into the UN.

Changes and developments within the UN human rights agenda and the increasing
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importance of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the field during the 1960s, presented
Native leaders with an alternative framework for their demands and offered a way to overcome
the “magic taboo” of domestic matters and to gain access to the organization. The initial push to
add human rights to the UN Charter came from the horrors of the Holocaust during World War
II and from US and European NGOs present at the UN’s inaugural San Francisco conference in
1945.44 The NGOs’ lobbying at the conference led to the establishment of the Commission on
Human Rights within the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which effectively upgraded
the Council to a principal organ for the international human rights agenda. Shortly afterward the
UN adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).45 Despite the human rights
mandate, the UN had no actual power to deal with reports of violations of human rights.
Further, in 1947, member states passed a resolution, proclaiming that the organization “had no
power to take any action in regard to any complaints concerning human rights.”46 After the
Universal Declaration was adopted, work on additional human rights Covenants either stalled or
was not done at all during the 1950s.
Decolonization, growing international discourses on race, and the rising prominence of
NGOs during the 1960s helped to transform human rights and placed it firmly on the UN
agenda.47 In December 1960, the UN adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which set one of the major themes within the UN discourse
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on human rights for the decade. The influx of newly independent nations in the UN family
(seventeen new members in 1960 alone), led to “more generally aggressive attitude” toward
decolonization and racism within the UN bodies and restructuring and expansion of committees
within the UN.48 As a result, several covenants on human rights were completed, adopted, or
newly drafted, namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). In 1969, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), entered into force.49
The UN also shifted its focus from drafting of new legislation to implementation, and the
Commission on Human Rights gained a stronger position to investigate reports of human rights
violations. In 1967, the ECOSOC passed Resolution 1235, which gave the Commission
authorization to examine information about human rights abuses. While the Resolution dealt
specifically with cases in South West Africa and Southern Rhodesia, it established in more
general terms that “a policy of violation of human rights was something that was not protected
by the Charter provision regarding respect of sovereignty.”50 In 1970, the ECOSOC followed
with Resolution 1503, which officially established procedures for appointment of working
groups, which would meet privately to consider reports of human rights abuses and refer
serious cases to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, which in turn could refer them to the ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights.51 The
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precedent for the working groups came three years prior to the Resolution 1503. In 1967, the
Commission on Human Rights, grappling with the issue of Apartheid, established an Ad Hoc
Group of Experts to examine conditions in South African prisons. Over time, the jurisdiction of
this group expanded to other parts of Africa as well as other aspects of racial discrimination. This
working group became a precedent for future working groups and special rapporteurs within
the agenda of international human rights, including the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations (WGIP), which was the first permanent body in the UN system to deal specifically
with indigenous issues.52
The increasing importance of NGOs as players within the human rights agenda and the
UN mechanism offered a possible way for Native peoples to enter the UN and carve out a space
for themselves there. The advantage of using NGOs came from the nature of the organizations’
work. NGOs represent people and their interests vis-à-vis the governmental and economic
powers by engaging in advocacy for social change. Thus the nature of NGO activities lies beyond
the conventional state and business categories. NGOs also create transnational links between
state and non-state actors, connecting the local and the global.53 And while NGOs cannot
directly bring state governments to comply with UN human rights standards, they have tools in
their arsenal to persuade governments to alter their behavior, including the ability to express
public unease with government policies through official reports to the ECOSOC Commission on
Human Rights, public shaming of governments with bad human rights records, and educating
the public on specific issues, which in turn influence political debates and agenda-setting within
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the UN.54
Even though NGOs played a role in the UN human rights agenda from the beginning,
their influenced was limited in the early years. The relationship between NGOs and the UN was
formalized in the UN Charter, Article 71, which placed NGOs under the auspices of the ECOSOC,
empowered to make “suitable arrangements for consultations” with the organizations.55
However, the Charter’s provisions did not allow for any NGO role with the General Assembly or
the Security Council. While these provisions were limiting, in practice they opened the UN
ECOSOC to a wide range of organizations to present their views.56 During the 1960s, and also
due to the decolonization process, NGOs’ presence and influence in the UN started to expand.
There were about one thousand NGOs with consultative status with the ECOSOC in the 1950s
and about two thousand by the early 1970s.57 The presence of human rights NGOs within the
ECOSOC followed the same pattern. The influx of newly independent states in the UN tipped the
power balance within the ECOSOC and the NGO Committee, in charge of reviewing and
recommending organizations’ applications for consultative status. In 1966, the membership of
the NGO Committee increased from seven to thirteen, with geographical distribution of 5 from
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African states, 4 from Western European and other states (U.S. and Canada), 2 from Latin
American states, and 2 from socialist states of Eastern Europe. These changes led to a shift away
from Western domination in the Council and the NGO Committee.58
The changes that took place in the 1960s and shifted the power away from Western
domination in the UN and within the ECOSOC NGO Commission opened a way for more serious
and challenging discussions of racism and human rights. By the early 1970s, even strong nations
were questioned and called out for their human rights violations, which signaled the increasing
international commitment to the agenda. For example, in 1967 the International War Crimes
Tribunal, or the Russell-Sartre Tribunal, was organized to investigate US military action in
Vietnam.59 Human rights violations were now seen as transcending national boundaries and
thus a usable framework for ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples to challenge their
subjugation. Further, the power shifts within the NGO Committee opened a way for indigenous
organizations to engage with the UN through an NGO consultative status with the ECOSOC.
When the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB) of Canada applied for an official NGO status in the
early 1970s, strong support for its application came from recently independent nations. A
delegate from India reportedly stated: “…only the wearer of the shoe knows where the shoe
pinches,” indicating shared experience and commitment to justice.60 By the beginning of the
1970s, the international arena was set for Native leaders and organizations to take advantage of
the human rights framework mechanism - the mechanisms were strengthened and operational,
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increasing numbers of nation-states supported the agenda, and many precedents, such as
working groups or fact-finding missions, were set in place.

Getting in: Indigenous Issues and the United Nations in the 1970s
Indigenous rights issues made their UN debut in 1957 when the International Labor
Organization (ILO) adopted Convention No. 107 Concerning the Protection and Integration of
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries. The ILO’s
Convention No. 107 became the first set of international standards for indigenous rights and
their protection, but it was limited to indigenous workers only. It also reflected the dominant
attitude toward Native peoples of the time and its overall tone and goals were assimilationist,
promoting integration into dominant societies.61 Despite this early appearance of indigenous
rights within the UN, the UN itself did not engage with the issue until the early 1970s.
Prior to 1969, the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, concentrated their work and studies on various
aspects of minority discrimination, which indirectly benefited Native peoples, but did not
specifically address indigenous rights. In 1969, the Sub-Commission received a report that
included a whole chapter on indigenous peoples and their problems and started a discussion in
both the Sub-Commission itself and the Commission on Human Rights about indigenous issues.
In 1970, the Sub-Commission recommended in its Resolution 4B (XXIII) that a study be made on
the problem of discrimination against indigenous peoples. The study was approved by ECOSOC
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on May 1971 in Resolution 1589, and Mr. Jose Martínez Cobo was appointed as the Special
Rapporteur.62 This study, also called the Cobo Study, represents the “earliest significant
engagement with indigenous issues” by the UN proper.63
Native Americans’ own work and strategies played an important role in bringing
indigenous issues onto the UN agenda and securing a space for indigenous peoples within the
organization. Two events specifically stand out as turning points in Native American UN work the 1973 takeover of Wounded Knee and the 1977 UN NGO Conference On Discrimination
Against Indigenous Populations in Geneva, Switzerland. The first was a generator of
international attention and awareness of Native issues and the second the beginning of a
sustained indigenous presence and work within the established international mechanisms of the
UN. However, the work of Native activists prior to and between these two events was equally
important, epecially the development of more organized strategies, which underlined Native
international activities and helped to open the UN door wider. In this regard, the year 1974 can
be seen as another turning point in Native international activism. That year, both the NCAI,
representing the moderate part of the Native rights struggle, and the American Indian
Movement (AIM), representing the radical part, held conferences, during which participants
discussed and outlined new strategies for international activism and approach to the UN.
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Even though the introduction of indigenous issues as a separate topic in the ECOSOC
Committee on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
engendered a slow change in attitudes toward the question, Native activists and organizations
continued to face numerous obstacles and challenges in getting their voices heard in the early
1970s. As already discussed, individual delegations, tribal or from national organizations, had
often limited success in reaching UN personnel or addressing the UN. In 1972, several Native
American activists went to the UN NGO Conference on the Environment in Sweden, which
included some issues of concern to Native Americans on its agenda. After the conference, Eddie
Benton Banai of AIM and other Native delegates met with the United States mission to the UN
(USUN) delegate Shirley Temple Black and Colorado Governor John Love, but they were denied
permission to address the UN plenary session, while the Boy Scouts of America were able to.64
One of the major obstacles was the prevailing perception of Native issues as a domestic
problem. As Philip (Sam) Deloria described it in 1974:
… the problem in getting an international interest in the problems of, or the situation
of Indian tribes is the fact that there’s a big magic taboo on the international scene
and that is the international community tends to avoid what are called domestic
questions, and the Untied States takes the position that all matters having to do with
American Indians are domestic questions, and as a result it’s very difficult to get
immediate international attention to the problems like treaty problems…65
The UN human rights agenda offered a way around this “magic taboo,” since human
rights had become an exception to the domestic question rule during the 1960s, and even
politically strong states started to face questions about their human rights record.66 In 1970,
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Indians of all Tribes seized the opportunity and prepared a position statement on racism and
genocide to be submitted to the UN General Assembly. Within the context of the human rights
agenda, they charged the United States with ongoing theft of treaty-guaranteed rights and
resources.67 A year later, facing continuous harassment and violence in the Pacific Northwest
over fishing rights, a delegation of six representatives of local tribal nations from Washington
and Oregon appealed to the UN for help to represent their struggle to the World Court. Further,
they asked the UN Secretary General to send a UN peacemaking group to Cook’s Landing on the
Columbia River. The delegation charged the United States with violation of the UN Declaration
on Human Rights.68 Both petitioning groups linked their specific local issues to the larger
context of international human rights and their own survival, in an attempt to get the
international body involved in their struggles.
Despite the increasing importance of human rights as an issue transcending national
boundaries, the use of the agenda by Native Americans did not automatically guarantee success
vis-à-vis the domestic matter challenge. During the occupation of Wounded Knee in 1973, the
traditional Oglala and AIM members tried to establish contacts with the UN from the onset of
the takeover. In early March, a delegation including Oren Lyons, a representative of the
Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy, and AIM leader Vernon Bellecourt visited the UN with
a request to address the General Assembly and to ask the organization to send observers to the
village. While the request concerned specific events at Wounded Knee and the situation of the
Oglala, the delegation presented it in the larger context of the UN human rights agenda. In Oren
Lyon’s view, the delegation did not only represent the people at Wounded Knee only, but also
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millions of Native peoples throughout the Western Hemisphere, victims of colonization and
genocide.69 The delegation’s request was denied, because, as the spokesman for UN SecretaryGeneral Kurt Waldheim explained, the organization could not interfere with issues considered to
be domestic matters, and therefore could not deal directly with nations-within-nations.
According to the spokesman, the only way for Native Americans to address the General
Assembly would be to find a member state to sponsor them.70
In early May, supporters of the Wounded Knee occupiers, including leading Native
activists Clyde Bellecourt, Wallace “Mad Bear” Anderson, and Eddie Benton Banai, staged a
support demonstration in the UN Plaza in New York. A Six Nations delegation delivered a
petition to the Chair of the UN Human Rights Commission as well as the USUN. The delegation
was authorized by the Oglala to request peacekeepers from the UN to be sent to Wounded
Knee. During the delegation’s meeting with the UN Legal Counsel Constantin Stavropoulos, Oren
Lyons asked if there was any way for Native Americans to raise their concerns in the UN forum.
Stavropoulos referred to the UN Charter and the UN’s inability to interfere in domestic issues,
the same answer given two months prior. He also reminded the delegates that they had “the
right of individual petition to the Commission of Human Rights,” something the activists were
already pursuing.71
These unsuccessful attempts to get the UN involved directly in the Wounded Knee
stand-off show the continued challenges posed by the “magic taboo” of domestic matters. At
the same time, Stavropoulos’ recommendation to use the human rights approach hints at the
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strengthening position of the agenda internationally and its potential to be a tool of outside
political pressure for change. What Native Americans needed in order to use this tool
effectively, was to organize and formulate a unified strategy. Recalling his conversations with
Stavropoulos during the first International Indian Treaty Conference in 1974 at Standing Rock
Reservation, Oren Lyons reflected on the challenges and possibilities. After asking Stavropoulos
why indigenous peoples did not have a forum at the UN, Stavropoulos reportedly answered: “…
because the members are colonials and want the aborigines’ land I [Oren Lyons] said ‘But you
are the UN. We talk about what’s in our head, what you think is right.’ He said ‘Ok [sic], you
organize aborigines’ [sic]. Anyway, the doors are open at the UN. He ‘invited’ me to come back
any time.”72 The legal council himself invited Native Americans to come back. But they needed
to show a unified, organized front in order to access the limited space the organization offered,
a space that could be filled and reshaped to suit indigenous needs.73
From the experiences of failure during Wounded Knee came a push for a more
coordinated and sustained approach and strategic planning in order to gain access to the UN.
Bill Means, one of the AIM leaders, explained the reasons and the decision behind AIM’s
international focus in the 1970s:
Well, the idea came again from the [Wounded Knee] trials, and then we’d have
these various meetings. In the trials, a lot of the elders came there. They used to
come in the courtroom every day. Mathew King, working with Fools Crow, said,
‘We need to take this to the international community because the chances of Russ
[Russell Means] and Dennis [Banks] being acquitted were very small.’ And so they
said the issue is the treaty, and nation to nation, so we need to go to a higher level.
And, because we have all this world wide attention, now is the time.74
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To formulate the new strategy and outline their ultimate goals, AIM invited Native peoples from
the Western Hemisphere, the Pacific Islands, and Australia to a week-long meeting at the
Standing Rock Sioux reservation in June 1974. Between June 10th and 13th, an International
Workgroup on Treaties, composed of lawyers, one representative of Amnesty International, and
Native American leaders and activists met, debated, and clarified their goals and strategies to
achieve international recognition of treaty rights and Native sovereignty.75
The Workgroup participants agreed that Native Americans should pursue their ultimate
goals and assert their sovereignty domestically as well as internationally. The present lawyers
suggested Native activists should engage the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the U.S.
State Department, not the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) or the Department of Interior, with
questions of treaty rights.76 This approach, as international lawyer Richard Falk pointed out,
would show that “this is an international issue, making it credible that these are groups of
sovereign nations.”77 The domestic approach, though important and necessary, presented
serious limitations. The Native and non-Native Workgroup participants alike expressed doubts
about the willingness of the State Department to consider and treat treaties with Native
Americans as evidence of their sovereignty. Robert McLaughlin, a treaty consultant and a
member of the Tribal Council of the Standing Rock Sioux, reflected on his experience with the
State Department: the “real danger of using the State Department is that they have expertise in
getting rid of conflict. It’s a dangerous bureaucracy. They are slicker that the Department of
Interior, etc.”78 Further, as AIM activist John Trudell pointed out, the U.S. government did not
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have an incentive to punish itself: “We realise [sic] that we have been going to the criminals (US
government) and asking them to punish themselves for their acts toward us. Now we need an
international treaty, not just the 1868 [Fort Laramie] treaty.”79 Given the limitations of the
domestic approach, outside pressure was necessary to succeed. As Oren Lyons stated: “It is no
longer a question of whether or not we take cases to courts such as the World Court, we will
have to. It is a question of how to do it.”80
One of the international strategies suggested by international lawyer Joel Carlson, was
for Native Americans to “formulate an international case and take it to the International court
[sic] at the Hague and bring world attention to the treaties which the US has broken.” Carlson
recommended that Native Americans draw up a petition, asking the Court to recognize their
sovereignty.81 Approaching the World Court, while a possible avenue for Native Americans to
assert their sovereignty, presented limitations stemming from the nature of international
relations and law, which made the outcome of the case uncertain. A possible failure of the case
caused some concerns among the Native participants about its potential negative impact. Oren
Lyons voiced this concern during one of the meetings: “… what if we lost in the World Court?
We can’t gamble. … How do we safeguard our flank?”82 Attorney Aubrey Grossman thought it
was “impossible for any court to examine any of the treaties and come up with any other
decision than that the US has violated them.”83 But even if the case failed, the lawyers felt it
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would draw world attention to the struggle, because “when injustice prevails, it’s news” and the
mass media “is a powerful force for a change,” and thus worth the try.84
The Workgroup participants discussed other international forums and organizations
Native peoples should approach, including the UN, which was favored as the preferred option
by Grossman and Falk. As Falk put it, the World Court was “a very conservative institution that
[was] basically controlled by the colonial power in the world.” He believed more emphasis
should be put on forums concerned with human rights, genocide, or problems of colonialism,
such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States to some degree, Organization
for African Unity, and other arenas within the world.85 Since coming to the UN directly with
demands for recognition of sovereignty would have been impossible, due to the UN Charter and
consideration of indigenous peoples as “domestic matters,” the framework of the UN Human
Rights agenda and larger concerns for world peace offered a way in, as the following exchange
shows:
Leon Shenandoah (Onondaga headsman): Am I right that the UN will listen only
to another nations?
Aubrey Grossman, lawyer: The Human Rights Commission will listen to a group.
Joel Carlson, international lawyer: Or if there were a threat to peace, the UN
Security Council will listen. There’s a precedent with Rhodesia on that.86
The Workgroup participants considered using the existing concepts to achieve their own goals
by gaining access to the international mechanisms and work from within. Jimmie Durham, AIM
International Division, who already had experience working in Geneva, pointed out the potential
use of the international forum to the advantage of indigenous peoples. He offered an example
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of Amilcar Cabral, an African revolutionary, who “finally learned to work with the UN, to make
speeches and use ‘white’ ideals and pretensions, though he was a simple guy who started a
revolutionary group.”87
Unity among Native peoples was a crucial aspect of the international strategy in order to
effectively utilize the UN. Richard Falk expressed the belief that these “treaty issue cannot be
solved unless the Indian nations cooperate with one another and develop what is a national
movement to achieve these results.”88 To achieve the needed unity and unified approach to the
issue of treaty rights, the workgroup participants stressed the need to create a forum or a
committee that would bring Native Americans together. Mathew King, President of the
Traditional Sioux, agreed: “The purpose is to create unity to a realistic effort that is to organize a
treaty committee on a national scale for presenting the cases to lawyers so that they can
present it to the US government.”89 In the light of the international direction the activists were
discussing, Russell Means pointed out, “If we are going to world forums, AOS and South
America, we must have our own forum first.”90
On June 13th, 1974, the Workgroup presented a “10-Point Consensus of International
Affairs Council,” outlining the new international strategy of “moving outside the constitution.”91
Among the specific tasks, the document listed the need to secure “support of world opinion
from other nations, especially small, oppressed nations,” and the need for unity, “especially if
we are going international.” Points 9 and 10 clearly stated there was a need to “continue work
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on international issues” and that there “should be a permanent commission to work on this
[international issues].”92 The same day, the participants put forward specific proposals for this
commission, which led to the establishment of the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC), as
an alliance of ninety-seven Native nations that would be recognizable around the world and
with the stipulation that any (Native) nation can join.93 In the following days, the newly formed
organization outlined its main purpose and goals as to be an establishment of access to
international political bodies such as the United Nations:
We recognize that there is only one color of Mankind in the world who are not
represented in the United Nations; that is the indigenous Redman of the Western
Hemisphere. We recognize this lack of representation in the United Nations
comes from the genocidal policies of the colonial power of the United States.
…
The International Indian Treaty Council established by this conference is directed
to make the application to the United Nations for recognition and membership of
the sovereign Native Nations. We pledge our support to any similar application
by an aboriginal people.94
Discussions about the necessity of and strategies for Native international diplomacy and
engagement with the UN spanned the entire movement for Native rights, from the radical AIM
to the moderate NCAI and NIB. The NCAI discussed the same issues at its conference in San
Diego, held in October of that year. Participation of activists and tribal leaders, such as Oren
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Lyons and Robert McLaughling (Standing Rock Sioux), at both the AIM and NCAI conferences,
especially in the meetings on international work, illustrates the importance these activists
attached to the question of transnational diplomacy and its strategies by the mid-1970s.95
The 1974 NCAI convention in San Diego included a workshop titled “Workshop Four:
National and International Indian Relations,” led by George Manuel of the NIB and Philip (Sam)
Deloria. The focus of Manuel’s speech during the workshop was the importance of Native
transnational cooperation and the role of an NGO consultative status with the UN ECOSOC for
Native organizations as a strategic way to gain access to the UN and ability to introduce new
topics and shape agenda-setting within the UN human rights mechanism. The NIB itself had
applied for NGO status in 1970, with the goal to raise awareness of and to bring the problems of
indigenous peoples before the UN, using the organization’s international human rights agenda.96
It took full four years before the UN ECOSOC NGO Commission reviewed the application. NIB
president George Manuel had to first assure Canada that the application did not mean a
challenge to the nation-state and its territorial integrity. Only after this assurance, did Canada
cease to actively block the organization’s application in the NGO Committee, but it did not
support it either. The main opposition came from Great Britain, France, and, not surprisingly,
the United States. The main support for the NIB’s petition came from the recently independent
states on the Committee. As a result of this support and Native persistence, the NIB was granted
NGO consultative status and was the first Native American national organization from North
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America to receive it.97 The status was granted with the understanding that NIB would create in
the near future a truly transnational organization, which would then inherit the NGO status. In
1975, the NIB co-founded the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP), to represent
indigenous peoples globally. The WCIP took over the NIB’s NGO status in 1977.98
The goal of the Native North American NGO strategy, as proposed at the NCAI
conference, was to use the framework of the international human rights agenda to gain access
and ability to subvert the mechanisms from within in order to introduce indigenous
understanding of human rights and sovereignty by expanding the existing definition of human
rights (defined as individual rights) to include collective rights. During the workshop Q&A
session, Deloria explained the results they were hoping to achieve by using the UN:
… what we’re hoping to do in the long run is through the use of the basic human
rights legislation in the United Nations, which itself is an exception to the domestic
question taboo, through the use of this human rights legislation and reinterpreting
the human rights legislation to take into account the groups’ rights, rights that
Indian people are concerned about, we hope to develop international standards
that will apply to what the United States does in relation to treaties and in relation
to basic Indian question. That’s a long way down the road and it’s going to require
a hell of a lot of research and discussion, but it seems to us that that’s the most
promising avenue that’s available.99
The inclusion of the workshop and discussion of international strategies at the NCAI
conference indicates that by the mid-1970s, even a moderate organization originally interested
only in the national aspect of Native rights recognized the necessity of engaging the
international community to protect treaty rights and started looking toward the UN. The NCAI
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went from a view of the UN as inappropriate for Native issues in the 1950s, to concentrating on
changing US laws regarding Native peoples with the hope their success could serve as an
inspiration and precedent for Native Americans in Central and South Americas in the 1960s, to
transnational cooperation with the NIB in the 1970s, which indirectly involved the organization
in international work.100 By the 1980s, the NCAI included workshops focusing on international
aspects of Native rights at its conventions. The 1984 convention in Spokane featured two
workshops, covering topics of formation of Native regional transnational organizations, various
avenues for filling legal complaints internationally, and ways to address Native human rights
issues in international forums. For his candidacy for NCAI President, Reuben Snake, a chairman
of the Winnebago tribe of Nebraska, stressed in his application essay the need to engage in
international work: “It is time to start thinking and acting internationally to create and
implement political coalitions with our Indian relatives throughout the entire Western
Hemisphere.”101

While the NIB/NCAI and IITC shared the long-term goal of international recognition of
Native political sovereignty, self-governance, and treaty rights, they chose different approaches
and tactics to achieve it, at least initially. The NIB’s strategy was centered on re-defining the

100

Suzan S. Harjo, interview by author, September 14, 2013, Washington, D.C.; “NCAI Signs
Agreement with Canadian Indians,” The Sentinel Bulletin (July - August, 1974), 3; “Proceedings,” 4, 13,
NCAI-R.
101
“Report of the 41st Annual Convention, Our Inalienable Rights: Treaties, Land, Culture,
Sovereignty, Government; The Powers & Responsibilities of Our Indian & Native Governments,” 152,
NCAI-R, NCAI Conventions, 1984 – 1985, Box 41, Folder: NCAI Conventions and Mid-Year Conferences
[1984 Convention – Spokane, Washington], Report of the 41st Annual Convention Our Inalienable Rights:
Treaties, Land, Culture, Sovereignty, Government; “Second General Assembly, 4:30 – 6:30pm: Workshop
on Addressing Indian and Native Rights in the International Arena,” 8, 19, NCAI-R, NCAI Conventions, 1983
– 1984, Box 40, Folder: NCAI Conventions and Mid-Year Conferences [1984 Convention – Spokane,
Washington] [41st] Convention; Reuben A. Snake, Jr., “WHY I WANT TO BE YOUR HUMBLE SERPENT: A
Brief Dissertation on My Candidacy for NCAI President,” NCAI-R, NCAI Conventions, 1984 – 1985, Box 41,
Folder: NCAI Conventions and Mid-Year Conferences [1985 Convention – Tulsa, Oklahoma]; NCAI
Convention – Tulsa Oklahoma 10/7 – 11/85.

158

existing framework of human rights to include collective, treaty-based rights of indigenous
peoples by subverting the existing concepts of human rights and laws, rather than attempt to
gain international recognition of tribes as sovereign nations directly. In Sam Deloria’s view, the
influx of the newly independent nations in the UN General Assembly, who could outvote the
“industrial nations,” led to the withdrawal of financial support for the UN by the later. And
having a movement with the goal of recognition of every individual Indian tribe as a full UN
member might accelerate the withdrawal process. As he stated, even if recognition of Native
tribes by the UN continued to be the “long range goal, I think by hitting our head against that
same spot on the wall over and over again, we’re going to miss the fact that there is a gate
through that wall just a little ways down, and let’s walk through that gate and get on the other
side that way and then see what we’re going to do.”102 Receiving a consultative status with the
ECOSOC for Native organizations was the gate through the wall for the NIB. Once through, the
goal was to re-define the existing ideas of international law, human rights, and the concept of
political sovereignty, to include collective rights and land rights. With the new, expanded
understanding of international law and nature of society, the organization was going to work on
developing a set of international standards that would limit the powers of industrial nations to
remove indigenous peoples from their lands or force them to assimilate.103
The IITC’s goal, as stated in the Declaration of Continuing Independence, was to seek
support “in the struggle for the continuing independence of Native Nations” and international
recognition of treaties.104 The goals and strategy centered on the question of sovereignty and
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its definition, positioned within the larger framework of decolonization. Following the
establishment of the IITC, the organization continued to discuss the meaning of sovereignty as
its ultimate goal. Some experts expressed doubts about Native Americans achieving the status
of independent nations. Some believed a distinction between internal and external sovereignty
should be made, with the IITC pursuing a status of a land rights organization. Others suggested
Native nations would collectively seek an observer seat in the UN, “with a transfer of trusteeship
administration from individual states to the UN Trusteeship Council.” But in general, the original
goal of independence was still seen as the ideal.105
In a manifesto from the second IITC Conference, held in 1976 on the Yankton Lakota
Sioux reservation in South Dakota, called the “Red Paper,” the organization reconfirmed its
dedication to Native sovereignty and positioned it in the larger context of colonialism,
international human rights, and decolonization. Citing the history of Native-white relations and
recent events, including the trials of Russell Means, Dennis Banks and other AIM leaders, and
the murder of AIM activist Anna Mae Aquash, the writers argued: “The above acts constitute the
most flagrant violations of international law, human rights, and self-determination principles.
The rules of the United States are designed to achieve results absolutely contrary to those goals
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of the United Nations Charter … and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples”106
Using the framework of decolonization and the UN Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the authors of the “Red Paper” charged the
United States with violations of the UN Declaration mandate to take actions to transfer all
powers to Indian peoples.107 The presentation of the United States as the perpetrator and
violator of national unity of Indian nations, seemed to be an effective way to turn the
Westphalian argument of territorial integrity of existing states around to the advantage of
Native peoples: “The U.S. has carried out acts aimed at disrupting the national unity of Indian
people established between Indian nations through its harrassment [sic] of our leaders and
through undercover spying through its agents and informers.” The writers charged the U.S.
government with violating the Charter of the United Nations, paragraph six of the General
Assembly’s Resolution 1514(XV).108
To establish their right to sovereignty, the “Red Paper” authors presented claims to
historical and continuous political sovereignty, enjoyed prior to the European arrival and
continued through treaty-making with the colonial governments and the United States. They
stressed the existence of indigenous laws and governments, as well as control and use of tribal
territories.109 In this, the “Red Paper” reads similarly to the Cherokee memorials to Congress in
order to prevent the looming removal in the 1830s, emphasizing internationally recognized
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markers of a state - civil government and laws, and use of land, embedded in Vattle’s Law of
Nations.110 Going one step further, the writers claimed Native nations’ historical right to their
sovereignty, and therefore an applicability for decolonization. They also positioned the issue in
the context of world peace, making Native sovereignty a global interest: “…the United States’
colonialism and imperialism, [ ] which constitutes gross violations of the Charter of the United
Nations, the International Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Conventions on
Genocide, Apartheid, Racism, and Treaty Agreements between Nations, and standards of
International Law and human rights, and whereas those oppressive conditions constitute a
growing threat to world peace.”111
The use of the decolonization framework was a logical choice for the organization to
pursue in the 1970s. As Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz points out, while “the existing model of
independent nations emerging from colonialism did not neatly fit the situation of Indian peoples
in the Americas,” membership of small island nations from the Caribbean and South Pacific,
most with populations and size of their territories smaller than some Native reservations within
the U.S., increased during the decade.112 This clearly showed that colonized peoples with any
territory or population size could benefit from decolonization, despite the existing arguments to
the contrary. In his 1974 book Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties, Vine Deloria, Jr., clearly
showed that the arguments against Native sovereignty based in territory and population size, or
the geographical encroachment by the United States, were bogus ones. He compared territorial
size and populations of numerous independent nations around the world with Native American
reservations, demonstrating that Native tribes could easily compete.113
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The IITC planned to test its strategy by pursing an independent nation status for the
Sioux Nation, based on the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, and framed it in the larger context of
decolonization. The activists hoped that gaining recognition of political sovereignty for one
Native nation would set a precedent within the UN system for the future.114 However, the
decolonization approach was hindered by the existence of the so-called “saltwater thesis” or the
“blue water thesis,” which states that “only overseas colonial territories were eligible for
decolonization and self-determination.”115 At the end, the IITC, like other indigenous
organizations, had to first fill the available space allowed to them within the international
system and then attempt to stretch and reshape it. The organization decided to focus on human
rights and their violations, namely the U.S. violations of the UN Convention on Genocide. The
IITC applied for NGO status with UN ECOSOC and received it in 1977.116
To gain access to the UN, the IITC had to negotiate between its ultimate goals and the
available political space. It meant revising their strategy, scaling back, and re-defining their
concepts of sovereignty.117 Correspondence between IITC’s Jimmy Durham and the UN NGO
Council Affairs Officer Lola Costa reveals the limited political space of the UN and the
compromises IITC had to make in order to gain access. Durham submitted the IITC Declaration
of Continuous Independence as a part of the NGO application, but the organization’s
commitment to Native independence immediately raised questions with the UN. Costa was
concerned that the IITC ultimate goal was at odds with the UN Charter’s policy of no
intervention in domestic affairs and territorial integrity of UN member states. Durham had to
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explain that the IITC’s mission was to gather and disseminate information about Native and
indigenous struggles and to develop mechanisms for advancing Native nations’ struggles for
their “human rights, freedom, dignity, independence, to combat colonialism, and to foster and
nurture Native American culture and pride therein.”118 Durham argued that the IITC applied for
NGO status, because it recognized the importance of information sharing in fields such as
human rights and education. The communication assured the UN officer that the organization
did not plan to apply for UN membership as a nation.119 The IITC had to maneuver and
compromise in order to gain access to the UN through the only available channel, that of the
international human rights agenda, aligning its strategy with that of the NIB.

The turning point in regards to a sustained presence of indigenous peoples on the
international scene came in 1977, with the UN NGO Conference on Discrimination Against
Indigenous Populations in the Americas in Geneva, Switzerland. The conference was organized
by the NGO Sub-Committee on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Apartheid, and Colonialism of the
Special Committee of NGOs on Human Rights and brought together Native delegates with about
fifty non-indigenous NGOs, such as the ILO and UNESCO. For many of the NGOs, this was their
first contact with Native peoples.120 With over one hundred indigenous delegates and another
150 as observers and guests, the conference brought an unprecedented number of indigenous
activists to Europe and generated new social contacts, expanded information exchange
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networks, and increased support for indigenous rights.121
Further, the conference offered opportunities for Native delegates to visibly assert their
political and intellectual sovereignty, and, for the first time, to have international organizations
specifically focusing on indigenous issues. Native delegates from North, Central, and South
Americas used the conference to present their grievances and demands, including a unified call
for the implementation of the principles of self-determination, set within the existing context of
human rights, thus implementing some of the international strategy discussed at the 1974
conferences. The 1977 UN conference marked a start of a more concentrated and coordinated
effort on the part of indigenous peoples, “the beginning of indigenous peoples’ direct activity in
the international context.”122 It also represented an official recognition of indigenous rights as a
transnational issue and part of the UN international human rights agenda.123 As Jimmy Durham
of the IITC evaluated it, the conference was “international recognition, on a massive scale, of
our rights as the people of this land and of the arrogance and hypocrisy of the American system.
It is the recognition of those two facts, by millions of Europeans, Africans, Cubans, and Asian
peoples. It means that we have made a very large part of the world recognize who we are and
even to stand with us in solidarity in our long fight.”124
Following aspects of the strategy outlined during the 1974 conferences, Native
participants at the UN gathering presented their struggles and demands within the frameworks
of human rights and world peace, while asserting their own world views and understandings of
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these frameworks. Discussions in the conference’s three commissions: economic, social and
cultural, and legal, which focused on topics of land and land rights, cultural rights and genocide,
and the right to self-determination, were positioned within the contexts of human rights and
international law. For example, the Economic Commission Report on land rights concluded: “the
land question is fundamentally an economic question, but involves the survival of human
societies and is, therefore, a moral question, a question of human rights.”125 The Final
Resolution of the Conference then stressed the need to better understand the relationship of
indigenous peoples to their lands “as basis to all their beliefs, customs, traditions, and culture,”
as well as the need for a recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights to the return and control of
sufficient and suitable lands, and the right to unrestricted and communal ownership of those
lands.126 The importance of land to the survival of indigenous peoples and their cultures led to a
recommendation to organize a conference that would focus specifically on indigenous peoples
and their relationship to land.127 This conference took place four years later, in September
1981.
Similarly, the issue of cultural rights was framed within the context of genocide and
human rights. The Social and Cultural Commission considered the definition of ethnocide and
defined it as a part of genocide, an already established UN issue of human rights: “To destroy a
culture is to destroy the basis for an autonomous society able to defend the interests of its
members. It is noteworthy that this Commission has had great difficulty in isolating the
destruction of culture from other acts of genocide, and it is necessary to constantly bear in mind
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the links existing between these phenomena.”’ The commission’s report concluded: “The
Commission of Ethnocide must be define as both a cause and a part of Genocide,” effectively
linking assimilation policies and removals of indigenous peoples from their lands to the larger
context of genocide and the UN human rights agenda.128 To ensure an end of assimilation
policies within the UN mechanism, the Commission also recommended revisions to the ILO
Convention No. 107 as well as for all international instruments regarding indigenous peoples to
include respect for traditional law and customs.129
Unity among Native peoples, stressed as a key aspect of international activism during
the 1974 conferences, continued to play an important role at the 1977 conference. The shared
experiences and unified demands presented by Native delegates from North, Central, and South
Americas, influenced the commissions’ final reports and recommendations. The Social and
Cultural Commission report specifically stated: “… we have heard the Indian participants speak
with a unified voice in defense of their way of life and in the call for positive action for its rescue.
It is in this spirit that the Commission has examined the different instances of cultural
aggression, Ethnocide and Genocide in the Americas.”130 Similarly, the unified stand and
consensus among Native delegates regarding their demand for self-determination, reflected in
the Declaration of Principles, led the Legal Commission to conclude that the Declaration “be
given detailed consideration and study by the appropriate non-governmental organizations, and
that the Declaration be brought to the attention of the appropriate organs of the United
Nations.”131 While not an immediate step toward recognition of indigenous sovereignty, the
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recommendation at least signaled the willingness to pay attention to Native views and a step
away from the “domestic issues” taboo.132
The conference, while an enormous opportunity, had its limitations and challenges. One
of the challenges Native delegates faced came from linguistic limitations, prevailing
misconceptions, and lack of knowledge on the part of non-indigenous participants, despite
increased media coverage and Native initiatives to educate the public about their issues in the
years preceding the Conference. Linguistic limitations among Native delegates from North,
Central, and South America required the services of interpreters. However, the assigned UN
interpreters lacked the knowledge of indigenous peoples’ cultural concepts and thus proved
ineffective. Dr. Jose Barreiro (Taino), Akwesasne Notes correspondent, commented on the
situation:
I went to the conference as a reporter for the national newspaper, Akwesasne
Notes, but after a session when the elder delegates had grown frustrated with
the assigned UN interpreters, who lacked awareness of indigenous peoples’
concepts and terminologies, an Arawak chief from Venezuela asked me to
translate. As it turned out, I interpreted meetings for three days - between
Aymara and Hopi, Seneca and Maquiritari, Mapuche and Lakota, and, at the
larger gatherings, formally between North and South… 133
Clear communication between Native delegates themselves was important for the
deliberations. It was even more important to be able to explain indigenous concepts and world
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views to non-indigenous NGO representatives and politicians, in order to gain support and bring
about the desired changes. Despite these limitations, the Conference was an important step in
increasing awareness and understanding between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. With
attendance of representatives affiliated with 38 different international organizations from
around the world (including some indigenous organizations) and representatives of at least 19
national governments, the Conference offered an opportunity to introduce indigenous issues to
people who may have never heard of them.134 As Niall MacDarmon reflected in his closing
address, for many of the NGOs it was their “first meeting with the indigenous Indian people”
and one of the goals of the Conference was “to inform ourselves [the NGOs] about the
sufferings and aspirations of people who are the victims of racial discrimination.”135 In this
aspect, the conference was a success.
The conference was an opportunity to assert Native political and intellectual
sovereignty, even if only within existing international frameworks, and it signaled a new phase
of indigenous international activism and their presence in international forums. In the words of
Romesh Chandra, the Chairman of the conference, the gathering marked “the broadest, united
representation of the indigenous nations and peoples that has ever gathered at any
international conference.”136 The Declaration of Principles gave focus and direction to future
work by Native organizations and activists. As Dunbar-Ortiz assessed, “Particularly during the
last five years of that decade [the 1970s], indigenous representatives took control of the new
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item on the UN human rights agenda.”137 While pursuing the human rights angle, Native
American activists and organizations looked for ways to reintroduce their long-term goals for
international recognition as sovereign nations. Even if they had to scale back in their activities,
Native Americans were now “present at the forum of the nation states of the world, and they
could not be ignored.”138

The 1980s: Continuing the Momentum of 1977
Seizing the momentum created by the 1977 Conference, Native Americans continued to
press for visibility and more space to voice their grievances and find solutions to the problems
they faced. Native organizations and leaders continued to work with the United Nations and, as
recommended at the 1974 AIM conference, approached other international organizations and
forums focused on human rights, in order to secure more support and raise awareness of their
situations and demands. Several key events took place in the early 1980s that helped to advance
indigenous issues on the international scene. The testimonies by Native delegates about human
rights violations and the centrality of land to the survival of indigenous peoples from the 1977
Conference discussions, led to the 1980 Fourth Russell Tribunal and the 1981 NGO Conference
on Indigenous Peoples and the Land. In both forums, indigenous concerns and rights were
presented within the larger context of international human rights and world peace, effectively
linking local problems of traditionally marginalized groups to global issues. From these events
and testimonies and indigenous demands presented there, came the call for a mechanism for
indigenous peoples within the UN system, which led to the establishment of the Working Group
on Indigenous Populations in 1982.
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The Fourth Russell Tribunal was one of the human rights forums outside the UN that
Native activists used to present local rights violations in the larger context of world peace.
Organized by a coalition of Denmark-based activists and organizations, collectively called the
Workgroup Indian Project, and supported by the Russell Peace Foundation, an organization
focused on promoting world peace and respect for human rights, the forum was modeled after
the first Russell - Sartre Tribunal in 1967. The impulse to organize the forum in 1980 came from
testimonies presented during the 1977 NGO Conference, and the goal of the Tribunal was to
further investigate some of these charges of human rights violations made there. Native groups
submitted 47 cases for consideration, from which 19 were selected for presentation as
declarations and 14 were chosen to be heard in full, through witness testimonies, expert
statements, and documentation.139 The cases were organized by themes into 11 major areas:
seizure of lands, appropriation of resources, invasion of Native territories, extreme oppression
and forced/cheap labor without normal recourse to basic legal protection, violations of internal
self-government, failure or refusal to involve Native Americans in creation of constitutions,
denial of religious freedom, racism or Euro-ethnocentrism and its impact, denial of adequate
health programs, basic public hygiene, sterilization, torture, extreme forms of repression,
imprisonment and behavior modification techniques, and the denial of Native rights and
recognition as Indians of certain groups.140
The importance of the Russell Tribunal for Native activists was the fact that another
prestigious international body outside the UN seriously considered their claims and their rights.
Further, the Jury of the Tribunal decided that most of the cases presented evidence that
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national and international laws had been violated.141 According to AIM/IITC activist Bill Means,
the Tribunal further internationally legitimized the struggles of indigenous peoples:
What made Rotterdam unique was that we were outside of the UN setting but
in the very prestigious Russell Tribunal [which] was like a catapult in terms of
our visibility, our issues, our histories, documents, what we’re calling for. Here
we are in the international community now, and we’re no longer out of sight,
out of mind. And so the Russell Tribunal helped to legitimize the struggle of
indigenous peoples worldwide.”142
The selected cases presented broad and complex issues that crossed the lines of several
different concerns and themes - human rights, world peace, national liberation, and nuclear
disarmament. Two cases especially generated wide publicity and interest. One of them
presented violations of human rights by the Guatemalan government directed against activists
from the Committee for Peasant Unity (CUC), most of them Maya. Two Maya activists,
appearing under assumed names and with covered faces to protect their identities (and lives),
recounted the violence in Guatemala directed against their people and the events leading up to
a massacre of CUC members at the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City in January 1980. The
CUC activists traveled to the city to protest government violence and the disappearances of
community leaders. Finding no support from government officials, the delegation decided to
raise the issue internationally and went to the Spanish embassy. The Guatemalan army and
police surrounded the embassy and almost immediately firebombed it, which resulted in the
death of 39 people. The only two survivors were the Spanish ambassador, who suffered burns,
and one Maya activist, who was later kidnapped from a hospital, tortured and killed. The
Spanish Ambassador denounced the massacre and declared later that he believed “his life was
saved only by the watchful presence of the Costa Rican Embassador [sic], who sat with him
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throughout his time in the hospital.143
The second case was brought to the Tribunal by the Western Shoshones, protesting the
forcible takeover of their lands by the U.S. government to build an MX missile system there. The
U.S. government was charged with unilaterally enforcing a financial settlement, which the
Shoshone nation rejected, because the proposed construction project threatened the already
declining water-table in their territory. Execution of the project would lead to the need to
relocate, and it would also put dangerous weapons on Shoshone territory. The case generated a
strong response from the international peace movement and also became one of the topics
discussed during the 1981 NGO Conference on Indigenous Peoples and the Land.144 While both
cases were local in their nature, they touched upon topics within the larger context of
international human rights as well as world peace and disarmament, making them a concern to
indigenous and non-indigenous people alike.
The NGO Conference on Indigenous Peoples and the Land focused on the central role of
land and land rights in the survival of indigenous peoples. At the same time, the whole question
was set in the larger context of world peace, nuclear build-up and disarmament, and
international law. Four commissions considered the role of land and indigenous land rights in
four different contexts: legal - land rights, philosophical and economic - related to transnational
corporations, international treaties and agreements, and threats to world peace tied to nuclear
arms build-up proliferation.145 While the 1977 Conference had concentrated on the indigenous
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peoples of the Americas, the 1981 Conference broadened its geographical scope from
hemispheric to global, further tying Native issues and struggles to concerns of a larger
international community. The conference included about 150 indigenous delegates from the
Americas, the Philippines, Australia, Norway, Scotland and Ireland, among others. This time
fewer governments from Western European countries registered for the Conference, yet many
of them came as unofficial attendees, while official government delegations from Asia, Africa
and Latin American countries also attended. Almost fifty NGOs with consultative status with the
UN ECOSOC registered for the conference. Six indigenous NGOs with ECOSOC consultative
status, the IITC, World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP), the Indian Law Resource Center
(ILRC), the South American Indian Council (CISA), the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), and
the Australian National Conference of Aborigines, were all invited to submit documentation to
the conference and organize delegations to attend. Several national liberation organizations also
attended, as they had in 1977.146
Similar to the 1977 Conference, indigenous peoples made presentations in the four
commissions, in which the issues of land and indigenous land rights were positioned within the
larger context of human rights and world peace. For example, the report from Commission Four
reads:
…ultimately, the struggle of the indigenous peoples for disarmament, land rights
and self-determination contributes to the welfare not only of the indigenous
peoples themselves, but also for the whole human family. By the same token
the Commission underlined that all world-wide efforts against the nuclear arms
build-up will benefit the struggles of the indigenous movement.147
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The Commission also emphasized the negative impact of the escalating arms race on indigenous
peoples and its connection to the larger issue of ethnocide and genocide: “the escalating arms
race taking place on the land and waters of the indigenous peoples, continues and represents a
continued physical and cultural genocide and must be condemned as blatant racism.”148
Pointing out that the struggles of indigenous peoples for their rights to control their lands and
resources contributed to the welfare of “the whole human family,” the Commission
recommended conferring of an “official UN status for the indigenous peoples in order that the
grave consequences of the arms race on their life and their land be heard in a major
international and intergovernmental formum [sic].”149

One of the major outcomes of the 1981 Conference, with long-lasting impact on
indigenous international presence and work, was a proposal to establish “annually a Working
Group on Indigenous Populations,” with a mandate to elicit information and hear testimonies
from “all indigenous nations, organizations and groups,” as well as to recommend “fact-finding
missions to investigate urgent and serious situations.”150 The original idea for the group was
first presented at the 1977 NGO Conference, but the actual proposal was drafted and presented
at the meeting of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities in August 1981 in Geneva.151 Strong support from Theo van Boven, Dutch
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international human rights lawyer and the director of the UN Division of Human Rights, was a
crucial boost to lobbying efforts to have the proposal passed in the Sub-Commission. Van Boven
stated in his opening address to the NGO Conference on Indigenous Peoples and the Land in
September 1981:
It has become clear, first of all, that there is need for further standard-setting
regarding the human rights of indigenous peoples. It has also become clear that
indigenous peoples need an appropriate forum within the United Nations to
which they can address themselves on a regular basis and which may give
regular consideration to their problems. Thirdly, it has also become clear that
there is need within the United Nations for an on-going system of Fact-finding
into problems affecting the enjoyment of human rights by indigenous
peoples.152
According to Dunbar-Ortiz’s memoir, she and Wally Feather, with permission from the
IITC, drafted the working group’s proposal for the human rights NGOs to sign. The other two
indigenous NGOs with UN consultative status at that time, the ILRC and the WCIP, were involved
in lobbying efforts to have the final resolution passed by the Sub-Commission. Asbjorn Eide, the
Commission member from Norway, was the initial sponsor of the resolution. As a result of
lobbying efforts and intricate diplomacy by the Native NGOs’ representatives, the SubCommission approved a resolution in favor of the creation of the working group.153 The 1981
International NGO Conference on Indigenous Peoples and the Land that followed the SubCommission meeting strongly endorsed the Sub-Commission’s resolution on the working
group.154
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The final approval of the working group by the UN Commission on Human Rights and the
ECOSOC took place in spring 1982. The working group was to be composed of five experts on
human rights from Africa, Asia, South America, Eastern Europe and Western Europe, who would
meet annually for five days prior to the annual meeting of the Sub-Commission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. These original five working days soon
increased to ten. The working group received a broad mandate to review developments
regarding the rights of indigenous peoples, analyze information submitted by indigenous
peoples and organizations and to submit conclusions from these reviews to the SubCommission. The working group was also tasked with the development of international
standards - a covenant for the promotion and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples.
The WGIP was the first permanent UN body to specifically address indigenous issues and its
establishment represented an opening for indigenous peoples to influence UN human rights
agenda-setting, especially since it was open to any indigenous group or representative,
regardless of their UN ECOSOC status.155
In practice, due to its broad mandate and by allowing submission of reports and
proposals directly from national and international indigenous organizations, the WGIP opened a
door to the UN wider for Native American and other indigenous organizations. The importance
of the working group can be ascertained from the attendance of the group’s first meeting. The
observers included governments of at least 12 countries, the PLO, several UN specialized
agencies, including the ILO and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), about 13
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indigenous organizations, some of which had NGO consultative status with the UN ECOSOC.
Numerous UN NGOs sent their representatives, many of them showing interest in indigenous
issues for the first time.156 The attendance of the working group two years later continued to
show a remarkable interest in indigenous issues, “unprecedented for a working group, and it is,
itself, a strong political statement about the importance and urgency of the issues being
considered by the Working Group.”157
The WGIP’s mandate to develop international standards on indigenous rights was
another step in dismantling the “magic taboo” and enhanced the opportunity for indigenous
peoples to directly influence understandings of human rights and international legislation. This
was the outcome that George Manuel and Sam Deloria hoped for in 1974 - the opportunity to
reshape the definition of human rights to include collective rights and new definition of political
sovereignty.158 Immediately, during the first meeting, delegates started to formulate definitions
and standards regarding indigenous rights. The final report from the first meeting defined seven
categories of indigenous concerns and rights:
a. the right to life, to physical integrity and to security of the indigenous
communities; b. the right to self-determination, the right to develop their own
culture, traditions, language and way of life; c. the right to freedom of religion
and traditional religious practices; d. the right to land and to natural resources;
e. civil and political rights; f. the right to education; and g. other rights.”159
In subsequent meetings the work continued on defining and redefining indigenous rights and
their standards, eventually leading to the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
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in 1994. After the completion of the Draft, the UN Commission on Human Rights established a
working group to debate the text and oversee any revisions. The final version of the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was adopted by the UN
General Assembly in September 2007.160

The establishment of the WGIP was also a success in the face of the changing political
climate of the 1980s. Within the United States, Native organizations reported an increasing
backlash against Native rights, threatening recent achievements as well as future progress.
Organized backlash against Native rights in the United States started developing in the mid1970s, from local vigilante groups and “protective associations,” and led to the 1976 formation
of the Interstate Congress for Equal Rights and Responsibilities. The growing threat of future
legislation against Native American interests and the possibility of abrogation of treaties
prompted the NCAI and the National Tribal Chairmen’s Association (NTCA) to call upon other
Native organizations to coordinate opposition. From this effort came the United Effort Trust
(UET) in 1978. The goal of the UET was to change public attitudes toward Native Americans
through mass communication and lobbying and to develop a strategy to counter the backlash. In
the same year, a conference with the goal to establish inter-organizational alliance to combat
the anti-Indian backlash was hosted by the Navajo nation. At this conference, the Native
American Treaty and Rights Organization (NATRO) was established. While UET declined to join
NATRO, it was committed to cooperate fully with it and other alliances formed to protect Native
rights.161
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With such a development, the WGIP became a necessary mechanism for Native activists
and organizations to exert international pressure on the US from the outside to uphold Indian
treaty rights. But even that became more difficult under the Reagan administration, which
turned away from former President Carter’s emphasis on human rights in his international
policy. While using human rights as a hammer against political opponents, such as the leftist
Sandinista government in Nicaragua, the administration at the same time withheld payments of
US dues to the UN. Due to the resulting “budgetary considerations,” many NGOs’ privileges
were eliminated, weakening the organizations’ position and effectiveness in the UN.162
The UN NGO Commission also felt the increased politicization of the international
human rights agenda in the 1980s. In 1984, the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC) was
granted NGO status with the UN ECOSOC. An NIYC Memorandum sent on February 10, 1984,
described the NGO Commission meeting, which discussed its application, as “highly politicized.
The USA and the USSR and its allies were involved in continuous arguments and recriminations.
This was quite a change from previous Committee meetings which were conducted in a non-
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political manner.”163 Political polarization also influenced the objections to the NIYC’s
application. While a number of the objections were factual, such as the organization’s weak
international membership (NIYC was a national organization) or a lack of discussion of
international issues reflected in its board meetings, in the NIYC’s view, some of the major
countries on the Commission were “ambivalent about NIYC, because it was difficult to place it
somewhere on the left-right spectrum.”164 Further, Nicaragua initially opposed the application,
arguably because of the NIYC’s position on the ongoing conflict between the country’s
Sandinista government and its Miskito, Sumu, and Rama indigenous peoples. In the end,
through carefully prepared presentations and lobbying, the NIYC received NGO consultative
status in the Roster category.165
Skillful maneuvering through the political landscape of the Cold War United Nations was
a necessary skill for indigenous delegates if they wanted to keep their issues on the agenda and
a chance for their recommendations and resolutions to pass. Understanding the Cold War
political relations between the so-called “Second” (Socialist) and “Third” (Developing) Worlds as
well as the “First World,” and countries regarded as neutral, was a key to a successful alliance
building. As Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz observed:
In those days [1980s], getting Sweden, Yugoslavia and the nonaligned countries
together was a dream combination for winning in the UN (except for the
Security Council) because the socialist bloc would never oppose anything
supported by the nonaligned countries, and the European states would support
Sweden and Yugoslavia, both of which were considered neutral. But the Reagan
administration opposed nearly everything, including the existence of the U. N.166
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With the increasing politicization of the UN international human rights agenda and the need for
skillful maneuvering in the ECOSOC and its commissions, the establishment of the WGIP played
a major role in keeping indigenous issues not only active in international discussions, but also
away from the political polarization of the time. Dunbar-Ortiz credits the presence and
participation of indigenous peoples in the group as the key factor “that did not allow the WGIP
to become politicized along the East-West cold-war lines.”167
But even with the WGIP shielded from the East-West political split, indigenous demands
and goals faced other challenges, including misconceptions of who indigenous peoples were.
Increased coverage and visibility of Native peoples and their problems helped them to gain
access to international forums. But, despite the increased awareness and amount of available
information, Native activists had to continually challenge existing socio-political concepts. Even
though the Cobo Study, published in 1982, provided a working definition of “indigenous
peoples,” the definition and its acceptance was still a contested area in the mid-1980s. A report
by the ILRC on the 1985 WGIP meeting illustrates the issue. Mr. Tovsevski, representative from
the then Yugoslavia (one of the five WGIP members), maintained the belief that indigenous
peoples were in fact minorities within respective nation states, not separate peoples. In his
view, creating a separate category for them by the working group and attempting a new
definition would only cause confusion. Further, he believed that “the emphasis placed on land
rights was inappropriate since there is no need to tie land to cultural and ethnic identities.”168
The authors of the report could only speculate why Mr. Tovsevski opposed the creation
of a separate category for indigenous peoples, while at the same time he was reportedly “one of
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those responsible for the creation of the Working Group” and was thought “to be very
sympathetic to Indian and indigenous peoples’ interests.”169 The reason offered by the authors
was that Mr. Tovsevski was also a head of the Working Group on National Minorities and was
trying to develop principles and standards on the rights of minorities, but without much success.
The relative success of the WGIP and the interest it generated might have seemed to him
“inappropriate.”170 Another possible explanation could be that as a representative from a multinational communist state, Mr. Tovsevski may have been concerned what the potential impact
that an official acceptance of the definition of “indigenous” and the idea of cultural survival tied
to land and land rights might have had on his own country. Regardless of the reason, Mr.
Tovsevski’s attitude presented a serious obstacle to indigenous goals and the need for Native
activists to challenge and redefine existing concepts and frameworks, as the ILRC’s report
shows: “If he remains on the Working Group as he probably will, we must give special attention
to his concerns and questions. Unless he can be pursuaded [sic] to change his views, progress is
likely to be very slow.”171

Conclusion
By the late 1980s, indigenous peoples had established a continuous presence in the
United Nations and had worked to challenge the existing concepts of human rights,
international law, and the logic of the Westphalian system. Changing political circumstances in
the 1960s ad 1970s, offered new frameworks and opportunities for Native leaders to
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conceptualize their situation and frame their strategies. Moderate and radical activists and
organizations redefined their strategies and used the international human rights agenda and the
NGO mechanism as a way to bypass the “magic taboo” of domestic matters and gain access to
the UN. Once in, Native activists have worked to redefine human rights and international law
concepts to include collective treaty rights and indigenous sovereignty. Through the WGIP they
have reshaped the scope and terms of the discussions concerning Native peoples, from “Indian’
to ‘indigenous,’ from ‘nations’ and ‘people’ through ‘populations’ to ‘peoples.”172 Skillful
maneuvering within the Cold War political landscape and alliance building within the UN made
possible to secure support for indigenous proposals and to keep them on the UN agenda. An
important part of the success was also the ability of indigenous peoples to cooperate and
present a unified stand on principles of land and land rights and indigenous self-determination.
Their cooperation crossed tribal as well as nation-state boundaries and grew into a global social
movement.
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“I think we have to organize the people around the world”: The Global Indigenous Movement
“When I attended the United Nations conference [1972], it was at the United Nations
conference in meeting many of the third world leaders that I developed the idea that
maybe we should have a world conference of indigenous minorities - - that means the
native peoples of each country who have suffered the same consequences as us. The
aborigines of each country.”
George Manuel, 19741
“…it has dawn[ed] upon us that even though we sit in the far corner of the world, there
is a movement through the whole world of ideas and of peoples and it seems to us that
maybe we could do our little bit to humanise [sic] the present world as it is.”
Angmalortok Olsen (Greenland), 19742
“…we, all Indians of the continent, are one reality, we suffer the same illness and the
remedy will be the same.”
Ramiro Reynaga, 19773

During the last four decades, Native peoples around the world came together in a
common effort to protect their rights and secure their survival as peoples, creating a global
movement. This movement started with a recognition of common historical experiences and an
idea for cooperation of indigenous peoples worldwide, unified on the major issues Native
peoples have faced. Through personal connections of Native leaders who shared their views of
the common struggle and solidarity rose a system, composed of networks of Native individuals,
groups and organizations and their non-Native supporters.4 The movement has represented
multitudes of diverse local struggles, but also a commitment to a common goal of recognition of
indigenous rights, including the right to self-determination. Shared experiences with
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colonization, specifically the loss of homelands, languages and cultural and religious traditions,
also became foundation for a construction of a common indigenous identity.
Scholars of social movements have presented different perspectives and definitions of
what is a social movement. But they all agree on few major markers that identify an entity as a
social movement. Those are networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals,
groups, and/or organizations; engagement in a collective cultural or political conflict and
protest; and a shared collective identity.5 As such, the indigenous movement is a social
movement with global dimensions, including membership of indigenous communities from
around the world and their non-Native allies; it makes use of the United Nations, itself a global
organization; and it has a goal to create and maintain standards for treatment of indigenous
peoples with a global application.6
Most of the existing literature on the global indigenous movement examines it within
the context of international affairs, focusing on the movement’s relations with the United
Nations (UN), its impact on world politics, and the impact on the formulation of indigenous
identity.7 While some authors acknowledge the role of individuals in the formation of the
movement, their geographical and topical foci do not allow for a fuller examination of the role
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of the underlying ideas and personal connections in the movement’s formation. This chapter
attempts to fill this gap by arguing that the internationalization of Native intellectuals, such as
George Manuel of the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB) or Gerald Wilkinson of the National
Indian Youth Council (NIYC), and their personal connections with other indigenous and nonindigenous activists, played a crucial role in the rise of the global indigenous movement, its
structure and work, as well as the construction of indigenous identity. Examining individual
actors and organizations within the movement, their connections and the ideas that engendered
their work will expand our understanding of the role the circulation of ideas and people played
in the formation of the movement and the conceptualizing of Native issues and identity within a
global framework.

Internationalizing Native Views: The Ideas Behind the Indigenous Global Movement
In 1994, scholar Edward Said argued that while the task of an intellectual was to
represent “the collective suffering of [their] own people, testifying to its travails, reasserting its
enduring presence, reinforcing its memory, there must be added something else … For the
intellectual the task, I believe, is explicitly to universalize the crisis, to give greater human scope
to what a particular race or nation suffered, to associate that experience with the suffering of
others.”8 The global indigenous movement emerged from the same idea of associating one’s
struggle with the suffering of others. It was Native Americans’ interest in other indigenous
peoples and their ability to recognize the similarities in their struggles that led to the
establishment of the early connections and networks that formed the bases of the movement
and their joint efforts to seek common solutions to the similar problems they faced. Drawing
parallels with colonized peoples around the world and the recognition of common goals to
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secure rights to their homelands and continued existence as peoples encouraged Native leaders
and activists to seek and offer support, but also to look to their counterparts in other countries
for inspiration and possible solutions to their problems.
Native leaders and activists had drawn parallels of their experiences with others outside
the borders of the settler-states that engulfed them already before World War II, sometimes
traveling to meet their counterparts in other countries. These experiences in turn influenced
their own views and attitudes toward the problems faced by their communities. Native writer
and activists D’Arcy McNickle’s experiences in Mexico in the 1930s and 1940s had influenced his
personal and political views and writing in the post-war era, in which he developed a global
perspective. In his speech at the 1959 NCAI Convention in Phoenix, AZ, McNickle drew parallels
between the experiences of Native Americans and the indigenous peoples of Africa, reflecting
on the racial stereotypes that indigenous peoples were subjected to:
It may not be any comfort to know that Indians are not alone in this experience.
The same judgment was cast upon so-called native peoples in other parts of the
world. Rudyard Kipling, one of the most popular writers in the early years of the
present century, referred to certain native tribes as “fuzzy-wuzzies,” and his
European and American readers doubtless felt that the term was adequately
descriptive of these people.9
Later in his speech, while talking about the Tuscarora’s fight against the plans of the New York
State Power Authority to flood part of their reservation, McNickle commented on the liberation
movements of Native peoples around the world, putting the Tuscarora struggle in the context of
Native liberation world-wide:
Today, the so-called native peoples of the world are on the move, breaking
away from old concepts and old economic systems that held them in bondage.
We read of the struggle of the African tribes and nations to establish their
independent existence. Sudan, Ghana, Nairobi have all moved up, and others
are to follow. After being told for generations that they were incapable of
9
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self-government, these peoples are discovering that there is no substitute for
learning by doing. They are making the further discovery that intelligence and
learning ability are not the exclusive possession of the favored nations of the
world.10
Concluding his speech, McNickle stressed the need for the NCAI to facilitate trans-national
cooperation and “to obtain and make available to Indian leaders information about community
planning and development in other parts of the world, as Puerto Rico.”11
While the NCAI continued to focus its activities mostly on domestic issues, its records
point to an existing interest among Native Americans in indigenous peoples beyond their
borders and in establishing connections with them. In reply to a reader’s reaction to an article
published by the NCAI, the NCAI office manager pointed out:
We understand that any publications from the NCAI are given wide readership
among the Indian people, mostly, we feel, because communication within and
between tribes is, at best, poor. Information about the difficulties of other people
similar to themselves would be of interest to the Indian people. And, of course,
the article was certainly read with greater interest because of the trip to Puerto
Rico of fourteen American Indian leaders last March.12
As the letter shows, North American Indians were making connections and visits to other Native
peoples - “people similar to themselves” - outside the U.S. already by the late 1950s.

This interest in other indigenous peoples and especially in opportunities for connecting
with them increased due to the political and social developments of the 1960s and 1970s,
discussed in the previous chapter. Decolonization and the changing attitude of the international
community toward the human rights agenda opened the UN to indigenous issues. The
organization and its conferences provided physical space for indigenous activists and
organizations to meet and discuss their situations and goals and to forge alliances amongst
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themselves and with “principled outsiders” and advocacy groups.13 While the UN contributed
to the strengthening of the connections between indigenous activists, other opportunities also
helped to establish the early networks of the movement. Some of these came as by-products of
government policies and programs that Native participants used to pursue their own goals.
In the early 1940s, the policies of John Collier, the US Commissioner of Indian Affairs
who attempted a hemispheric approach to Native issues, created an opportunity for D’Arcy
McNickle and others to connect with Native peoples in Mexico.14 Similarly, the Canadian
government looked to New Zealand and Australia as models for Canada’s Native policy in the
late 1940s and again in the early 1970s, which created an opportunity for Native leaders from
Canada to establish contacts with the Maori and Aborigine peoples.15 In March 1971, Canada’s
Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) sent a delegation to New Zealand and Australia, which
included George Manuel, President of the National Indian Brotherhood, Len Marchand, an
Indian member of the Canadian Parliament, and Bill Mussell, an Indian special assistant to the
DIA minister Jean Chrétien.16 Participation in the DIA trip gave the Native members opportunity
to meet with the indigenous peoples of the countries visited and to draw comparison between
their similar government policies and attitudes toward Native peoples. After a meeting with
representatives of the New Zealand government, during which an official boasted of the
country’s progress in Maori education, Manuel reflected on the similarities between the
governments’ attitudes toward Native peoples: “… the longer I listened to the learned
gentleman, the more I thought I was listening to Mr. Chrétien describing the White Paper to a
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visiting Maori anthropologist.”17
Even though the New Zealand and Australian visits were organized by their
governments, Manuel managed to meet with the Maori and Aborigine leaders privately, beyond
the eyes and ears of government officials. Through these private meetings and discussions, the
indigenous peoples of the three countries realized how much they had in common: a shared
historical experience of colonization, political views on the questions of land and aboriginal
rights, education, and the preservation of their cultures.18 In his report about the visit, Manuel
explained: “We share with the Maori and Aborigine, and I suspect also with the many different
African people, not only this common struggle but also the very real progress that we have
made in the past decade. Progress measured … by the success of our struggle for survival.”19
Later the same year, George Manuel had a chance to test his assumption of shared
experiences in Africa. In December 1971, he was invited to Tanzania to attend the 10th
anniversary of the country’s independence. During that visit, Manuel took a side trip to Kenya.
He examined the countries’ historical experiences with colonization, their liberation movements
and their results, comparing them to the situation of Canada’s First Nations.20 Manuel saw the
high levels of poverty in Africa and the U.S. and Canadian Indian reservations as the lasting
results of British colonization of these peoples and the extraction of resources. Speaking at the
NCAI Conference in 1974, Manuel recalled a conversation with an African youth during his trip
and commented:
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I told him wait a minute here, we have a share in that too. Buckingham Palace,
a lot of our resources in Canada went to England, and I think, you know, that
was a message to me, that colonization, the framework of colonizing - - and
you’re colonized here by the United States, we’re colonized, a lot of our people
have been colonized all over the world - - has been a destructive method in
seducing us into conceding our pride and dignity.21
The African, New Zealand, and Australian trips gave Manuel a chance to expand his views and to
consider the struggle of Canadian Indians for treaty rights and self-government within a global
framework, and as a parallel with the experiences of other colonized people.22

Student exchange programs, sponsored by governments and educational institutions,
also afforded opportunities for young Native Americans to connect with their counterparts in
other countries and become familiar with the issues affecting them. In 1979, Montana State
University in cooperation with the Norwegian government and the Association of Norwegian
Students Abroad initiated a student exchange program between the Sami and American Indians
from several communities. In the first three years of the program, twenty Native Americans
participated in the University of Oslo International Summer School and toured Sami
communities. Sami educators, students, and community leaders studied at the Center for Native
American Studies at Montana State University and visited local reservation communities. An
article published in the NCIA Sentinel about this program expressed hope that in the future,
Native American students would be able to visit and connect with indigenous peoples in Central
and South Americas, Asia, and Australia as well.23 Exchange programs like this one had the
potential to facilitate new connections, but also engender the expansion of Native political

21

George Manuel’s speech at the NCAI Conference in San Diego 1974, Workshop 4. “Proceedings,”
15 - 16, NCAI-R.
22
McFarlane, Brotherhood to Nationhood, 165.
23
“American Indians and International Indigenous People,” NCAI Sentinel, Vol. 39, No. 1 - 2 (January February, 1982), 21. As discussed in chapter 1, the United States and Mexican governments established a
similar program in the 1940s.

192

thinking into a global framework by providing points of reference and comparison with different
parts of the world.
The UN’s role in facilitating contacts between indigenous peoples and bolstering further
internationalization of Native views is undeniable. In 1972, Native peoples from the Americas
attended the UN NGO Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, Sweden. Speaking
at the conference’s Environmental Forum, Native delegates from North and South America
presented location-specific cases connected by the same theme - the loss of native lands, in
some cases forceful removal, and the negative impact of economic development and materials
extraction on the environment.24 The stories of land dispossession and disregard for Native land
rights certainly sounded familiar to the gathering’s Native participants. An article based on a
report made for the Christian Science Monitor, published in the Akwesasne Notes, highlighted
the similar attitudes of the white Brazilians toward Amazonian Indians, the Chinese toward the
Tibetans, the Indonesians toward what they called “primitive cultures,” and the East Africans
toward the Masai, Somali, and Polomo farmers. The article quoted a Mohawk spokesman at the
conference, expressing sympathy with other Native peoples: “We feel solidarity with these
traditional people everywhere … These are the people who love and respect the earth, who live
in harmony with their environment.”25
The location of the conference also offered an opportunity to the North American
visitors to meet with the indigenous peoples of Scandinavia, the Sami. The leading Swedish
newspaper Dagens Nhyeter organized a trip for George Manuel to visit the Sami living north of
the Arctic Circle after the conference.26 During his visit, Manuel attended the “All-chief’s”
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meeting of the Sami from Norway, Finland, Denmark, and Sweden, and a feast where he tasted
their traditional foods. He was surprised by the similarity of the dishes he was served to the
foods traditionally consumed in the Northwest Territories and the Yukon.27 The similarities did
not end there. Swedish lawyer and spokesman for the Sami Tomas Cramér, drew parallels
between the shared historical experiences of Native Americans and the Sami with land
dispossession, which started with “a few squatters, then farmers who successively took away
the land rights of the original inhabitants, aided and abetted by the respective governments.”28
Native activists took advantage of the existing infrastructure of the Wesphalian nationstate international relations to build connections and networks with other indigenous peoples.
Government policies and programs as well as the existence of the UN and its conferences
created opportunities for Native leaders and activists to connect across the national borders.
However, it was the Native peoples’ own initiatives that led to the emergence of the indigenous
global movement - their own efforts to seek out their counterparts in other countries and learn
about their situations, and the ability to see past their regional differences and draw on the
similarities and shared experiences. The increasing awareness of these shared experiences and
issues, the challenges that indigenous peoples faced from nation state governments while
attempting to secure their rights, led to a recognition of the need for cooperation and unity in
their efforts; a recognition of a need to create an organized mechanism that would give Native
peoples, many of them numerical minorities in their homelands, the necessary political power
to pressure their governments into respecting their rights. A global coordination of the political
activities of a unified movement, representing the diverse indigenous peoples of the Americas,
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Eurasia, Africa, and Oceania, would speak not for hundreds of thousands of peoples, but tens of
millions. In George Manuel’s view, cooperation and information exchange through such a vast
network would strengthen indigenous peoples as political entities, and help bring their
grievances onto the international scene, forcing national governments to uphold treaty rights:
I think we have to organize the people around the world who have the same
conflict with their governments, the same problem, to develop the political
power that we’re seeking in order to persuade government to concede to our
interpretations as far as treaties is concerned, you know, you’re talking about
treaties, and it goes in the same sense with the aboriginal rights, claims of
Indian people where there are no treaties. … we’ve got to be thinking as Indian
people as a whole across the United States, Canada, and other parts of
developing the power … that’s necessary to persuade the kind of change that
we need…29
Domestic and international political and social changes, discussed in the previous
chapter, helped to create more favorable conditions in the 1970s and 1980s for activists and
organizations to build and expand their connections and networks into a global movement
composed of plurality of actors - indigenous and non-indigenous individuals, groups and
organizations. The ability to create such a movement also came from an increase in local and
regional Native organizing in the early 1970s as well as increasing globalization and advances in
technology.30 Numerous indigenous organizations were established throughout the Americas:
the National Indian Brotherhood of Canada, the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, the NCAI, National
Indian Youth Council (NIYC), and the American Indian Movement (AIM) in the US, and several
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organizations in Columbia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. They were followed by the establishment
of transnational indigenous organizations such as the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC),
the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP), or the
Consejo Indio de Sud America (CISA). Most of these organizations, while representing diverse
local actors and struggles, were centered around the concept of shared experiences, goal, and
indigenous identity.31

The Emergence and Structure of the Global Indigenous Movement
Personal connections and the need to cooperate bridged the geographical divide of the
movement’s actors, allowing them to engage in a collective protest. As Rhiannon Morgan
pointed out, this protest does not “necessarily imply the physical presence of protesters in one
place.”32 Through personal relations, activists generated, or at least attempted to raise support
for distant peoples and their struggles. These attempts became the foundation of the global
movement and its work.
In the early 1970s, the Sami people of Scandinavia approached Vine Deloria, Jr., Native
American activist and intellectual, to be an expert witness in their case against the Swedish
crown, concerning Sami aboriginal land rights in Lappland.33 Deloria agreed to help the Sami,
but the Swedish court did not allow him to testify. Further, the Swedish court changed the
location of the hearings from Stockholm to a small town in the north of the country. In Deloria’s
view, Sweden did not want to publicize its dealings with its indigenous peoples: “I have been
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disqualified as a witness for the Lapps [Sami]. The Swedish Supreme Court didn’t want anyone
outside of Sweden to know what was happening. They moved the trial to a very small town far
from television and radio. Sounds like the BIA, doesn’t it.”34 The fact that the Sami approached
Deloria, an expert on North Native American rights, to be a witness for their case, indicates not
only their acknowledgment and recognition of similarities between land rights issues of the
indigenous peoples from the two continents, but also shows that they tried to use these ideas
and connections for mutual help.
The lawsuit and Deloria’s dismissal by the court took place the same year as the 1972
UN NGO Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. The Sami of Sweden did not
manage to meet Vine Deloria, but they did confer with George Manuel of the NIB. This meeting
and the urgency of the Sami case influenced Manuel’s own international activism and search for
indigenous cooperation. Deloria himself was glad that Manuel visited the Sami: “I am very glad
that you were able to make it over to Sweden and give the Same people some great support. I
was supposed to go but was wiped out by the Swedish court before I could even pack my
bags.”35 For Manuel, this visit had a lasting impact on his future political work.
Even though Deloria could not help personally in the case, he tried to raise support for
the Sami in his network of acquaintances, friends, and supporters, tying the case to the larger
question of international indigenous land rights. In a letter to Lutheran theologian and
ecumenist Reverend Bendtz, he explained:
I have been trying to help the Same (Lapps) people who are being taken
34
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advantage of by the Swedes. I know that you are personally blameless having
served your time in hell at Augustana [seminary]. However, the whole question
of the land rights of aboriginal peoples is coming up very fast and you might
be able to get something done for the Same peoples and bring to bear all of
your world missionary experiences.36
Deloria also reached out to an acquaintance in Germany, Waultraud Wagner, a member of the
Arbeitsgruppe für Nordamerikanische Indianer [German Working Group for North American
Indians], and informed her about the case. After reading about the Sami struggle in a
newspaper, most likely Akwesasne Notes, which Wagner helped distribute in Europe, she took
upon herself to write to the President of Finland to “bring [his] influence to bear against the
usual European understanding of land-rights” in the Sami case, since Finland was involved in the
lawsuit as well. Wagner in her letter also recommended Vine Deloria, Jr., as an expert on
indigenous land rights, mentioning that he had already been excluded from the case by the
Swedish government. In her reply to Deloria, however, Wagner doubted that her written
intervention would help much.37 The Sami reached out to Deloria as a Native activist and
expert. While Deloria was not able to help personally, he used his personal connections in an
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attempt to activate a network of supporters who could help influence the court proceedings on
behalf of the Sami.
Personal connections among activists laid down the foundation for an official
cooperation between individuals and organizations as well as transnational cooperation
between national indigenous organizations. Executive director of the NIYC Gerald Wilkinson was
able to establish a working relationship with Ramiro Reynaga, Native activist from Bolivia and a
member and coordinator of the Consejo Indio de Sud America (South American Indian Council,
CISA). Wilkinson met Reynaga through Doug Latimer, Vice-President for Harper and Row
Publishers.38 They kept in contact through correspondence during the 1970s and the 1980s,
discussing the situation of Native peoples in the hemisphere and the need for a successful
movement to achieve a change.39 Wilkinson presented Reynaga with an idea for a hemispheric
project of Indian cooperation, and in 1981 asked him to be part of it.40 The following year,
Renyaga was ready to start working with Wilkinson and the NIYC and applied for a U.S. visa.41
Within a few short years, Reynaga, while continuing his work and efforts to organize Native
peoples in Latin American countries, became a member of the NIYC, advancing the
organization’s international work and representing it in the UN Working Group on Indigenous
Populations (WGIP) in Geneva. He also helped Wilkinson with the NIYC’s application for UN NGO
consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).42
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While international cooperation among indigenous peoples grew in the 1970s and
1980s, it was not immune to Cold War political realities and the propaganda battle between the
East and the West. Connections to leftist organizations and parties, however brief, could hinder
the ability to work for US-based organizations, as Wilkinson and Reynaga found out. When
Reynaga applied for a U.S. visa in 1982, he was told by the U.S. Consul in Bolivia, that he could
not get a regular visa because of his political background. In order to enter the United States, he
would have to receive a special waiver, which only the U.S. Attorney General could issue.43 The
objectionable political past was Reynaga’s brief involvement with a leftist movement and his
work with the Youth of the Bolivian Communist Party, back when he was a student.44 In the
end, Reynaga received the necessary visa, but his past remained a problem whenever applying
for his visa renewals, which he had to do on a regular basis.45 In 1984, delays in his visa renewal
prevented Reynaga from participating in the UN WGIP.46
Personal connections among activists seeking solutions to the problems their
communities faced also led to transnational cooperation among Native national organizations
and the creation of Native transnational organizations, expanding the indigenous networks
hemispherically and globally, from Native to indigenous issues. This cooperation could take
different forms, from expressions of support to the exchange of ideas and personnel in order to
learn from each other. In 1974, the NCAI signed an agreement with the NIB to exchange staff
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members, “in an attempt to develop mutual understanding between the native peoples of both
countries.”47 The two organizations believed that knowledge and understanding of their similar
problems would help in devising their solutions. To achieve this better understanding, the two
organizations agreed on an exchange of staff personnel, visits by executive officers, and a joined
meetings of their respective executive bodies. These exchanges took place for at least two years
following the agreement.48
The NIYC was also seeking connections to and cooperation with Native organizations
throughout the hemisphere. In 1975, Gerald Wilkinson contacted Clive Linklater, First VicePresident of the NIB, proposing cooperation between the two organizations. As Wilkinson
stated, the NIYC was “seeking the broadest possible contact and exchange with all Canadian
Indian organizations. We would like to exchange information and ideas on regular basis with the
Indian people of Canada.” As Wilkinson further stated, the NIYC was pursuing the same goal
with the Native peoples of Central and South America as well.49 Wilkinson’s correspondence
outlines his efforts to establish contacts with Native activists in Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico, among
others.50 In 1974, Wilkinson went on a trip to Mexico, visiting various Indian communities, in an
attempt to “establish real contacts with Indian organizations in Mexico, Central and South
America.”51 Wilkinson’s vision for the NIYC was to eventually become a transnational
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organization “extending from Tera del Fuego [sic] to Point Barrow.”52
Even though the NIYC did not turn into the hemispheric organization Wilkinson
imagined, his contacts throughout the Americas proved important in his efforts for the
hemispheric cooperation he was seeking. By the mid-1980s, the NIYC was involved in numerous
transnational projects concerning Native peoples, as well as conflicts between national
governments and Native peoples, such as those in Guatemala and Nicaragua. The organization’s
involvement in Guatemala, for example, included distribution of information about the
atrocities committed against the Mayan people in order to increase awareness and
“international consciousness” among the Native tribes in the North.53 Further, the NIYC joined
other organizations in putting together a relief project for Guatemalan Indian refugees in the
United States, which would involve legal assistance as well as material help.54

The idea of a common struggle and solution and the need to present a unified position
on the international scene regarding indigenous rights, led to the formation of transnational regional, hemispheric, and global indigenous organizations. These organizations incorporated
personal connections and transnational networks within their frameworks and structure. The
World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) was an example of a global indigenous
organization, born out of shared ideas and an effort to protect indigenous rights. The WCIP
came out of George Manuel’s idea to hold an indigenous peoples’ conference that would discuss
international cooperation and the potential formation of an organization to represent
indigenous peoples worldwide. As Manuel reflected in 1974, the idea quickly gathered support:
“…when I mentioned this to the Maoris, to the Aborigines, to the Tahitians, to the Laplanders, of
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a world conference, not one of them objected to it, but one of the things they said, how are we
going to do it, we got no money, we’re so poor, we have a hard time to have our own meetings
within our own country.”55
In August 1972, the NIB endorsed Manuel’s idea for the international conference, and
the first preparatory meeting took place in April 1974, in Georgetown, Guyana.56 One of the
challenges in organizing the preliminary meeting was to establish contacts with Native
organizations in Central and South America. Manuel had to locate and identify legitimate
indigenous organizations, many of which at the time were local in nature and their leaders often
suspicious of the NIB as a possible organization of white anthropologists, who might co-opt
them rather than join them. NIB organizers also had to make sure that the organizations they
were contacting were not government-controlled. In an attempt to ensure the participation of
legitimate indigenous leaders, Rodrigo Contreras, a young Ecuadorian working for the NIB, and
Marie Marule, the NIB’s secretary and Executive Director, made personal contacts and visited
with Native leadership in numerous countries, promoted the idea of the conference, and
checked on Native organizations’ relations with their respective governments.57
The preparatory meeting for the international indigenous conference was an instant
success, and it showed indigenous peoples’ readiness for a world-wide cooperation. The
representatives came from the Maori people of New Zealand, the Aborigine of Australia, Sami
people from Norway, Finland, and Sweden, representatives from Greenland (Denmark), Native
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peoples from Central and South America, the U.S. and Canada.58 Financial help for the
conference came from church groups, and the local arrangements were made by the
government of Guyana.59 The goal of this first preparatory meeting was to see whether the idea
of an international indigenous conference and organization was a viable one. The agreement on
these questions was unanimous and plans were made for a second preparatory meeting, held in
June 1975, and a proposition for the actual conference to take place later the same year.
Meanwhile Manuel sent Rodrigo Contreras to South America to spread the word about the
planned international conference.60
The second organizational meeting focused on funding and accreditation for delegates
to the planned conference. The organizers contacted indigenous peoples in twenty-four
countries, excluding Asia and Africa, though attempts were made to contact groups in the Soviet
Union, China, and other parts of Asia. The meeting’s policy board was composed of delegates
from the Maori Council (New Zealand), the Mink’a (Bolivia), the Unidad Indigena (Colombia), the
NCAI (United States), one representative each from the Nordic Sami Council (Norway, Sweden
and Finland), the Greenlandic Association (Greenland - Denmark), and George Manuel for
Canada. Local associations and committees involved in international matters, including the
Greenlandic Committee on International Relations and the International Work Group for
Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), helped with the organization and coordinating the documentation
for the meeting and the future international conference, which was set to take place in October
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1975, in Port Alberni, British Columbia, in a Native community and on Native land.61
The Port Alberni International Conference of Indigenous Peoples was hosted on the
Sheshaht Band of Nootka Indians’ land, and led to the establishment of the WCIP. Its 260
participants, 52 delegates from 19 countries, 135 observers, 25 members of the press, and 54
staff members represented indigenous peoples globally. They came from Argentina, Australia,
Bolivia, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Finland, Greenland (Denmark), Guatemala, Mexico, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, the United States (including
Hawaii), and Venezuela.62 The structure of the new organization was to include indigenous
groups from five geographical areas: North, Central, and South Americas, Europe, Greenland,
and the South Pacific. George Manuel (Canada) was elected as the Chairman and Phillip (Sam)
Deloria (the United States) as Secretary General. The Executive Council members, representing
these different geographical areas, were Julio Dixon from Panama (Central America), Clemente
Alcon from Bolivia (South America), Aslak Nils Sara from Norway (Europe - Greenland), and Neil
Watene from New Zealand (South Pacific).63
The WCIP incorporated transnational networks into its organizational structure and
functioned as an umbrella organization for regional and national indigenous organizations and
groups. Its decentralized structure allowed for a lower level of bureaucratization of the central
secretariat and a greater flexibility. However, insufficient funding in its early years restricted the
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organization’s activities and effectiveness. The WCIP represented a truly global indigenous
organizations, until its dissolution in 1996.64
From local and national organizing, combined with transnational networking, came
regional indigenous organizations, such as the IITC, CISA, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC),
and others.65 They focused on localized issues that came out of the same colonial experiences,
but were, at the same time, regionally specific. These organizations incorporated transnational
networks into their structure and represented their constituencies vis-à-vis their nation-states
and in the UN.
In the Arctic region, transnational organizing emerged from local community struggles.
It progressed from framing the issues within native rights to indigenous peoples’ issues. For
example, the First Nations and Canadian Inuit opposition to a hydro-electric project in James Bay
in Arctic Québec in the early 1970s and the opposition of the Sami people to a proposed hydropower plant on the Alta River in Norway in the late 1970s and early 1980s were separated by
geography and time, but both represent the local struggles that led to a more coordinated
efforts to secure indigenous rights via regional organizing.66
A turning point in indigenous organizing in the Arctic was the 1973 Arctic People’s
Conference. That year, several representatives of indigenous peoples from the Arctic attended a
meeting on Arctic oil and gas development in France, where they met members of the NIB. The
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delegates met again shortly afterward in Copenhagen to further discuss a possibility to organize
an Arctic Peoples’ Conference. The person behind the initiative was James Wah-Shee, a
president of the Federation of Natives North of 60 from Canada. Similar to Manuel’s idea, WahShee envisioned holding a transnational conference for and organized by the indigenous peoples
of the Arctic.67 The conference took place in 1973 in Copenhagen. Representatives from the
Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (founded in 1971 and called today Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami), the NIB,
Greenlanders, and Sami from Finland, Norway and Sweden were present, but members of Inuit
communities from Alaska and the former USSR could not attend.68 The conference had an
enormous impact on the indigenous peoples of the Arctic in terms of their international
activism. Aqqaluk Lynge, one of the organizers, recalled in 2008: “The Arctic Peoples’
Conference was a turning point for us. We were first of all thinking of ourselves as ‘Inuit’ but
Helge Kleivan urged us to include the Sámi in our organising [sic] efforts and he inspired us to
consider ourselves as part of a broader indigenous movement.”69
The transnational organizing efforts in the Arctic continued and during the 1975 Port
Alberni Conference, Inuit activist Eben Hopson from Alaska, through his assistant Billy Neakoq,
extended an invitation to a planned pan-Inuit gathering, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference,
which took place in Barrow, Alaska in June 1977. The conference brought together 54
representatives of Inuit communities from the US (Alaska), Canada (Northwest and Yukon), and
Greenland (Denmark). Again, members of Inuit communities living in the USSR (Chukotka) were
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not in attendance.70 The focus of the conference was on the challenges faced by the peoples of
the Arctic, including the survival of Inuit communities, their language and culture, and the
environment under stress due to development. The delegates articulated several demands,
including the recognition of Inuit aboriginal land rights, Inuit input into environmental policy, the
recognition of the Inuit languages, culture, education, and history, the establishment of mutual
exchange programs between Inuit communities, and free and unrestricted movement for all
Inuits throughout their Arctic homeland. The attendees also demanded the creation of an Inuit
university, the advancement of a common written language, cultural history, and exchanges of
educational materials among communities across the borders of nation-states. To achieve these
goals, the delegates agreed to establish a regional organization to represent them.71
The regional organizing among the Inuit communities came from the same sentiments
of shared experience and identity as did Manuel’s idea for the indigenous peoples conference
and the founding of WCIP: “We Eskimo are an international community sharing common
language, culture, and a common land along the Arctic coast
of Siberia, Alaska, Canada and Greenland. Although not a nation-state, as a people, we do
constitute a nation.”72 The challenges and goals discussed during the 1977 Barrow conference,
while specific to the Inuit peoples and the Arctic region, echoed similar concerns of indigenous
peoples around the world. The Barrow conference established the Inuit Circumpolar Conference
(ICC), a regional umbrella organization, which continues today to work on questions of the
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environment and the survival of indigenous peoples of the Arctic. Together with six other
indigenous organizations, including the Sami Council and the Russian Association of Indigenous
Peoples of the North, the ICC has the status of permanent participant in the Arctic Council, an
intergovernmental forum on common issues concerning the Arctic, such as development and
environmental protection.73
Local and regional organizing was greatly influenced by the specific conditions and
circumstances in which Native peoples found themselves. In Latin America, local differences in
the political status and the incorporation or the lack thereof of Native peoples within the
dominant settler-societies, geographical and cultural isolation, as well as the character of other
political opposition to the state, influenced the form and extent of local Native organizing as
well as international networking. Changing conditions in the 1970s, including improved access to
education for Native peoples, positively influenced indigenous political mobilization in many
Latin American countries, such as Ecuador, Peru, or Nicaragua.74 As Alison Brysk points out,
since many of the countries in Central and South Americas were dictatorships in the 1970s and
1980s, the emerging indigenous organizations and activists quickly started looking beyond the
borders of the nation-states for support and help, building transnational alliances.75
Out of these efforts emerged national and regional organizations for South and Central
Americas and the Amazon Basin. The Coordinadora Indígena de la Cuenza Amazonica (Amazon
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Basin Coordinating Council, COICA) was founded in 1984, comprising Native American
organizations from nine Amazon Basin countries. In 1977, the Consejo Regional de Pueblos
Indigenas de Centro America, Mexico, y Panama (Regional Council of Indigenous Peoples of
Central America, CORPI) was formed, based in Panama. The focus of the organization was to
address specific issues of concern to their members and the specific areas it encompassed.76 In
1980, during the WCIP’s second conference in Cuzco, Peru, Andean intellectuals from Peru and
Argentina established a new regional organization, the Consejo Indio de Sud America (the South
American Indian Council, CISA), with the aim to represent all the Native organizations in South
America.77 Its founding came out of the efforts of delegates from local and sub-regional
indigenous organizations from throughout South America. CISA established offices in La Paz,
Bolivia, but after they were attacked by the military forces of the new dictatorship that came to
power in summer 1980, the organization moved to Lima, Peru. CISA remained a relatively small
group, but had a strong international presence. Both CORPI and CISA were affiliated with the
WCIP, but operated autonomously. In 1982, CISA applied and received its own NGO consultative
status with the UN ECOSOC.78

Native American activists and organization not only utilized existing networks, but also
worked on expanding them and creating new connections between North and South Americas.
In 1983, Nilo Cayuqueo, a Mapuche from Argentina and one of the founding members of CISA,
founded the South and Meso American Indian Rights Center (SAIIC). Based in Oakland, CA, the
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Center’s focus was to provide information on available international support to CISA and other
South and Central American Native organizations and movements. With its work, the SAIIC
linked indigenous rights movements in South, Central, and North Americas.79
The International Indian Treaty Council (IITC) also fostered links between the North,
Central, and South American Native rights struggles. The organization’s hemispheric structure
was conceived during its founding conference in 1974, even though its records suggest that this
gathering had only a few Native representatives from Latin American countries.80 Minutes from
the meeting of the International Workgroup on Treaties during the conference list specifically
only one Native representative from South America, Gonzalo Castillo from Colombia.81
However, the vision for the IITC, reflected in the minutes from the founding debates, was for the
organization to be an international body “representing an alliance of 97 nations,” with one
officer and one alternate delegate from each of the seven regions, which the founders
designated.82 This suggestion was carried into the final Declaration of Continuous
Independence, which stated that the delegates at the Conference “represented 97 Indian tribes
and Nations from across North and South America.”83 The transnational structure of the
organization is today reflected in the regions it represents: Latin America - Central, Latin
America - Mexico, Latin America - South, the Caribbean region, North America, the Arctic region,
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and the Pacific region.84
The Declaration of Continuous Independence also acknowledged the organization’s links
to the larger indigenous movement. While the document itself focused on the violations of
treaties by the United States, it, at the same time, indicated that the newly established IITC
would seek cooperation with and support other Native nations, struggling for sovereignty:
“[IITC] will stand in unity to support our Native and international brothers and sisters in their
respective and collective struggles concerning international treaties and agreements violated by
the United States and other governments.”85 Specifically, the Declaration mentioned an alliance
with the people of Puerto Rico and their liberation movement.86 An endorsement for AIM and
the Treaty Conference’s efforts by the Irish Republican Army, delivered during the International
Treaty Council conference in June 1974, points to AIM’s connections to liberation movements in
Europe as well.87
The intent for the IITC to be a transnational alliance of Native peoples on a hemispheric
level was further reflected in the organization’s logo: an outline of the American continents,
connected by an image of a smoking calumet with a feather on each side.88 The calumet itself is
a symbol of trans-national Native diplomacy - treaty making between Native nations as well as
between Native nations and the European powers and later the United States and Canada.89
After its foundation, the IITC quickly became a voice and representative for Native peoples on
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the international scene, linking and representing the North, Central, and South American
indigenous rights struggles. By 1981, representatives of Native communities from Latin
American countries and members of CISA also participated in the Treaty Council’s meetings and
conferences.

Differences and Dissent in the Movement
Representing multitude of various struggles of indigenous peoples around the world,
the global indigenous movement experiences, like any other social movement, differences
around issues such as leadership, membership, framing, and strategy.90 Despite the
acknowledged similar historical experiences and common ground on questions of indigenous
rights, members of the movement come from diverse backgrounds and face different
circumstances. Such differences can create misunderstandings, even divisions, among individual
activists and organizations. For example, participants at the 1975 Port Alberni conference that
founded the WCIP observed divisions between the delegates from North and South Americas.
Douglas Sanders, professor of law and an adviser to Native organizations in Canada, reflected on
the conference in 1977:
The international conference brought together delegates from countries with
policies which supported indigenous organizations with public or semi-public
funding and delegates from countries where indigenous people might be
recognized by governments as peasants or workers, but not as politically distinct
groups within the nation. The divisions in the conference were clearly along
those lines.91
It may have been easier for delegates from North America, the Scandinavian countries,
Aoteaora (New Zealand), or Australia, to understand each other, based on their groups’ similar
relations with their respective national governments. Coming from countries upholding
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democratic principles and the ideals of human rights and concerned with their international
image, these delegates had different experiences with organizing and government repression
than delegates from Latin American countries, many of them repressive dictatorships. For
example, the existence of government funding for Native organizations in the North must have
appeared strange, even incomprehensible, to activists coming from countries such as Paraguay,
where Native peoples faced repressions to a point of genocide, slavery, and terrible poverty, or
Guatemala, where state terror (at its height in 1981 - 1983) demobilized Maya organizing.92
In contrast, the US government provided funding through grants to several programs
run by the AIM, even though several members of the Senate considered the organization
radical, even revolutionary, and the organization was under FBI surveillance.93 The WCIP itself
eventually received financial support from several governments, though that support was slow
in coming. In 1978, the organization received permanent financial support from the government
of Norway, which in turn applied pressure on the governments of Denmark and Sweden to join
in the support. The government of Canada started funding the WCIP around the same time.94
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Such relations may have appeared paradoxical to most Latin American delegates, for whom
finding finances to support their organizing work was difficult, even when not facing active
government repression. A letter from Ramiro Reynaga to Gerald Wilkinson, asking for financial
help, indicates the hardship and financial difficulties Latin American Native activists often faced:
“I must have funds enough to survive. It is impossible for me to do any important work walking
hungry, bargaining second hand clothes; looking for free sleeping places.”95
Official government attitudes toward Native organizing and the treatment of activists
and organizations accentuated the differences between the North and South. The governments
of the US and Canada in general attempted to avoid violent confrontations in order to preserve
their international image as champions of democracy and human rights. There were of course
exceptions to this general attitude. For example, during the 1960s fishing rights struggle in the
Pacific Northwest, local Native fishermen and their supporters faced harassment, arrests, and
violence from the local game wardens and police.96 During the siege of Wounded Knee in 1973,
the Oglala occupiers and their AIM supporters faced off and regularly exchanged gunfire with
the present US Marshals, local police, the FBI, the BIA police, the US military, and the Oglala
President Dick Wilson’s personal guard, called the GOONs. These firefights resulted in many
injuries and at least two deaths inside the village.97 Yet, despite the ferocity of the gunfights,
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the Wounded Knee siege did not end with the government forces overrunning the village and a
massacre of the occupiers. As discussed in chapter two, many Native American activists believed
that the reason for the peaceful end of the occupation was the presence of the international
media and the world’s attention it brought to the conflict, as well as the US attempt to preserve
its international image as a leader of the free democratic world.98
After the occupation of Wounded Knee, AIM and its supporters were subjected to FBI
surveillance and a misinformation campaign, part of the so-called COINTELRPO program also
used against the Black Panther Party, and several paid FBI agents infiltrated the organization.99
Supporters of AIM on the Pine Ridge reservation in the years following the occupation
experienced increased repression and violence from the tribal president Dick Wilson and his
supporters. By the mid-1970s, the situation on the reservation resembled a civil war. Many AIM
supporters and Wilson’s opponents met with “accidents” or were victims of unsolved
murders.100 This violence came from the tribal president, but since Wilson’s regime had the
support of the BIA and the FBI, both federal agencies, it could be argued the violence was
indirectly sanctioned or at least tolerated by the US government.
While the repressions on the Pine Ridge reservation and the FBI campaign against AIM
often led to violence and deaths and certainly cannot be minimized, Native activists were able

Cong at Wounded Knee: The Trail of a Blackfeet Activist (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2004),
131; Hendricks, The Unquiet Grave, 130 – 131.
98
Rosier, Serving Their Country, 266 - 267.
99
Smith and Warrior, Like a Hurricane, 246 – 247, 272; Peter Matthiessen, In the Spirit of Crazy
Horse: The Story of Leonard Peltier and the FBI’s War on the American Indian Movement (New York, NY:
Penguin Books, 1980, reprint 1992), 56, 114, 120 – 121, 126; Dennis Banks and Richard Erdoes, Ojibwa
Warrior: Dennis Banks and the Rise of the American Indian Movement (Norman, OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2004), chapter 19; Russell Means and Marvin J. Wolf, Where White Men Fear to Tread:
The Autobiography of Russell Means (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Griffin Press, 1995), 250, 312, 326;
Churchill and Vander Wall, Agents of Repression, chapter 10.
100
Matthiessen, In the Spirit of Crazy Horse, 128 – 129, 131 – 132, 262; Akim D. Reinhardt, Ruling
Pine Ridge: Oglala Lakota Politics from the IRA to Wounded Knee (Lubbock, TX: Texas University Press,
2007), 204 – 205; Banks and Erdoes, Ojibwa Warrior, 284 – 289.

216

to benefit from a stable democratic judicial system that sometimes ruled in their favor.101 The
campaign also seemed to be directed mainly against the radical wing of Native American rights
struggle, leaving the more moderate activists and organizations mostly alone. Such situations
were quite different from some of the Latin American countries, such as Bolivia, Paraguay, or
Guatemala, in which Native organizers faced not only imprisonment, but often torture and
death. Even participating in the Port Alberni conference put some delegates in danger. One of
the early tasks of the newly established WCIP was to protest the imprisonment of Constantino
Lima, a Bolivian delegate, who was arrested after his return home. The WCIP arranged for Lima’s
daughters to come to Canada and in 1977 secured his release from prison and an asylum
granted by Canada for him and his family. Upon his arrival to Canada, it was discovered that
Lima was tortured during his imprisonment.102
The unstable socio-political situation in some countries also endangered Native
organizers and delegates, even when government repression was not pointed directly at them.
Susan Harjo’s recollection of the 1975 Port Alberni conference illustrates the stark differences
between the situation in the US and Mexico:
And there was an airline strike and the worst thing that happened to most of us,
on the way home, was that they lost our luggage… when we had to, you know,
change flights … it was inconvenient… What happened to the delegates from
Mexico was they went back to situation where the people ... had taken over
some land and the Agrarian Reform Ministry called in the army and killed them.
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So, we lost our luggage and they got killed.103
While in Harjo’s recollection the violence was not pointed specifically at the Native
activists, most of the oppression in Latin American countries came from national governments
and was aimed directly at activists, who continued to face threats to their freedom and life
throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s. During the 1977 UN NGO Conference on
Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations in the Americas, Rene Fuerst, an ethnographer
from the University of Geneva, spoke for the Native peoples of the Amazon, who could not
attend the conference, because they “were not allowed by the government they live under to
leave and come here [Geneva].”104 Fuerst in his speech reminded the listeners of some of the
oppression that Native peoples in the Amazon were facing and the fact that these were illdocumented and often justified by the governments as their “right to intervene for so-called
reasons of national security and prosperity.”105
Romesh Chandra, Chairman of the NGO Subcommittee on Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Apartheid, and Decolonization, in his closing speech directly expressed his expectation of
repressions against some of the Native delegates: “I tell you clearly there will be harassment and
repression against many who participate in this conference. … Repression and harassment
because this has been real and people have heard you.”106 Nial MacDermot, from the ECOSOC
Special Committee on Human Rights, also reflected on the dangers many delegates took by
coming to the conference. In his concluding speech, he wished everyone a safe return home, “a
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phrase which is perhaps more than just the usual formality.”107 Mike Meyers of the Onondaga
Nation also acknowledged the dangers many delegates faced as well as the commitment of
Native peoples toward each other. Addressing representatives of national governments at the
conference, he asked them to consider what they have heard before writing and sending their
reports about the meeting and the delegates, “that may cause a death among our people I have
grown to know and love. Because if one of them disappears from the face of the earth because
he came here to speak the truth about the conditions we live in and the things we have to face,
the people who will remember that man’s death will be coming after you.”108
The differences between the local struggles the global indigenous movement
represented, required flexibility and different approaches to make the movement work, and
occasionally exposed the leadership of transnational indigenous organizations to criticism. The
dominance of North American leadership in the early years of the WCIP led to criticism and
dissatisfaction, especially from South American members. Nilo Cayuqueo saw the organization’s
politics as not directly related to the actual interests of Indian peoples in South American
countries and felt the organization did not work too well for them, “because the Canadians have
a somewhat hypocritical and paternalistic view of South American Indian[s].”109 Cayuqueo’s
observations point to the different situations and challenges that indigenous peoples faced in
different parts of the world and the divisions experienced already at the Port Alberni conference
in 1975. By the early 1980s, Native activists from Central and South America were ready “to
change the present course,” namely to see leadership positions filled with representatives from
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outside North America.110 Such changes took place during the WCIP Third General Assembly,
held in April 1981 in Australia. The new elected president was a Native representative from
Costa Rica, and the vice presidents were a Mapuche from Chile and a Sami.111
Despite these differences that could lead to disagreements, criticism, and dissent,
commitment to the shared goals of recognition of indigenous rights and creation of
international standards for treatment of indigenous peoples, and the need for a unified stand on
the international scene to achieve these goals enabled activists of diverse backgrounds to see
past their differences and to cooperate. At the Port Alberni conference, delegates were able to
come together and get to know each other through numerous presentations, workshops,
meetings, and working groups that created opportunities to share experiences, knowledge, and
ideas, and for people to bond and create friendships.112 The conference helped the participants
reach a realization of “common experiences of oppression, though they varied from ‘mild’ racial
discrimination to ethnocide and genocide,” and the need for future cooperation, leading to the
establishment of the WCIP.113

The Global Indigenous Movement at Work: The Case of Nicaragua
The nature of social movements’ work includes both protest and conventional political
activities, such as lobbying, legislative politics, and representation of interests, as well as
involvement in direct action protests. Indigenous activists, groups, and organizations have
engaged in local protests and also represented the interests of indigenous peoples at the UN
and other international forums, and lobbied for support for indigenous issues among states,
advocacy groups, and NGOs. Since the late 1970s, indigenous organizations have increasingly
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been active in and around transnational organizations such as the UN, through lobbying efforts
and influencing agenda and standard setting processes.114
Immediately after its establishment, the WCIP passed several resolutions calling for a
recognition of aboriginal titles to and control of lands owned by indigenous peoples and their
protection from sale to non-indigenous people. The organization also called on all national
governments to recognize individual as well as collective indigenous economic, cultural, political
and social rights. As part of its lobby and interest representation effort, the Port Alberni
conference delegates tasked the WCIP with conducting a study on the problems of
discrimination against indigenous populations. The results were to be published and submitted
to the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, as
a step to influence future policies and standard setting.115
Indigenous organizations, especially those with the UN NGO status such as the WCIP,
IITC, Indian Law Resource Center (ILRC), and others, actively influenced policies and standard
setting by commenting on proposed UN covenants and criteria, and by drafting and debating
proposals for the future UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Within
the structure of the WCIP, covenant proposals were passed through regional and local
organizations, such as CORPI, to local indigenous communities for comments and suggestions.
Those were then passed back to the WCIP for presentation to the UN. Other organizations, such
as the ILRC and IITC, submitted their studies, statements, and resolutions directly to the UN
Commission on Human Rights or the Working Group on Indigenous Populations. Through this
conventional political work, these organizations brought issues such as land grabs and genocide
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to the attention of the UN and the international community and helped create new mechanisms
and standards for indigenous rights.116
Through its networks, members of the global indigenous movement were involved in
many local struggles, employing both conventional political work and more direct, personal
involvement that could include protests and disruptions. The involvement of North American
Native activists, leaders, and organizations in the conflict between the Nicaraguan Sandinista
government and the indigenous Miskito, Sumu, and Rama peoples of the Atlantic Coast in the
1980s, provides a good example of the movement’s work, both through conventional politics
and direct involvement in the conflict.
In July 1979, the Sandinista popular revolution successfully overthrew the US-backed
dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua. The new government embarked on a
revolutionary nation-building project and extended its programs and presence to the Atlantic
Coast area, which had developed relatively separately from the rest of the country until that
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point. Historically, the Atlantic coast was dominated by Great Britain and its trading interests,
while the western part was colonized by Spain. During their rule, the British relied on the
indigenous Miskito for security, which in turn allowed the Miskito to preserve their freedom and
influence in the region. In 1860, the British ceded the territory to the Nicaraguan state in the
Treaty of Managua, which established the Moskito Reserve (also called La Moskitia) with a
degree of self-government. However, in 1894, the state occupied the Atlantic Coast and
annexed the Miskito Reserve. The Miskitos were forced to sign a declaration of allegiance to the
Republic of Nicaragua and the area was renamed the Department of Zelaya.117 Their relative
separation from the rest of the country and their different historical development also
influenced the political and cultural distinctiveness of Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast residents.118
During the Sandinista revolution, the Atlantic Coast and especially its indigenous
peoples remained somewhat isolated from the armed conflict. Some Miskito joined the
revolution, but only as individuals, not as an organized entity. According to Armstrong Wiggins,
one of the Miskito activists, the Miskito and Sumu organization ALPROMISU, founded in 1973,
was not developed enough to “take on Somoza frontally” at that time and adopted a policy of
allowing individuals to join the revolution.119 After the revolution, the Sandinista government
turned its attention to the Atlantic Coast and tried to include its indigenous population in labor
unions, rather than to continue ALPROMISU, an ethnically oriented organization. In the fall of
1979, Commandante Daniel Ortega visited an ALPROMISU meeting, during which the

117
Charles R. Hale, Resistance and Contradiction: Miskitu Indians and the Nicaraguan State, 1894 –
1987 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 37 – 38; Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas, 209;
Brysk, From Tribal Village to Global Village, 112 – 113.
118
The residents of the Atlantic coast include the Miskito, Sumu, and Rama indigenous nations,
English-speaking Creoles, two communities of Garifuna (descendants of Africans and Caribs forcibly
deported to Central America), an African community, Chinese community (mostly descendants of Chinese
merchants who came there during the nineteenth century), and Mestizo Nicaraguans. Roxanne DunbarOrtiz, interview by Lucie Kýrová and James Jenkins, October 8, 2010, San Francisco, CA; Dunbar-Ortiz,
Indians of the Americas, 192.
119
“Colonialism and Revolution,”Akwesasne Notes, 8; Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 128.

223

organization changed its name to MISURASATA (Miskitu, Sumu, Rama, Sandinista Asla ta Tanka Miskitu, Sumu, Rama, Sandinista Working Together), to indicate a partnership between the
indigenous peoples of the Atlantic Coast and the new government.120 Some of the young
MISURASATA leaders became indigenous representatives in the government: Steadman Fagoth
was selected to be a representative on the Sandinista-established Council of States and
Armstrong Wiggins represented the organization in the Casa De Gobierno (House of
Government).121 In the following year and a half, MISURASATA continued to work with the
Sandinista government and on indigenous organizing in the Atlantic Coast region, land rights,
education, and a literacy campaign, sponsored by the government and taught in the Miskitu
language by young educated Miskitu.122
The conflict between the MISURASATA and the government started in early 1981. The
two main reasons for it were the indigenous land rights and autonomy demands by the Miskitu,
Sumu, and Rama. In 1980, MISURASATA started to work on a survey of lands and boundaries of
indigenous villages in La Moskitia. This survey was to serve as a foundation for the indigenous
peoples’ land claims. MISURASATA planned to present the results to the government in early
1981. However, before they were able to, the government arrested and jailed many of the
organization’s leaders. The government accused them of conspiracy against the state and
separatism. The arrests sparked a massive protest by the indigenous peoples, which eventually
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led to the release of the leaders in early March.123 During this time, an incident took place in the
Miskito village of Prinzapolka between the local inhabitants, Sandinista police, and some
Sandinista soldiers, which resulted in four dead on each side.124 After the Prinzapolka incident,
tensions and mutual mistrust grew between the indigenous population and the Sandinista
government.
The situation was further complicated by a parallel and often overlapping conflict
between the Sandinistas and supporters of the former dictator Somoza, the US-backed
paramilitary Contras, who made their base in neighboring Honduras, across the borders from La
Miskitia. Between December 1981 and January 1982, several armed confrontations between the
Miskito and the Sandinistas took place and several Miskito villages were attacked. With limited
information, each side blamed the other. The indigenous peoples saw their participation as a
resistance to the government’s aggression against them, while the Nicaraguan government
argued that these incidents were a result of incursions of the CIA-backed Contras from
Honduras, in order to destabilize the area, create refugees, and weaken the state. Some Miskito
fled the violence and went across the border to Honduras. The Sandinistas decided to relocate
several Miskito villages along the Nicaragua-Honduras border. The justification for this move
was concerns about a counter-revolution coming from Honduras and the need to move the
villagers to safety. However, some Miskito believed that these “forceful” relocations were part
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of a government plan to secure the lands that the indigenous peoples had laid claims to.125 The
situation quickly escalated into a long-term armed conflict. As the Reagan administration
became increasingly involved with the Contras and used the conflict with the Miskito, Sumu,
and Rama as a tool in its anti-Communist foreign policy, the conflicts became even more
tangled.126 The counter-revolution often obscured the conflict over indigenous rights, with both
the Sandinistas and the Contras using the Native peoples for their political propaganda.
With political options in Nicaragua limited, some MISURASATA leaders looked beyond
the state borders for support and help. After his release from jail, MISURASATA leader
Steadman Fagoth went to Honduras, where he started his own organization called MISURA,
which became linked with the US-backed Contras.127 Others, like Brooklyn Rivera and
Armstrong Wiggins, reached out to the global indigenous movement, utilized existing
connections, and created new ones in order to gather support.128 Brooklyn Rivera settled in
Costa Rica and traveled to the United States and Geneva repeatedly. To find a peaceful solution
to the conflict, he worked with the NCAI, the ILRC, and the NIYC. The NIYC sponsored his visit to
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New Mexico to meet and talk with local Pueblo communities there about the situation in
Nicaragua.129 In 1984, when Rivera met with the director of the WCIP Clement Chartier in the
ILRC office in Washington, D.C., he asked Chartier for WCIP’s participation as an international
observer in the upcoming peace talks between MISURASATA and the Nicaraguan government,
scheduled for December of that year.130 For his part, Armstrong Wiggins relocated to
Washington, D.C., and started working for the ILRC, giving testimonies about Nicaragua’s
indigenous peoples and their situation to transnational organizations such as the OAS InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights.131
Other Miskito, Sumu, and Rama leaders and activists remained in Nicaragua and
attempted to work with the government. At the same time, they continued to utilize the
international community as well. In 1981, Hazel Lau traveled to the UN NGO Conference on
Indigenous Peoples and Land held in Geneva, to present the Miskito position. In December of
the same year, a UN-sponsored seminar on racial discrimination was held in Managua,
Nicaragua, during which a local Miskito elder Mildred Levy met confidentially with
representatives of the WCIP to discuss the situation on the Atlantic Coast.132 From within
Nicaragua as well as outside the state, Miskito activists and leaders utilized and built alliances
with Native and non-Native supporters, using the networks of the global indigenous movement
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to help bring the conflict to a peaceful resolution.

The involvement of North American Native activists and organizations came from official
requests for help from the Miskito, Sumu, and Rama as well as the Nicaraguan government, but
personal connections and links within the global indigenous movement network played an
influential role as well. For example, the relationship between AIM and the Sandinista National
Liberation Front (FSLN) started in the early 1970s, when both organizations were founded. Some
of the future Sandinista leaders, such as Carlos Fonseca and Roberto Vargas, had lived in exile in
the United States and were involved in the Chicano / Latino Movement, through which they
established contacts with AIM. In 1973, Fonseca wrote a letter expressing solidarity with AIM
and support for the occupation of Wounded Knee.133 Based on these ties, AIM and the IITC
were some of the indigenous organizations the Sandinista government turned to for
consultations on their policies: “The new government has regularly consulted our organization
in its consultative capacity on the indigenous question.”134 In December 1981, AIM and IITC
representatives participated in the UN seminar on racism that took place in Managua,
Nicaragua. After the seminar and at the invitation of the Nicaraguan government, some of the
IITC delegates, including Bill Wahpepah, toured the Atlantic Coast and Miskito villages.135
Similarly, personal connections brought Dr. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, an activist,
consultant and representative of the IITC, to Nicaragua and a several years-long cooperation
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with the Nicaraguan government on indigenous issues. In May 1981, Roberto Vargas invited
Dunbar-Ortiz to join a San Francisco labor delegation on a trip to Nicaragua that he had
organized. After the official five-day visit, Dunbar-Ortiz stayed on for two more months and,
with the permission from the Ministry for the Atlantic Coast (INNICA) traveled in Miskitia.136 As
a result of this visit, Dunbar-Ortiz spent most of the next eight years in and out of the country,
working on indigenous issues:
I decided that I wanted to return to Miskitia. I wanted to try to get the
International Indian Treaty Council and other North American Native
organizations and individuals to rally support for the Miskitu within the
revolutionary process, and to try to help the Sandinista leadership understand
indigenous aspirations.137
Personal connections of the global indigenous movement networks served to bring
about the involvement of both Native and non-Native activists and organizations in the
Nicaraguan conflict, and to build further alliances with supporters. The WCIP, through its
president Jose Carlos, made personal connections with both sides of the conflict. During his
travels in 1982, Carlos personally met with some of the former leaders of MISURASATA in Costa
Rica. In early spring, he traveled to Paris where he met with Robert Jaulin, a French philosopher,
and the Nicaraguan Ambassador there. After the Paris visit, Carlos met with anthropologist
Helge Kleivan, one of the founders of IWGIA, and discussed a possibility of forming a
commission that would visit Nicaragua to observe the conflict.138 In 1984, as Nicaragua was
preparing for its general national elections, Robert Jaulin approached Ramiro Reynaga and
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invited him and the NIYC to be a part of an international delegation that, under the umbrella of
the UN Human Rights Division, was to observe the elections. Reynaga accepted the invitation
and became actively involved in the preparation of the trip for the delegation’s Native
participants.139

Native organizations and activists outside Nicaragua responded in diverse ways and with
varied degrees of involvement in the conflict. Employing conventional politics, many
organizations utilized the indigenous global network to raise awareness and spread information
about the conflict, lobbied US politicians, such as Senator Edward Kennedy, for help to bring the
conflict to a peaceful solution, and challenged the Nicaraguan government to respect Native
rights. Some activists’ involvement became more direct with participation in fact-finding
missions to the country, some of which were organized by the Nicaraguan government, some
unofficial.
The ongoing conflict between the Sandinistas and the Contras, the dominance of the
Cold War rhetoric and propaganda, and the involvement of the Reagan administration, further
complicated the situation. Some Miskito leaders, like Steadman Fagoth and his followers, joined
with the Contras in Honduras. Others worked hard to separate the question of indigenous rights
from the counter-revolution and they criticized Fagoth for his actions.140 The financial support
for the Contras by the Reagan administration and involvement by the CIA also cast suspicion on
MISURASATA leaders critical of the Sandinista government and with ties to the US, as rumors
circulated that they were affiliated with US intelligence.141 Rivera, Wiggins, and other activists
tried hard to untangle these struggles and present them as parallel.
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In such a situation, access to information and a clear communication between activists
and organizations was crucial. Personal contacts between activists and the Native press served
as a means of this communication and information distribution. Shortly after the arrests of the
MISURASATA leaders in February 1981, the Native periodical Akwesasne Notes started reporting
on the conflict. In the light of the inadequate access to facts, the newspaper adopted a cautious
position, pointing out that it was “difficult from this distance to fully ascertain all the forces at
work in this situation.”142 CISA coordinator Nilo Cayuqueo reflected on the lack of information
in his interview for the Notes in 1981 as well: “What we need really is more information about
this, because some people say they’re [the Miskito] being manipulated by the CIA, some say
they’re being manipulated by the Church, some say by the Maoists, some say by the
Trotskyists.”143 Cayuqueo’s comment reflects the role of Cold War propaganda, which helped
obscure the situation by subsuming the indigenous struggle against the government and
dominant non-Native forces for their rights into the larger conflict between East and West. In
1985, NCAI Executive Director Suzan Harjo similarly commented on the situation:
The East-West issues and the objectives of the left and the right ideologies have
overshadowed the life-threatening situation of the Indian people and their
struggle to survive in Nicaragua. It is time that all people pay attention to the
future of the Indian people, and to call upon all parties to assure their future
and to stop using them as a political football.144
It was therefore necessary to keep Native perspectives and the indigenous voices from
Nicaragua active and visible.
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Akwesasne Notes became one of the vehicles for Native voices in this conflict, affording
space to both sides to express their views. Alongside its own editorials, the newspaper carried
interviews with and statements by exile Miskito leaders Brooklyn Rivera and Armstrong Wiggins
and their North American supporters, such as Russell Means, Hank Adams, Jim Anaya, and
scholar Bernard Niecheman.145 The newspaper also published articles and speeches
representing the position and views of the Nicaraguan government, including its “Declaration of
Principles of the Popular Sandinista Revolution in Regards to the Indigenous Communities of the
Atlantic Coast,” and supporting articles and letters to the editor by activists, such as Roxanne
Dunbar-Ortiz and Jimmie Durham, who in their own words sided with the Sandinista
government against US aggression and plans to overthrow it, but, at the same time challenged it
to uphold the Native rights of the Miskitu, Sumu, and Rama.146 Despite their differing positions
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toward the Sandinistas and proposed solutions to the conflict, the contributors to the periodical
and its staff stressed the common goal of ensuring that the question of indigenous rights of the
Miskito, Sumu, and Rama people did not get overshadowed by the Cold War competition and
rhetoric surrounding the conflict.
The nature and extent of Native activists’ involvement in the conflict varied. Armstrong
Wiggins and Steven M. Tullberg, a lawyer for the ILRC, testified in the OAS Inter-American
Human Rights Commission and the US Senate about their experiences in Nicaragua.147 In May
1982, an NCAI resolution addressed the situation of indigenous peoples in Mexico and Central
America, including Nicaragua. The NCAI reaffirmed its commitment to the preservation of Indian
cultural values and rights and asked the WCIP to transmit its resolution to international
organizations such as the OAS, the Organization of Non-Aligned Countries, the European Human
Rights Commission, the UN Human Rights Commission, the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission, and the foreign ministries of all the countries in Central America and Mexico, as
well as relevant US governmental offices and the media.148 By submitting the resolution to
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international organizations, the NCAI attempted to lobby for political support for the Miskito,
Sumu, and Rama peoples. The WCIP itself discussed the need to establish a contact with the
Nicaraguan government in order “to keep an open dialogue” in hopes that there could be
“better relations and cooperation with the Nicaraguan Government” regarding the question of
indigenous peoples.149
A more direct involvement in the conflict often meant Native activists’ participation on
fact-finding trips or serving as international observers during meetings and negotiations
between the Sandinista government and MISURASATA. As already mentioned, IITC members
participated in two official visits to the country organized by the Nicaraguan government in late
1981 and early 1982.150 Similarly, the WCIP in 1982 discussed the possibility of sending a
commission to Nicaragua as observers. As Council Member Bernardo stated, the commission
was to be a “commitment of C.O.R.P.I. and W.C.I.P. towards the Indigenous Peoples and the
Miskito People of Nicaragua.”151 In 1984, Apache lawyer Jim Anaya and ILRC staff attorney
Steven Tullberg accompanied Brooklyn Rivera on an official visit to the Atlantic Coast. The visit
was a first step toward peace talks between the government and MISURASATA, and it concluded
with a prisoner exchange.152
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Native activists also served as international observers during the peace negotiations.
Four rounds of talks took place between December 1984 and May 1985. The international
observers included government officials from Columbia, Canada, France, Holland, Mexico, and
Sweden, representatives of human rights organizations, such as Survival International, and
representatives from Native-organizations from North and South Americas, including the WCIP,
NIYC, AIM/IITC, Survival of American Indians Association (SAIA), and the Haudenosaunee Six
Nations.153 During the talks, both sides presented proposals, demands, and conditions for a
peaceful settlement, including among others amnesty for MISRUASATA fighters, the
resettlement of relocated indigenous villagers, and the recognition of autonomy of La Miskita.
However, renewed violence along the Nicaragua - Honduras border and differing views,
especially on the question of indigenous rights and autonomy, led to a breakdown of the talks in
May 1985.154
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After the breakdown of official negotiations, Native organizations, activists and their
non-Native allies, continued their efforts to bring the conflict to a peaceful resolution. They
repeatedly appealed to the Sandinista government to reinstate the peace talks with
MISURASATA.155 WCIP president Clem Chartier and Brooklyn Rivera embarked on a speaking
tour through Canada and Europe in July and August 1985, to raise support for lobbying the
Sandinista government to come back to the negotiating table. The WCIP as an organization
continued to meet with Commandante Borge trying to persuade him and the Sandinista
government to re-start the talks. The last meeting took place on December 19, 1985, during
which MISURASATA agreed to continue the negotiations within Nicaragua.156 Meanwhile, the
Sandinista government attempted to negotiate with local indigenous communities on the
Atlantic Coast and in December 1985 invited the WCIP’s Clement Chartier to visit the region on a
fact-finding mission. However, Chartier found this visit restrictive, because he was not allowed
to travel outside the main village of Bilwi (Puerto Cabezas). Because of this, Chartier accepted an
invitation from Brooklyn Rivera to join him and several others, including Russell Means (AIM)
and Hank Adams (SAIA), on an unofficial two-week long fact-finding trip in January 1986.157
During this trip the activists visited about seven Miskito villages along the Rio Coco area, and
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conducted interviews with the residents and MISURASATA fighters who came to meet them.158
Continued pressure from Native and non-Native organizations on the Nicaraguan
government to resolve the conflict in a peaceful manner, the Sandinistas’ own desire to end the
conflict, and a change in their attitude eventually created favorable conditions for renewed
negotiations. North American Native activists continued to challenge the Nicaraguan
government, using international opinion as a pressure tool. Clement Chartier continued to work
to help resolve the conflict by going on speaking tours across the western United States in 1987.
Together with George Manuel he also organized an international indigenous peoples’ rights
seminar in Vancouver, B.C., and presented the findings and his experiences in Nicaragua before
the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva.159 Indigenous rights in Nicaragua remained on the
WCIP’s agenda and the organization advocated for the reunification of the Miskitu, Sumu, and
Rama families, separated by the conflict, and promoted the establishment of a peace zone along
the Nicaragua - Honduras border.160 Dr. Dunbar-Ortiz continued to work with the Sandinista
government, including on the repatriation of Miskitu families from Honduras.161 The Miskito,
Sumu, and Rama formed a new organization - YATAMA, composed of MISURASATA and two
other indigenous organizations that had formed during the conflict, MISURA and KISAN.
Brooklyn Rivera remained one of the main negotiators for the indigenous peoples.162
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The Sandinistas eventually openly acknowledged their previous “cultural insensitivity”
and altered their position on the question of autonomy and indigenous rights.163 While sporadic
violence and conflict continued until 1988, the change in attitudes and negotiations with
YATAMA produced an offer of a new autonomy plan from the government. In March 1988,
Rivera traveled through La Miskitia, discussing this new offer with the local indigenous
communities. He invited Clem Chartier to join him as an observer and adviser for the
negotiations. These negotiations led to a peaceful settlement of the conflict between the
Sandinistas and the indigenous peoples and a passage of a statue of autonomy by the
Nicaraguan government. This settlement was followed a few days later by a ceasefire
agreement between the Sandinistas and the US-backed Contras.164 The peace settlements were
followed by elections in February 1990, in which YATAMA candidates formed majority in the
new autonomous regional governments. On the national level, the Sandinistas were voted out
of power as well and Violetta Chumorro, a leader of the National Opposition Union (UNO),
became the next president.165
Today the Atlantic Coast is divided into two autonomous zones, and both are to a large
degree ethnically distinct regions. The Autonomy Statute granted local self-rule on all matters,
with the exception of security. However, provisions regarding the division of powers with the
national government remained unclear. The Statute also guarantees traditional communal land
rights, however the state continues to control certain categories of natural resources, such as
timber in national parks, which limits indigenous rights.166
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The relatively extensive involvement and interest by Native activists and organizations
from North and South America in the Nicaraguan conflict came from a growing solidarity among
indigenous peoples and the recognition of the potential impact that this conflict and its solution
could have on Native peoples throughout the hemisphere. As Ramiro Reynaga, quoted in the
opening of this chapter, stated: “…we, all Indians of the continent, are one reality, we suffer the
same illness and the remedy will be the same.”167 The issues at the heart of the conflict
between the Miskito, Sumu, and Rama peoples, and the Sandinista government - guarantee of
indigenous rights, including the right to self-determination, were the same as those Native
Americans in the north grappled with. Native activists, regardless of their position on the
conflict, looked to Nicaragua as a potential precedent for indigenous - nation state relations
through the hemisphere. In the early 1980s, Bill Wahpepah of IITC stated:
Because we have lived through this history [colonization] and resisted all these
years, Nicaragua has a chance to change this history of dealing with Indian
people. Nicaragua, as a government, is standing on the threshold of history.
Nicaragua, as a government, has a chance to do it honestly, to deal honestly and
justly with Indian people. So the Nicaraguan revolution does not only belong to
Nicaragua, it belongs to all freedom-loving people. Especially here in the
Western Hemisphere.168
Gerald Wilkinson, the director of NIYC, saw the importance of Nicaragua similarly. He
described the ongoing peace negotiations in 1985 as “vitally important, not only to the Indians
of Nicaragua but to Indians across the Hemisphere because any agreement or lack of agreement
will set a precedent for all governments in the region in terms of their relationships with their
Indian citizens. We have come to realize that in a sense Misurasata is negotiating for all of us.”169
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A successful negotiation for Indian autonomy on the Atlantic Coast and respect for indigenous
rights by the Nicaraguan government, could potentially set up a precedent for government Native relations throughout the Western Hemisphere. Looking back, James Anaya characterized
the conflict in Nicaragua in a global framework, as “a symbol of the challenges being posed by
the worldwide Indigenous movement” to the national government.170
Involvement in the indigenous-Sandinista conflict also influenced Native organizations
within the global indigenous movement. Disagreements on the position toward the Sandinistas
positioned some northern Native organizations against each other and even caused splits in AIM
and IITC. The NCAI criticized the role of the US in Nicaragua and maintained a recognition of the
legitimacy of the Sandinista’s government, but challenged it to uphold indigenous rights. The
ILRC and NIYC adopted a more critical stand toward the Sandinistas and their treatment of
indigenous peoples. Similar to NCAI, the WCIP acknowledged the legitimacy of the Sandinista’s
government, but kept the situation of the Miskito, Sumu, and Rama people on its agenda during
the conflict. However, unhappy with its president Clement Chartier’s participation on the
unofficial fact-finding trip to Nicaragua in 1986, combined with the trip’s bad publicity and
allegations in international press about Chariter’s support for the Contras and links to the CIA,
the organization limited his presidential duties to “nothing” for the remainder of his tenure.171
AIM and IITC experienced the biggest divisions and splits between those willing to work with the
Sandinistas, such as Bill Wahpepah, Bill Mean, and Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, and those who
adopted anti-Sandinista position, such as Russell Means, Ward Churchill, and Glenn Morris of
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Colorado AIM. These divisions, discussed in more details in the next chapter, continued to play
out into the mid-1990s.172 Despite these differences and divisions within AIM and IITC, the
global indigenous movement demonstrated its flexibility and Native organizations continued to
pursue their larger international goals for recognition of indigenous rights, working within the
UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations to formulate standards for indigenous peoples’
rights and their protection.

The Global Movement and Indigenous Identity
The global cooperation among indigenous peoples came from the recognition of shared
historical (and contemporary) experiences and a commitment to safeguard their rights and
survival as distinct peoples. The similar experiences with colonization and goals for
improvement also became a foundation for the construction of indigenous global identity and
attempts to define the category of “indigenous peoples,” sometimes called the Fourth World.173
This identity, while accepted and internalized by Native peoples, does not supersede or replace
Native tribal identities. It is construct that allows for a unification of diverse peoples on the
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international scene.
As already stated in the introduction, the category of “indigenous peoples” and its
definition is a contested issue. Claims to indigenous identity are often challenged by nationstates, though sometimes these challenges come from Native peoples themselves as well. The
lack of a single, over-arching definition of this term allows for such challenges, but, at the same
time, grants flexibility and the possibility for Native peoples to insert their own understanding
and definition of themselves. The principle of self-identification, embedded in the 1986 Work
Group on Indigenous Populations’ working definition, grants the ability to assert one’s identity
freely and carries implications of political sovereignty as well.174
Ability to self-identify has been an important aspect of Native activism and claims to
sovereignty since the early 1970s. Philip (Sam) Deloria discussed the importance of selfidentification versus being identified by the nation-state in 1974 during the NCAI Conference in
San Diego. While he acknowledged the difficulties of defining who is and who is not indigenous,
especially given the different situations around the world, Deloria argued that, it would have to
be indigenous peoples themselves who would decide, not the settler-states:
…we simply cannot allow ourselves to get tangled up in the domestic political
concerns of any particular country and we cannot allow ourselves to have our
Participation in this international organization [UN] defined by the governments
of the countries that we come from. … we simply cannot participate in the
international organization only as federally recognized tribes. For this purpose
there’s no alternative but to see Indians as Indians … we simply can’t allow the
United States government, by playing the politics of who they’re going to give
services to, and the politics of who they’re going to recognize, to tell us how
we’re going to relate on the international level.175
The WCIP also included the principle of self-identification in one of its resolutions in 1977, which
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stated that only indigenous peoples had the right to decide who belongs to this category. The
International Labor Organization (ILO) and the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations
(WGIP) later supported the principle of self-identification as well, as a reaction to nation-states’
refusal to acknowledge their Native peoples. In 1986, the WGIP specifically stated that anyone
who considered themselves to be indigenous and was accepted by an indigenous group or
community would be considered to be indigenous.176
Based on this principle, the WGIP maintained an open-door policy for its sessions. As
anthropologist Ronald Niezen points out, this situation of “definition of no definition” should be
confusing, but it actually works, as indigenous delegates come to meetings with little insecurity
about their status and few doubts about the claims of others. Based on his own observations,
Niezen argues that there exists “a clear awareness among indigenous delegates of who
represents indigenous peoples and organizations and who does not.”177 Some nation-states,
such as India or China, have contested the principle of self-identification, but indigenous peoples
continue to demand that nation-states accept this practice.178
Experiences with colonization and colonial subjugation serve as the basis for indigenous
global identity, as well as in-group recognition and acceptance by other Native peoples. During
the 1975 Port Alberni conference, delegates of the Scandinavian Sami faced hostility to their
claims of indigeneity at first. They were recognized and embraced as indigenous peoples only
after they shared their historical experiences and culture, similar to those of other delegates.179
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In 1980, the American Indian Movement (AIM) established connections and mutual support
with the Welsh national movement. This cooperation was based on the recognition of the
similar experiences with colonization rather than the differences between the two peoples.180
Similarly, Native peoples from Africa and Asia, such as the Amazigh (Berber) people of Moroco,
the Herero people of Namibia, the Pokot people of Kenya, and the Hadza people of Tanzania,
who came from countries that have relatively recently achieved national independence and who
experienced the same grievances of land loss, displacement, assimilation, and genocide, have
successfully made claims to indigenous identity as well.181 For example, facing threats to their
language and culture, the Amazigh people started organizing in the 1960s. In 1993, they
participated in the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, where they had an
opportunity to interact with indigenous peoples from other regions and compare their struggles.
It was then, that the Amazigh started to see themselves as indigenous and to seek protection of
their collective rights as peoples.182
Similarly, while the nomadic Tuareg people of Sahara are not typical of an indigenous
people, they have been accepted as such by the members of the Indigenous Global Movement.
The Tuareg have a hierarchical and aristocratic social structure, loosely grouped into a
federation of tribes, and they are residents and citizens of post-colonial states. At the same
time, since the 1960s they have had grievances with the state consistent with other indigenous
peoples’ experiences: state-sanctioned violence, forced settlement and assimilation, loss of
language, loss of territory, and loss of identity. While in the mid-1980s the Tuareg did not
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identify themselves as indigenous peoples, by the late 1990s and early 2000s they presented
their case at international forums in Geneva as such. The attempts of the state to impose
control, social change and political marginalization created conditions and experiences
comparable to those of other indigenous peoples and allowed for the Tuareg to identify with
them.183
In-group identification or recognition can also serve to reject one’s claim to indigenous
identity. For example, during the 1999 WGIP’s meeting, representatives of the Rehoboth Baster
Community presented their grievances with the government of Namibia, claiming that with
Namibia’s independence in 1990 they lost their traditional form of government and communal
lands, and were denied their language in administration and education. The Rehoboth Basters
are descendants of indigenous Khoi and Afrikaans settlers. Many indigenous peoples see them
as a dominant white community with ill-founded claim to the African homeland and understood
their grievances as a backlash against Namibia’s independence. As a protest and to express their
rejection of the Rehoboth Basters’ claim to indigenous identity, the other indigenous delegates
to the 1999 WGIP meeting left the room while the Rehoboth representative made their
presentation.184
As the examples above show, indigenous global identity is a modern construct. It only
recently came into being and is often invoked for political purposes on the regional, national,
and global level. But as Niezen points out, it is grounded in indigenous peoples’ strategic
essentialism that aims to claim indigeneity by expressing a sense of intergenerational continuity,
permanence, traditions, and a willingness to defend these ideals.185 The “essence” of
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indigenous identity comes from the arguments of individual tribal nations in support of their
status vis-à-vis nation-states, using their “authenticity” and traditions, names, and connections
to specific territories.186 The aspects of territory, language, and historical continuity are specific
to each Native nation. But the experiences of ethnocide and ethnic cleansing (genocide), forced
relocations, educational assimilation, loss of lands and subsistence, the common features of
indigenous peoples’ histories, and the similarities of the relationships between Native peoples
and states are the components of the indigenous global identity, grounded in “evidence,
testimony, and collective memory.”187 These shared experiences are similar to the adherence to
collective name, historical continuity, specific culture and homelands by each Native nation, the
foci of the “constitutive political myth” around which the community’s identity is built.188 The
“constitutive political myth” and ethnic symbols play a role in Native groups’ conceptualization
of their identities. As anthropologist Šavelková argues, some Native groups construct their
identities using pre-existing ethnic foundations, based on their culture, histories, and territory,

ethno-symbolism. Primordialists, such as Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz, see nations as existing since
time immemorial and modern nations as extensions of their medieval counterparts. Nationalities are seen
as natural, based in primordial attachments that come from being born into a particular community,
language (even a dialect), and social practices. Primordialism came under criticism by
modernist/constructivists for their belief in the givenness of ethnic and national ties, which made them
fixed and static, forbidding any individual choice in construction of ethnic identity. The modernist or
constructivist approach considers nations and nationalism to be a modern construct, tied to a modern,
industrial society. In the view of constructivists, such as Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson, nations
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the so-called “myth-symbol complex.”189
Global indigenous identity does not supersede Native people’s tribal identities. In this
sense, global indigenous identity is not a replacement, rather an “add-on,” similar to an
acceptance of the identity of the nation-state that has indigenous peoples in its midst.
Armstrong Wiggins, a Miskito, explained in 1981, as the conflict with the Sandinista government
was unfolding, that their Miskito identity developed first, only later came the identity as
Nicaraguan: “…we are Miskito first. You see, one thing is plain reality. Our identity is absolute.
The other - the one of being a Nicaraguan - that one just happened.”190 Similarly, for Native
peoples any larger indigenous or pan-Indian identity comes into play only after their tribal
identity. As Nizen points out: “For indigenous representatives, the impulse to seek a wider
identity is often regional, sometimes community based, and occasionally individual. It seems to
begin with a sense of regional solidarity with those who share similar ways of life and histories
of colonial and state domination that then grows into the realization that others around the
world share the same experience.”191
Such realizations and connections based on a recognition of the indigenous identity are
evident in some of the interviews collected during a 1986 fact-finding trip to the Atlantic Coast
of Nicaragua by Brooklyn Rivera, Russell Means, Hank Adams, and Clement Chartier. As the
transcripts show, the visiting activists introduced themselves by their tribal affiliations to their
hosts, but then expressed connections with the Miskito, based on the underlining similarities of
the struggles they faced. Clement Chartier pointed out that while he was from Canada, he “fully
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understand[s] and appreciate[s] that the Indigenous struggle, the Indian struggle, is the same
everywhere, that is, our rights are being denied.”192 The Miskito also acknowledged these
identity connections and called the visitors “Indian brothers.”193 Ramon Bobb, a Miskito from
Kuamwalta village, echoed the connections with the visitors: “I want to greet each one of you
because you are our Indian brothers, all of you, and I feel very pleased with your presence here
this morning.”194 Mauricio from the same village also stressed the ties that bound together
hosts and visitors: “… we are struggling with our own Indian ideology for freedom and to
liberate our land and our people, I am very pleased to be with my Indian brothers this
morning.”195
While grounded in ethnic symbolism, the global indigenous identity differs in its nature
from ethnic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism defines the experiences of ethnic groups with
oppression and marginalization as uniquely their own and unsharable with those outside the
group.196 Similarly, many indigenous groups differentiate between themselves and the majority
society in order to stress their identity and to maintain their group’s boundaries of the “wethey” and “we-you” categories.197 This dichotomy is also acknowledged between indigenous
peoples themselves, and their larger indigenous identity does not erase them. At the same time,
as Niezen argues, indigenous peoples tent to see their experiences with colonization and goals
to preserve their rights in a more collective terms than ethnic nationalism does. They work more
cooperatively, gathering in international forums and pursuing (to a degree) collective
strategies.198 This cooperation and the global indigenous identity can be seen as an expression
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of Native peoples reaching across the “we-you” boundaries to connect with each other and
acknowledge the similarities they share, creating in effect a federated identity.199 Such
constructed identity and the category of “indigenous peoples” allows for the unification of
peoples from diverse cultures and regions to pursue their shared goals of collective rights and
recognition of their identities.200

Conclusion
Through their increasingly international work, Native leaders, such as D’Arcy McNickle
and George Manuel, came into more frequent contact with Native peoples around the world.
These contacts and the knowledge gained from them led to a realization of similar experiences
with colonization, loss of homelands, and cultural traditions. Based on these shared histories as
well as goals for the future, leaders like Manuel formulated ideas for indigenous global
cooperation. Their ideas, shared with other Native peoples through their activists’ connections,
led to cooperation that grew along the networks established first by individual activists into a
truly global movement, encompassing Native local, national, and trans-national organizations,
and their non-Native allies. The diversity of the multitude of local struggles that the movement
represents can pose challenges to transnational organizations and their leadership, and requires
flexibility of the movement’s actors to negotiate their differences, while working toward the
shared goals of recognition of indigenous rights. This work consists of local protests,
conventional political lobbying and interest representation in state governments and
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international organizations, as well as mutual support and help among indigenous peoples. The
recognition and acknowledgment of shared experiences strengthened through the expanding
cooperation and contacts among Native peoples and also engendered the idea of a common
indigenous identity. This indigenous identity does not supersede tribal identities, and is often
formulated - constructed - by indigenous peoples themselves, which in itself is an expression of
sovereignty, and helps them in the pursuit of their political goals.
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Leftist Ideologies and Indigenous Intellectual Sovereignty
“We’re not anti-Communist, we’re not anti-Marxist or pro-Marxist. What we want to do
is to be able to work together for our common interest, which is anti-Imperialist.”
Nilo Cayuqueo, 19811
“Intellectual sovereignty would be developing a framework so that whatever
non-Indians could discuss and articulate could be always matched and generally
surpassed by an Indian framework that was more comprehensive.”
Vine Deloria, Jr.2

Native Americans have engaged with European-based ideologies and concepts since the
contact period. As discussed in chapter one, Native leaders and activists examined and
sometimes used these concepts to further their goals. As the visibility of Native issues and
activism increased during the 1960s and 1970s, parties on the Left, domestic and international,
started paying closer attention to them. The Left’s increased interest in Native rights struggles
brought these groups closer together as potential allies in their fight against American
imperialism. Native American leaders and activists in turn engaged with the ideologies of the
Left, such as Marxism, and examined them in terms of what they could offer to the Native
struggle, what role tribal nations would have in the new alternative society the Left was
promising, and what guarantees Native peoples would have for the continuous protection and
respect of their treaty rights. In countries of Latin America, liberation movements against
dictatorial regimes often included leftist parties and unions. Native peoples in these countries
pondered the same questions about their place and rights would be in the future society
envisioned by the Left.
Native leaders and activists examined the ideologies’ basic tenets, but they also paid
attention to their practical application in regards to indigenous peoples in countries like the

1

“Of Mental Colonization in South America: Interview with Nilo Cayuqueo,” Akwesasne Notes, Vol.
13, No. 3 (Late Summer, 1981), 16.
2
Vine Deloria, Jr. to Robert Warrior, July 18, 1991, Vine Deloria Papers, Series II. Correspondence,
Box 40, Folder: Robert Warrior, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University.

251

USSR or Nicaragua in the 1980s. The Native views on the usefulness of Marxism and the Left’s
view of Native Americans were not homogeneous; they were diverse and some have changed
over time as well. Native intellectuals discussed the potential usefulness of ideologies, such as
Marxism, philosophical differences between European-based ideology and traditional Native
world-views, as well as the practical application to indigenous issues. They carried theses
discourses through the networks and personal connections of the indigenous global movement,
through personal correspondence, interviews and editorials in Native periodicals, and published
books.

Connected more by the questions they asked, rather than the answers, some Native

intellectuals saw leftist ideologies as a potentially useful tool, with aspects that could be
incorporated into the struggle for Native rights. Others rejected them out right as having
nothing to offer. And yet others questioned whether using European-based ideologies was not,
in itself, a form of colonization. Activists, such as Robert Thomas, Gerald Wilkinson and Ramiro
Reynaga, called for a development of an original Native ideology, rooted in tradition, as a
philosophical foundation for the Native rights struggle. While this discussion started already in
the mid-1970s, events such as the conflict between the Sandinista government and indigenous
peoples in Nicaragua, as well as the treatment and attitudes from American Left, seem to be an
influential factor in strengthening the call of some Native leaders’ for intellectual sovereignty.
This chapter presents a sample of the discussion among Native intellectuals about
Marxism, the problems they found with the philosophy ands its practical application, as well as
their view on intellectual colonization and sovereignty. It also discusses the attitudes of some of
the parties on the so-called Left toward Native Americans and their demands, which also
influenced Native discourses. The indigenous side of this debate is based on articles published in
Akwesasne Notes, Ward Churchill’s book Marxism and Native Americans, and private
correspondence between some of the Native activists involved. The Left side of this debate
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offers examples based on sources from communist parties in the United States and Latin
America. This case study is not exhaustive. While limited and not all-encompassing, the sources
used illustrate the main points of the debate.

Alliances and Cooperation
Native Americans’ introduction to leftist ideologies likely came from early connections
with progressive and leftist parties and organizations, such as labor unions or radical student
organizations. According to Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, connections between Americans Indians and
leftist parties can be traced to the first half of the twentieth century, when some Native
Americans in Oklahoma were members of the Socialist Party. Similarly, in the 1930s, several
Pueblo families in northern New Mexico joined the Communist Party, U.S.A. (CPUSA).3 Native
American workers also joined labor unions, such as Pueblo workers in the southwest in the late
1950s or the Haudenosaunee ironworkers in New York City in the 1960s.4
Involvement and cooperation with labor unions and parties on the left was beneficial to
Native Americans because it provided support, knowledge, and experiences in terms of
organizing and fund-raising. The unions’ history with organizing work would have been helpful
to early Native Americans’ attempts at organization formation and fund-raising. Helen Peterson,
Executive Director of the National Congress of the American Indians (NCAI) expressed this view
in a 1959 letter:
Also, in view of the lack of experience of our people with trade unionism, the
increasing employment of southwest Indians in uranium mines, our common
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interests with labor in the depressed area and CCC [Civilian Conservation Corps]
bills, and the potential that exists for fundraising for NCAI from unions, I am
wondering what you would think of asking my lawyer friend (Bill Rentfro) to
speak about trade unionism and to be a consultant on this subject during the
Phoenix convention?5
Peterson’s suggestion was accepted and William Rentfro, a representative of the AFL-CIO’s Oil,
Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union came to speak at the NCAI convention at a
session on “Community Organization and How-To-Do-It Ideas,” and to serve as a consultant for
tribal representatives on questions of labor, education and organization.6 Similarly, involvement
with labor unions in New York and Washington, D.C., helped with organizing of the Native
communities there. Suzan Harjo, former Executive Director of the NCAI, pointed out that the
prevalence of workers’ unions in New York instantly translated into political activity.7
In Latin American countries like Chile and Colombia, Native groups also had working
relations with local labor unions and leftist groups. However, like in the United States, Native
peoples in South America did not necessarily follow labor unions and leftist parties politically. As
Nilo Cayuqueo, coordinator for CISA, pointed out in 1981, many Native peoples had their own
political organizations.8 Labor unions provided support for indigenous peoples outside of the
Western Hemisphere as well. During the 1981 UN NGO Conference on Indigenous Peoples and
the Land, one of the suggestions for short term strategies coming from one of the commissions
was for indigenous peoples to “link up with progressive trade unions,” since “in countries like
Australia, sympathetic unions have helped the struggle of indigenous peoples.”9
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The interest of the Left in Native Americans as potential allies rose once Native activism
pushed Indian issues onto the American national as well as international scene. With the
increased use of direct action protests in the 1960s and 1970s, Native issues became more
visible, and non-Native activists and organizations, themselves pushing for reforms in the
society, started paying more attention to them. Through their own quest for authenticity and
alternatives to the main stream society, members of the counterculture, hippies, and the New
Left interacted with Native Americans and sometimes became their supporters and allies.10
Non-Native communists, the Black Panthers, the Students for Democratic Society (SDS), Peace
and Freedom Party members, radicals from the University of Washington and Portland’s Reed
College, and others came to show support with Native fishermen in the Pacific Northwest during
the 1960s fish-ins. Similarly, during the occupation of Alcatraz from 1969 to 1971, support came
from “counterculture types,” radicals from the Bay Area, and local unions, including the AFLCIO.11 The increased enrollment of Native students in colleges during the 1960s would have
provided another opportunity for young Native Americans to interact with leftist organizations
on campuses, such as the SDS or Free Speech Movement, and learn about socialist and Marxist
ideas. Such contacts led to the “cross-fertilization of ideas, techniques, partnerships.”12
The interest of the Left came from what they saw as a struggle against a common
enemy, the “state monopoly capitalism.” They saw Native Americans as a part of a larger
revolutionary movement and as allies.13 Writing in 1973 about the occupation of Wounded
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Knee, journalist and a member of the CPUSA John Pittman identified the movement for Native
rights as a “national liberation struggle” and claimed that its connections to the working class
were rooted in the same goals of their political fight “to defend their liberties and livelihood
from attacks by the same monopolies and government officials.”14 The CPUSA made the same
connection in their Resolution on the Path to Native American Indian Liberation in 1979, stating
that the lack of control over reservation development by Native Americans resulted in fewer
jobs, and therefore “the struggle for self-government is an integral part of the fight for full
employment.”15 In the 1980s, CPUSA member Henry Morrison, in what appears to be a draft of
a conference speech, identified other common aspects of the Native liberation struggle and
working class goals: the push back against the Reagan administration budget cuts, the fight
against racism, a desire for cultural diversity, and the similar nature of Native sovereignty and
working class struggles as “objectively anti-monopoly.” As a final aspect, he noted that the
working class should be morally interested in Native Americans, since it “is called to be the
upholder of the highest moral ideals of humanity.”16
Communist parties in Latin American countries made similar connections. In 1986, the
Communist Party of Ecuador organized an international symposium to discuss the “Indian
movement in the fight for national independence, democracy, and peace in Latin America.” The
report from the symposium, published in an international periodical Otázky míru a socialismu
[Questions of Peace and Socialism], a communist international magazine, presented examples of
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a long-term interest and engagements of communist parties with indigenous problems in
countries like Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia. Further, it identified the common goals and
common enemies of Native peoples and the working class - the imperialism of the United States
and local oligarchies.17
From identifying the common enemy and links between Native peoples and the working
class, it was only a step to a call for the inclusion of Native American struggles in the programs of
leftist organizations and parties. Starting in 1969, the CPUSA felt it should be informed about the
Native American struggle, and should “develop the support of all the American working people”
for it.18 In his 1973 article, John Pittman even provided a historical precedent for urging the
working class to support national liberation movements: “Especially topical and relevant are the
appeals of Marx and Engels to the English working class to cast off its own exploiters by joining
the Irish struggle for emancipation from the same oppressor.”19 In his view, it was time for the
Party to not only include the demands of Native workers in its program, but also the “special
demands of the Indian people as a people.”20
Similarly, the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) formed the Wounded Knee Legal
Defense/Offense Committee (WKLD/OC) to defend AIM members involved in the takeover of
Wounded Knee in 1973. A letter from the NLG Colorado chapter calling for volunteers stated: “If
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we in the Guild consider ourselves partners in all struggles against American Imperialism, we
should understand the importance of supporting the efforts at Wounded Knee.”21 This early
effort and WKLD/OC’s work led to the establishment of the Committee on Native American
Struggles (CONAS), a national working committee of the National Lawyers Guild, which
continued to be involved in Native issues and struggle for self-determination and sovereignty,
including for example support for the fishing rights in the Pacific Northwest and The Longest
Walk in 1978.22
Cooperation with parties and organizations on the Left did not automatically mean that
Native Americans accepted the political ideology that governed those organizations. But it
would certainly prompt an examination of those ideologies and their usefulness to the
indigenous struggle. For example, the correspondence of activists, such as Gerald Wilkinson,
Ramiro Reynaga, Vine Deloria, Jr. and others discussed Marxism, its utility, and practical
experiences with the Left on numerous occasions.23 In the mid-1970s, Roberto Mendoza, an
AIM activist, started a Native Marxist Study Group in the San Francisco Bay area. The idea came
after Mendoza met members of a similar group in Vancouver, British Columbia. The goal of the
group was to examine Marxist analysis and liberation theory, regarding the possibility of its
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application to Native history and a formulation of a strategy for Native decolonization. The two
groups remained in regular contact for nearly two years, exchanging reports and speakers.24
The discourse on the utility of Marxism for the struggle for Native rights was carried
through personal correspondence between activists as well as published interviews and
editorials in Native periodicals. Theories of the left were also mentioned in the final report on
Indigenous philosophy and the land from Commission Two at the 1981 UN NGO Conference on
Indigenous Peoples and the Land. In 1983, Ward Churchill published an edited volume called
Marxism and Native Americans, a compilation of essays by Native and Marxists writers,
presenting a conversation between several members of the two groups.25
As already stated, the views on Marxism were diverse among Native activists and
intellectuals. What connected the group was the shared interest in preserving indigenous rights.
Through this lens, Native leaders examined the merits of Marxism. Some of them saw a limited
usefulness in Marxist analysis and a possibility for an alliance with leftist groups in the struggle
for Native rights. John Mohawk, a writer for the Akwesasne Notes, pointed out that while the
Native American rights movement and Marxism greatly differed in their ideologies, histories,
and goals, many Marxists ideas were in theory truly anti-colonial. According to Mohawk,
substantial areas of Marxists thought, such as its critique of capitalism, could be a useful tool to
Native Americans. He saw nothing “contradictory about Native people seeking and finding allies
within the camps of the ideologies of other people.”26 Nilo Cayuqueo, a Mapuche activists from
Argentina and a coordinator for CISA, also believed that Marxism had “many good things” that
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could be extracted from it. He saw a possibility of an ideological dialog between Marxists and
indigenous peoples, as long as it was an honest and open one.27
Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, a member of the San Francisco Marxist Study Group and an
activist in IITC, used Marxist analysis in her dissertation and later book Roots of Resistance, a
study of the development of capitalism, land use and land tenure in northern New Mexico
between 1680 and 1980. In her view, Marxist theory was useful in understanding the
expropriation of land from the Pueblo people and the social effects of capitalism on them.
However, she also points out that this is the only book in which she used Marxist analysis.28
Not all Native activists and leaders agreed on the usefulness of Marxism and lefties ideologies in
the struggle for Native Rights. Some, such as Russell Means, rejected Marxism as an European
philosophy that had nothing to offer to Native peoples.

The Marxist and the Native: Differences
Some of the objections to Marxism that Native critics voiced came from the differences
between European and Native philosophies, as well as from the differences between the
political ideology and the reality indigenous peoples faced in countries with leftist or communist
regimes. One of the main points in these debates was Marxism’s lack of spirituality and its
emphasis on materialism. Vine Deloria, Jr. saw the result of the rejection of religious
interpretations of the human condition by traditional Marxism as resulting in the focus on the
individual as a part of nature and a function of social relations. But this interpretation remained
within a man-centered concept that took the human world as its point of origin and remained
within its boundaries. As Deloria pointed out, such a rejection of religious experiences from the
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scope of inquiry was foreign to Native Americans.29 The Revolutionary Communist Party’s (RCP)
explanation of the Left’s, and in this case specifically the communists’, view on spirituality
supports Deloria’s assessment: “Communists are opposed to the whole idea of spirits, but not to
the spirit, if this is understood to mean the advancing consciousness of mankind, based on the
material world.”30
The rejection of spirituality and the emphasis on materialism led to what Russell Means
called the conflict between being and gaining, where being was a spiritual proposition, while
gaining was a material act, which resulted in the different attitudes toward material possessions
between Europeans and Native Americans.31 Frank Black Elk further elaborated on this
difference in his article, commenting on European “compulsion to gather up material and play
with it … an obsessive preoccupation with purely physical accumulation and arrangement.”32
This need for material gain was not exclusive to Marxism. Both Means and Black Elk saw
Marxism as a continuation of earlier European traditions and attitudes, such as Christianity and
capitalism, rather than a revolutionary departure from them. In Black Elk’s view, what Marx did
was to transport the Christian idea of heaven from the after-life to this one, making heaven
attainable on earth through productive work. With Marx, any remaining spirituality died and the
European need for material accumulation and rearrangement “became concertized as
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‘dialectical materialism;’ materialism has thus become the European religion.”33
Leftist understanding of and attitude toward nature represented another philosophical
concept alien to Native American views. As Deloria, Jr. pointed out, in a Marxist framework
nature played an indispensable role in the creation of society and man’s self-development,
which were achieved through labor and transformation. The assumption was that humans and
nature were initially at odds and only the transformation of nature through man’s work, a
creation of a new world, accomplished a union or reconciliation with nature, which then
functioned as a bond with other men, an entrance to society.34 The RCP echoed this belief in its
article, explaining that the “productive forces develop as a result of the struggle of man against
nature” and that “only by correctly grasping the objective laws of nature and society, and
thereby being able to change the material world, that man’s ‘spirit’ is truly unleashed.”35 This
scenario of alienation and the need to work on and transform nature in order to be natural, a
contradiction as Deloria pointed out, was a foreign concept to Native Americans, who did not
see humans and nature as opponents.36
This philosophical difference underlay Marxist and Native varied attitudes toward
natural resources and their management as well. To Native critics, the centrality of development
in the Marxist vision seemed too similar to capitalism. As Black Elk argued, “Marxists are hung
up on exactly the same ideas of ‘progress’ and ‘development’ that are the guiding motives of
those they seek to overthrow.”37 Pronouncements and plans put forward by communist parties
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regarding Native Americans and natural resources stressed the need for development. In 1969,
the CPUSA formulated its support for Native American liberation, which included among others
a resolution of the situation of Native Alaskans. In the Party’s proposal, Native Alaskans would
receive a “fair share” of Alaskan oil reserves, compensations for genocide, and a restoration of
suitable lands for “Indians who wish to retain tribal form,” and the “allotment of capital funds to
develop industry and to mechanize agriculture.”38 A decade later, the RCP’s vision of Native
future still stressed the importance of development. In their revolutionary program, the Party
planned to establish large areas of land for Native Americans within their envisioned socialist
state and to provide “special assistance … in developing these areas.”39
Marxist attitudes toward land and tribal peoples drew the attention of Native activists.
In 1974, members of the Vancouver Marxist Study Group went on a trip to Chinese Mongolia to
visit the tribal peoples living there and to see the effects of Chairman Mao’s minority policies. As
Dr. Dunbar-Ortiz pointed out, the question of land was the reason why Mao’s Marxism attracted
the attention of indigenous peoples. While Marx’s original framework had a tendency to be
contemptuous of peasantry and showed an incomplete understanding of the importance of
land, which led to “serious errors” in the USSR, Mao’s approach was land oriented, which was
more likely to engender the interest of Native peoples.40
Native American critics also objected to the often dismissive, even paternalistic,
attitudes by the Left toward indigenous peoples. Such attitudes came from the above discussed
philosophical differences and, perhaps from a blind faith in the correctness of Marxist-Leninist
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principles and modernity. Even Marxists supportive of Native sovereignty and selfdetermination tended to look down on Native spirituality and heritage, because they were seen
as “aspects of stone age culture” and backward ideas. In their view, Native Americans had to
move up to the present and future, and leave the past behind.41 In the early 1950s, Earl
Browder, member and president of the CPUSA, wrote an essay for private circulation among his
friends. It was a response to an article published in the Soviet magazine Novy Mir [New World].42
Browder objected to the interpretation of American history as “robbery” and argued that
colonization, including the theft of land and the genocide of Native Americans, was inevitable as
a part of Marx’s view of the progression of history. In Browder’s view, if European colonizers
joined Native societies and became like them, they would have become “economically and
culturally backwards, having condemned their children to ten thousand years of evolution out of
barbarism.”43 In his view, Native Americans were barbarians, with nothing to offer: “Without
the ‘white man’s’ conquest of America, there would have been no modern industry and
civilization.”44
Browders’ view firmly reflects the unilinear concept of social and cultural development,
reflected in Marx’s and Engels’ The Communist Manifesto, proposed by Henry Morgan in his
book Ancient Society, where he largely deals with Native American societies, and endorsed by
Friedrich Engels in his The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. This unilinear
evolutionary plan became a fixture in Marxism. Ironically, Marx’s writings from the decade
before his death, especially his Ethnological Notebooks, notes on mainly Morgan’s book, but
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also other anthropological writings, reveal a departure from this evolutionary path toward
multilinear development of human societies. However, these notebooks, remained unpublished
until 1972.45
Communist parties mostly departed from views such as Browder’s by the 1970s, the
RCP’s response to Russell Means’ speech in 1980 being an exception. CPUSA documents and
materials from the international symposium organized by the Communist Party of Ecuador in
1986 show a remorse and condemnation of colonial history and the land dispossession and
subjugation it brought to Native peoples.46 Occasionally, members of the Left showed
agreement with Native views and criticism of industrialism and its emphasis on development.
Bill Tabb, a Marxist activist involved directly in Native struggles for land and sovereignty,
acknowledged that Marxists with their focus on class “can be insensitive to the irreparable
damage uncontrolled industrialism can do.”47 Tabb believed Marxists should pay attention to
American Indian thinking about the destructive nature of industrialism, since it would enrich
their own views and understanding, allowing them to forge an alliance against a common
enemy.”48 But in general, while communist parties acknowledged the role Native traditions and
views have played in the movement, providing a “culture of resistance,” they believed that
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those traditions were not enough or were incapable of guiding indigenous peoples to their
liberation. In the overall leftist view, it was only the “class revolutionary movement” and the
application of Marxist-Leninist principles that could solve the problems of indigenous peoples
and lead to their true liberation.49
The Left’s dismissal of Native traditions and its insistence on the leading role of Marxist
principles highlights the dominance of class consciousness over ethnic identity in Marxist
thought. This translated into the actual attitudes of the parties and organizations on the Left
toward Native peoples, their activism and demands. In 1980, Helge Kleivan, anthropologist and
one of the founders of the International Work-Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), noted that
many European organizations, founded during the 1970s with the aim to support Native
Americans, “lately have turned out to be controlled by people representing the extreme left.”
These organizations verbally attacked Native leaders who did not join the class struggle as racist,
even going as far as to claim that Indian leaders who had to leave their countries, such as Bolivia
or Peru, were “not representatives of the Indian people.”50
Not all Native activists rejected Marx’s class analysis of society and their views started to
clash with those who held more traditional, culturally oriented stand over the direction of the
Native rights movement. Commenting on the 1980 WCIP conference, during which the Consejo
Indio de Sud America (CISA) was founded, Kleivan stated: “…this conference was one big fight
between ‘Marxist’ Indians and ‘Indianist’ Indians. The ‘Indianists’ who seems to be strongest in
Bolivia, finally won their victory and they are the ones that have control over CISA.”51 Kleivan
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was concerned that these divisions could potentially “create tremendous new problem to the
effort by Indians to strengthen their organizations.” As an example, Kleivan quoted a Bolivian
activist as saying: “We will soon see 14 Indian movements in Bolivia, that is as many as there are
political parties on the left…” Kleivan continued: “There are already two MITKAs at present, one
Indianist, and a more recent trotskist [sic] version of the original MITKA.”52 In his interview for
Akwesasne Notes, Nilo Cayuqueo also commented on the split in MITKA, which by 1981 included
three organizations, two of which “decided to join the Left in a broad front, and the other one
didn’t want to. … So the ones who didn’t want to join are accused of being racists.”53
The attempts of the Left to gain influence in Native movements also came from what
some Native activists perceived as the leftist organizations’ self-interest. In the early-1980s
Colombia, local Native communities were fighting land dispossession by wealthy land owners. A
left-wing guerrilla movement called M-19 operated in the same area, also fighting the landlords.
The local Native population did not agree with the M-19’s politics (often violent) and did not
want the group to be involved in their fight. Nilo Cayuqueo commented on the situation in his
interview for Akwesasne Notes, claiming that the M-19 was “trying to gain influence with the
Indians,” but for their own self-interest.54 Five years later, Ramiro Reynaga made similar
observations. In his letter to Gerald Wilkinson, Reynaga commented on attempts by the InterAmerican Indian Congress to establish a Latin American Council To Support Indigenous Fights
[sic; most likely Rights]. In his view, the new organization was “a front of the communists aimed
to grab the Indian movement.”55 Reynaga saw a similar situation in Mexico, concerning the
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Association of Professional Bilingual Indians, Civil Association (APIBAC). The association used to
belong to the official party in Mexico, but by the mid-1980s it became “sort of independent” and
was trying to gain access to the U.N. But, as Reynaga saw it, it was in danger of being taken over
by the left: “Of course the left is trying to eat them, through Aurora Perez de Jantzen, a Mexican
Indian married to Holland antro [sic].”56
Regardless of whether it was the motive of self-interest or sincere belief that MarxismLeninism was the only guiding principle for Native American liberation, Marxist tendency to see
Native issues as part of a larger revolutionary struggle only drew criticism from Native
intellectuals and activists. While some Marxists may have recognized the special aspect of land
rights, they continued to see the question of the control of resources and land-based struggles
as subordinate to the overall revolutionary process.57 Regarding urban Indians, some leftists
considered them to be a working class “undergoing a whole process of proletarianization.”58
Such understanding influenced the Left’s vision of unity between Native peoples and the
working class, but also the formulation of the role and place for Native peoples in a projected
future society.
The vision of a future that the Left projected for Native peoples did not necessarily
match with Native aspirations. In general, the Left offered local autonomy and self-government
rather than self-determination and full sovereignty. Both the CPUSA and the RCP in their
pronouncements promised to guarantee Native Americans autonomous control over their lands
and resources and supply them with funds for development, but all would take place within a
larger socialist state.59 The Leninist approach to the so-called national minority question and
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the example of the USSR was accentuated by several authors as the preferred goal.60 But the
realities of ethnic autonomy within the USSR left a lot to be desired. Socialist and communist
states’ policies toward their minorities were assimilationist in nature. The USSR’s doctrine of a
multicultural society was conceived and practiced within the context of Leninist ideology, which
in theory allowed for the right of self-determination of national minorities, in reality, however,
any signs of ethnic nationalism were strictly suppressed, especially under Stalin. The tendency
was to force nomadic groups, who were harder to administer, to relocate to places under
centralized control. Ultimately, the concept of class took a precedent over cultural and ethnic
differences.61
Commenting on the treatment of indigenous peoples in the USSR and China, Russell
Means criticized the dominance of the concept of class over the cultural and ethnic one; what
he saw as the Marxist’s demand that non-European peoples give up their traditions:
I see that the territory of the USSR used to contain a number of tribal peoples
and that they have been crushed to make way for the factories. The soviets
refer to this as ‘The National Question,’ the question of whether the tribal
peoples had the right to exist as peoples; and they decided the tribal peoples
were an acceptable sacrifice to industrial needs. I look to China and I see the
same thing. I look to Vietnam and I see Marxists imposing an industrial order
and rooting out the indigenous tribal mountain peoples. … So, in both theory
and in practice, Marxism demands that non-European peoples give up their
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values, their traditions, their cultural existence altogether. We will all be
industrialized science addicts in a Marxist society.62
The dominance of class consciousness over ethnic identity in Marxists thought was also
expressed in the Left’s attitude toward the emerging idea of a global indigenous identity, also
called the Fourth World, which many saw as “narrow nationalism.”63 Rather than to
acknowledge the validity of ethnic and cultural identity, the Left asserted that the focus on the
ethnic aspect of the Native American rights struggle was a ploy by bourgeois sociologists in
order to prevent Native participation in revolutionary movements. Representatives of
communist parties of Latin American countries further accused “reactionary forces” of “forcing
anti-communist ideology on Native Americans,” pushing them to create separate Native political
parties and thus leading them away from the “right path.”64 To combat this “revanchist”
attitude, the CPUSA for example called for help to strengthen what they called “the Indian left in
the movement and to help Native Americans to develop a Leninist approach to their struggle.”65
Native critics of Marxism, such as John Mohawk and Ward Churchill, rejected their
projected local autonomy within the larger socialist state and pointed out the unwillingness or
perhaps inability of the Left to think outside the presumption that non-European societies
would inevitably follow the social and economic development of Europe.66 As far as these critics
were concerned, without philosophical flexibility and a willingness to consider Native American
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thoughts as autonomous, Marxism had little to offer, since it would be impossible to achieve
sovereignty within the ideological context of Marxism that envisioned a society under the
dictate of the proletariat.67 The situation of indigenous peoples within the USSR and other
socialist and communist states served as an example of the difference between Marxist theory
and Marxist practice and as a deterrent for Native activists:
We look at what happened in the Soviet Union to the indigenous peoples, and
to Soviet Union supporting the military regimes in South America. And China,
which has turned around from its socialist program and now it’s not clear what
they’re going to do. We look at Vietnam and Cambodia — socialist countries
who have massacred indigenous peoples. And we see what the Ethiopians are
doing to the Eritreans. And what the Albanians have done against everyone.68
By the mid-1980s, some Native activists had doubts that Marxism was philosophically
flexible enough to be of use to the indigenous struggle. Ramiro Raynaga in his letter to Gerald
Wilkinson expressed his belief that this was impossible. Commenting on his 1973 book Ideology
and Race in Latin America, in which he called for a way to “indianize the marxism [sic]” he
stated: “Of course now I know that it is impossible, as the red priest proved that it is impossible
to christianize [sic] the marxism [sic].”69 Nilo Cayuquero took Native objections to using
Marxism a step further, and positioned the question in a context of intellectual sovereignty: “It’s
a colonial mentality that by reading Marx and understanding Marx’s theories that’s the way
we’re going to arrive at Liberation.”70 According to Cayuquero, true revolution and freedom
could be achieved only when Native peoples were able to determine themselves “what happens
in our society, in our communities. This is something they [the Left] don’t understand. Some of
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my brothers, some of the leaders say that this attitude of the left is a new form of European
colonization.”71

Competing Visions: The Left and the Indigenous in Nicaragua
The different philosophical approaches and political aspirations came to a clash in the
1980s in Nicaragua, when the country’s new Sandinista government embarked on a
revolutionary nation-building project. During the early 1980s, the Nicaraguan government
implemented policies, often without the consultation or consent of the indigenous Miskito,
Sumu, and Rama people on the Atlantic Coast, which these Native peoples perceived as
threatening to their rights and interests. Even their brief period of cooperation between late
1979 and early 1981 was marked by some complications and tensions. The mounting counterrevolution, threat of invasion by the US-backed Contras from Honduras, and Cold War rhetoric
complicated the situation on the Atlantic Coast and often obscured and subsumed the
underlying reasons for the conflict between the Nicaraguan government and the indigenous
peoples. The Contra threat to the Sandinistas and potentially to the territorial integrity of the
Nicaraguan state influenced the government’s view of Native demands of autonomy and land
claims in the Atlantic Coast. But the conflict between the government and the indigenous
peoples also came from the combination of a lack of awareness and too little understanding of
indigenous reality by the Sandinistas, and the divergence of these actors’ philosophical
approaches and political views.
Differing views and understandings of land and natural resources between the
Sandinistas and Nicaragua’s indigenous peoples came to a head in early 1981. Land rights
became one of the main issues in the conflict between the revolutionary Nicaraguan
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government and the Miskito, Sumu, and Rama people on the Atlantic Coast. In 1980, the
indigenous organization MISURASATA prepared a land titles survey and was ready to make a
claim to the area of the Zelaya Department, La Miskitia, and its resources. According to a Miskito
activist Armstrong Wiggins, MISURASATA’s intentions were to continue working with the
Nicaraguan national economy, but on the basis of mutual respect and with the indigenous
peoples in control over the land and its resources.72
However, this demand did not align with the government’s view. In August 1981, the
government formulated its Indian policy in a Declaration of Principles of the Popular Sandinista
Revolution in regards to the Indigenous Communities of the Atlantic Coast, which was to serve as
guidelines for the government’s dealing with the “indigenous minorities.”73 The Sandinistas
considered the Zelaya Department and its resources to be an integral part of Nicaragua and its
economy. The government in its policy committed to guarantee and legalize ownership of the
lands through land titles, granted to each community that has lived and worked there and that
would be organized either as a commune or a cooperative. However, the natural resources of
the area were to remain “the properties of Nicaraguan people” and under the control of the
centralized state. The local indigenous communities would have a “right to receive a portion of
the benefits” only.74
While the Miskitu, Sumu, and Rama people envisioned an autonomous economy
working with the national one, in the Sandinistas’ vision the Atlantic Coast belonged firmly
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within the national economic development, directed from Managua. The Sandinistas were
willing to give only a limited recognition of indigenous land rights and they denied indigenous
control over natural resources completely.75 The views expressed by the Sandinistas in their
Declaration of Principles are reminiscent of the attitudes of the CPUSA and RCP toward
economic development and indigenous peoples. In the CPUSA’s 1969 Native American
Liberation program and the RCO’s article discussed earlier, Native Americans were to receive
their “fair share” of the local resources and an assistance for development. However, all would
be done as a part of the socialist state, not as an autonomous endeavor.76
Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz maintains that the policy regarding individual and communal land
titles was an error on the part of the Sandinistas, which did not come from inflexible political
philosophy, rather from a lack of experiences and understanding of the local history and the
nature of indigenous land claims. She has pointed out that the Sandinistas were coming from an
experience in western Nicaragua, where they granted individual land titles to farmers who had
lived on and worked the land that belonged to the Somoza family and their supporters before
the revolution. However, the Atlantic Coast proved to be completely different:
They [the Sandinistas] didn’t understand why it was offensive to the Miskitos
that they came out to give out land titles like they had in the western part of the
country. It just baffled them, because it was wildly popular in the western part
of the country… So, the Sandinistas were baffled: “What is it?” … And the
Miskitos are saying “Who are you to give us our own land? This is our land.”77
The Sandinistas’ approach to the question of land and their surprise at the Miskitos’ reaction
highlights differing views of indigenous peoples and their rights. For the Sandinistas, the land
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titles were to be held privately by farmers or cooperatives; they did not imagine that a large
portion of the land could be claimed by a group defined along ethnic lines.
The Sandinista’ attitudes regarding indigenous identity and status within Nicaraguan
society reflect the dominance of class consciousness over ethnic identity. The Sandinistas
viewed the Miskito, Sumu, and Rama peoples as “ethnic groups” or “minorities,” culturally
different sections of the Nicaraguan nation, rather than “peoples” or nations in their own right.
This view underpinned their policies. In the 1981 FSLN Declaration of Principles, the government
policy clearly stated that “Nicaragua is but one nation.” And while the government supported
“different cultural manifestations” and was going to provide support to the Miskito, Sumu,
Rama, and the Creole to develop and enhance their cultural traditions and languages, at the
same time it established Spanish as the official language of the country.78 The government was
willing to provide assistance to “every ethnic group” to develop their artistic cultural expression
as a means to enrich the national culture; however, any demand for rights based in ethnic
identity would have been considered ethnocentric and racist.79
From Misktio, Sumu, and Rama perspectives, as voiced by some MISRUASATA leaders,
the Sandinista policies regarding indigenous identity represented assimilationist tendencies. In
the summer of 1980, the Sandinista government launched a literacy campaign on the Atlantic
Coast. The Ministry of Education planned this campaign to be in Spanish only, disregarding the
indigenous languages in the coastal area, which, due to its historical development, was
dominantly Miskito- and English-speaking. Because of MISURASATA’s pressure and demands
that classes be offered in the Native languages of the students, the government launched a
second campaign in October 1980, using Miskito high school and university students as
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instructors. The plan to conduct the literacy campaign in Spanish only could be seen as an
oversight, an erroneous attempt at the unification of the nation, influenced by theories of class
dominance over ethnic identity. However, it also could be viewed as a sign of cultural hegemony
and an assimilationist effort.80
In an interview for Akwesasne Notes, Armstrong Wiggins explained the Native
perceptions of the Sandinistas’ attitude. In the view of some Native activists, the government
wanted to create “A ‘new’ Indian who is not an Indian, should not think too much as an Indian,
but should become of the campesino (peasant) group or what is called the great proletariat.”81
Nilo Cayuqueo echoed Wiggins’ view of the Sandinistas: “I’ve seen murals and propaganda
posters that say ‘We must make Nicaraguans more Nicaraguan.’ This makes us very sad because
we strongly supported the Revolution; now we want to see what happens.”82 Contrary to
Sandinista views, the Miskito had maintained and insisted on a separate, native identity.
Wiggins explained the Miskito attitudes in his interview:
In our region our language, much of our culture, our economic way of life,
survived. Yes, many of our people are Christianized through the Moravian
missions, but our identity as Moskitos remained. It continued and we have our
customs, habits and common concerns. … So even our peoples - they may say
we are Nicaraguans. But then, we are Miskito first. You see, one thing is plain
reality. Our identity is absolute. The other - the one of being a Nicaraguan - that
one just happened. It is there, but it is not essential in the everyday.83
These differing views and understandings of indigenous identity informed the
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indigenous political demands and the Sandinistas’ policies. While the Miskito, Sumu, and Rama
people asked for self-determination, the Nicaraguan government wanted a greater integration
of the Atlantic Coast into the state’s economy and society. In 1981, Daniel Ortega in a speech
during a commemoration of the second anniversary of the revolution clearly explained: “We
have to integrate them totally, so that the Miskito of Waspán, Puerto Cabezas, Siúna, Rosita,
and Bonanza, as well as the Rama, the Sumu, the Blacks from Bluefields … become united with
the Sandinista Front, with the Nicaraguan people and with the Nicaraguan revolution.”84
These differences in political views and aspirations led to an armed conflict between the
Sandinistas and the indigenous peoples that lasted for several years. Due to international
pressure and the threat of the Contra insurgency, as well as the Sandinistas’ desire to end the
conflict, the two sides eventually came to the negotiating table. By 1985, the idea of an
autonomy was no longer “counter-revolutionary,” and the Sandinistas put forward a proposal
for the autonomy of the Atlantic Coast.85 However, some of the Sandinista representatives
continued to deny indigenous identity and status as peoples and nations, a position similar to
those of the CPUSA, RCP, and others on the US Left. As late as 1987, Tomas Borge, the Interior
Minister of Nicaragua, continued to define the Miskito, Sumu and Rama as “national minorities”
and “commons.” He argued that the Sandinistas did not use the term “nationality” in regard to
the inhabitants of the Atlantic Coast, because it did not “reflect our objective historical reality.
Nation Rama can hardly come to existence, since there is only about 700 Rama Indians. … The
meaning of the term ‘nationality,’ as it has been established in social sciences, does not reflect
the social reality of the examined area.”86 Borge also dismissed the concept of “Indianism” (or
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Indigenism) as a “pseudo-solution offered by imperialism,” which was nothing more than
“designs with the goal to preserve the isolation and segregation of Indians forever.”87
Borge’s views did not differ much from those of other leftist and communist parties. In
1987, a Soviet journalist Vladimir Dolgov echoed the same view of Indian identity and the
concept of the Fourth World in his article in the New Times that discussed Nicaragua’s new
constitution, which included provisions for the autonomy of the Atlantic Coast, and its impact on
the indigenous peoples. As Dolgov saw it, Native Americans were “ethnic groups” living in
communities with their own language, culture, customs and traditions, but not peoples or
nations. The author argued that the concept of the Fourth World was created by Brooklyn
Rivera’s “American advisers,” only because he wanted a “theoretical foundation for his
Borge’s and Dolgov’s views were arguably influenced by the US meddling in Nicaragua’s
affairs. The Reagan administration used the issue of indigenous rights in Nicaragua as a tool in
its anti-Sandinista propaganda.88 Given the connections of some of the

MISURASATA leaders

to Native organizations in the US and Canada and their demands for autonomy and land rights,
it was easy to argue they were influenced by American bourgeois and imperialism, rather than
presenting their own views. But Borge’s and Dolgov’s views also echoed the general attitudes of
communist parties and other Marxists toward indigenous identity and status as subordinate to
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the concept of class, and they were dismissive of Native American’s own views on the matter.
Similar to other leftists, the Sandinistas interpreted indigenous self-identification and political
and economic demands rooted in specific ethnic identity as ethnocentric, contradicting “the
government’s national development strategy,” and impeding the centralized management of
natural resources.89 They dismissed them as concepts coming from bourgeois sociologists and
imperialist propaganda, rather than take them seriously as original indigenous thoughts,
because the formulation of a separate identity did not fit with their concept of Nicaraguan
national unity and nation-building.90
The concept of the Fourth World, criticized by Borge and Dolgov as bourgeois scholars’
construct, was formulated by George Manuel of the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB) in the
early 1970s and summarized in his 1974 book The Fourth World as a concept of indigenous
space and identity. As already discussed, Manuel also promoted global indigenous cooperation,
based on the recognition of shared colonial experiences. These ideas filtered to the Miskito,
Sumu, and Rama peoples through their transnational engagement in the global indigenous
movement. As Charles Hale points out, “ALPROMISU leaders were exposed to militant Indianist
ideas when they attended meetings of the Pan-American Indian Movement in Canada (1975),
Kiruna, Sweden (1977), and Geneva (1977).”91 The meetings Hale mentions were the founding
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conference of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) in Port Alberni, Canada; 1977
WCIP meeting in Kiruna, Sweden; and the UN NGO Conference on Discrimination Against
Indigenous Populations in the Americas in Geneva, 1977. As a founding member of the WCIP,
ALPROMISU participated in meetings and conferences and was part of the indigenous network,
sharing ideas and experiences.92 Through these connections, ALPROMISU members likely came
to contact with the concept of the Fourth World and indigenous identity, the same Hale calls
“militant Indianist ideas.” The acceptance of the idea of shared identity between Native peoples
by the Miskito, Sumu, and Rama was reflected in the designation of Russell Means, Clement
Chartier, and Hank Adams, during their 1986 trip to La Miskitia. The villagers and MISURASATA
fighters, who came to see them, addressed them as “Indian brothers.”93 What Borge and
Dolgov criticized as planted ideas by the American bourgeois, were in fact ideas coming from
and circulated among indigenous peoples themselves.

As the situation on the Atlantic Coast escalated into an armed conflict, supporters and
critics on both sides debated and evaluated the revolutionary government’s policies and the
merits of Leftist ideologies as applied to indigenous peoples. North American Native
organizations and activists split in their opinions. Some activists, such as Bill Wahpepah, Bill
Means, and Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz maintained that it was possible to work with the Sandinista
government and challenge and advise it on indigenous issues. In their view, the government
officials made mistakes, but were willing to learn and correct their errors.94 As an example, Bill
Wahpepah pointed to their dismantling of the Instituto Nicaraguense de la Costa Atlantica
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(INNICA):
… they dismantled an entire bureaucracy dealing with the Indian peoples… Now
this is not because we [IITC] recommended it, but we did in our conversations a
year ago [1980] say that we hoped that INNICA would not become a BIA. I think
after their serious consideration and their serious implementation of the
revolutionary philosophy of Nicaragua they’ve done one of the most impossible
things.95
When the Sandinistas presented their autonomy plan in 1986, Wahpepah, Means, and DunbarOrtiz saw it as a genuine effort on the part of the government to resolve the situation
peacefully, which showed the Sandinistas’ political and ideological flexibility.96 Further, they
argued on the need to support the Nicaraguan government against US attempts to destabilize
and overthrow it while challenging it to uphold indigenous rights.97
Other activists were more skeptical or rejected the Sandinistas’ policies completely. In
1984, NIYC director Gerald Wilkinson acknowledged the Sandinistas’ lack of awareness about
indigenous peoples and their issues. He described them as being “genuinely mystified” that
Native Americans were peoples in themselves, and not a part of the working class. Wilkinson
surmised that they had not dealt intellectually with the concept of Native Americans being
peoples.98 At the same time, he was critical of Sandinista’ policies and treatment of the Miskito,
Sumu, and Rama. Two years later, he pointed out that the Sandinistas’ actions (land titles, the
arrests of MISURASATA leaders, relocation of Indian villages) cannot be explained as mistakes. In
his view, “The Sandinista acted this way seemingly for ideological reasons in an effort to massify
[sic] the society both in a political and economic sense. They ran into thousands of years of
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Indian tradition which they chose to crush rather than accommodate.” Wilkinson added: “Their
acts cannot be explained away as ‘errors’, ‘mistakes or ‘cultural insensitivity’ any more than the
U.S. wars against us in the 1800’s can be explained away by these words.”99
The combination of the political realities of the US-Contra threat and the Nicaraguan
government’s lack of understanding of Native peoples played a role in the Sandinistas’ attitudes.
Without an awareness and knowledge of indigenous peoples’ histories and identity claims, the
Sandinistas saw the Sumu, Rama, and Miskito within the context of social classes, and
formulated their policies accordingly. However, Armstrong Wiggins has likewise dismissed the
argument about the lack of knowledge of Native aspirations and views on the part of the
Sandinista leadership as an excuse. Wiggins maintains that while a student at the National
University of Leon in 1979, he had personal contacts with a Sandinista organization at the
institution. There he met some of the future Sandinista leaders through a debate group, where
he made his views on indigenous issues clear.100 Additionally, some of the Sandinista leaders
learned about Native issues through their contacts with AIM in the early 1970s. Dr. Dunbar-Ortiz
also noted the familiarity of some of the Sandinista leaders with Native issues:
I think the Sandinistas were, some of them, were prepared idealistically, some
of them had a lot of contacts with the American Indian Movement and Vern
Bellecourt had been down there … So they expected, those who have been
exposed, expected to go out in the Eastern Nicaragua to find a kind of American
Indian Movement, to find Indians who thought like the Indians in North
America. The others, who have not been exposed to that, didn’t even know
that. They just had their usual Latin American racist attitude toward the
indigenous people.101
Wiggins’ and Dunbar-Ortiz’s statements indicate that at least some of the Sandinista leadership
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were familiar with Native issues before the revolution. However, these may have been limited in
terms of affecting the national policies of the revolutionary government, in which nationbuilding ideology influenced by Marxism took precedence over consideration of ethnic
difference.
The other group of US Native activists, including Russell Means, Hank Adams, Ward
Churchill, and Glenn Morris of the Colorado AIM chapter, rejected the Sandinista government
and its policies completely. They argued that AIM had to support the Miskitu, Sumu, and Rama
in their demands and not to wait for the Sandinista government to come around on indigenous
issues. By the early 1980s, Russell Means considered Marxism to be just another European
ideology, perpetuating colonial relations and racism, having nothing to offer to indigenous
peoples.102 Thus, he considered policies coming from Marxist governments suspect. In the view
of activists such as Russell Means, Ward Churchill, and Glenn Morris the Nicaraguan
government’s autonomy plan, offered during the initial peace talks in the mid-1980s, was a plan
to increase the government’s control over the Atlantic Coast. For these activists, it read like “a
rehash of the U.S. government’s Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, all dressed up in Marxist
language.”103 Gerald Wilkinson of the NIYC also voiced a criticism of the proposed autonomy
project. But in his view, the weakness of the proposal was not being specific enough to
effectively show the impact it would have had on indigenous peoples: “Sandinistas now preach
‘autonomy’ for Indians. This is an abstract catch word like ‘power to the people.’ It is so abstract
it means nothing, the term is never defined.”104

102

Russell Means and Marvin J. Wolf, Where White Men Fear to Tread: The Autobiography of Russell
Means (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Griffin Press, 1995), 464.
103
Ward Churchill and Glenn T. Morris, “The ‘real’ AIM stands up,” Colorado Daily, February 19,
1986. Photocopy of the article found in Robert L. Anderson American Indian Movement Papers (hereafter
Anderson AIM Papers), Box 1, Folder 11, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, University of
New Mexico.
104
Gerald Wilkinson hand written notes from Bogota, Sunday – Miskito session, n.d., NIYC-R, Box 5,

283

As Nicaraguan indigenous activists sought to build alliances with Native organizations in
the North, the disagreements over the ideological ability and willingness of the Sandinistas to
respect Native rights in their policies. Native organizations in the North adopted opposing
positions and in the case of AIM and IITC these disagreements led to a split within the
organizations. Russell Means’ public denunciation of the Sandinistas and their policies did not sit
well with AIM and IITC.105 Glenn Morris and Ward Churchill criticized the IITC for siding with the
settler-state of Nicaragua against indigenous interests.106 Armstrong Wiggins also raised
objections to IITC’s treatment and presentation of the Miskito and their situation. In his letter to
Bill Means, Wiggins stated: “I do not know your agenda for Nicaragua or for my people, but your
actions and your language reflect the anti-Indian views of non-Indian governments all over this
hemisphere.”107 Bill Means and Bill Wahpepah expelled both Morris and Churchill from AIM and
IITC over their activities regarding Nicaragua.108 Bill Means continued to defend the IITC’s
position by pointing out that the organization did not abandon indigenous peoples. But it
understood the difficult position of the revolutionary government, which, in their eyes, was
making genuine efforts to rectify the situation of Native peoples on the Atlantic Coast, while
simultaneously trying to defend the country from attacks by the US-backed Contras.109
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IITC thus supported the Nicaraguan government against US aggression, while continuing to
challenge it to uphold Native rights. It also positioned the Miskito against each other - Steadman
Fagoth and his followers, connected to the Contras, against Miskito fighting the Sandinistas,
against those attempting to work with the Nicaraguan government.110

Nicaragua represents the first time a revolutionary leftist government in the Western
Hemisphere dealt with indigenous issues and Native Americans paid attention to the
Sandinistas’ policies toward the Miskito, Sumu, and Rama peoples. These policies were
influenced by the political threat of counter-revolution, but also the ideological background of
Marxism and Marxist-inspired philosophies of Sandino. The new government regarded the
indigenous peoples and the Atlantic Coast as an integral part of the Nicaraguan revolutionary
state and society, the peasantry and proletariat, disregarding their unique identity and history.
When the Miskito, Sumu, and Rama demanded economic, cultural, and political rights defined
along ethnic identity, the different views clashed. To the Sandinistas, focused on class and
integration and facing the Contra threat, these demands looked like attempts at separation and
weakening of the state, rather than an alternative political organization of the Atlantic Coast
within the Nicaraguan state.
To some Native American observers, the Sandinistas’ failure to respect indigenous rights
were mistakes that came from the lack of knowledge and awareness of the Miskitu, Sumu, and
Rama realities and could be remedied. To others, the Nicaraguan government’s policies
represented the shortcomings and failure of leftist (and in extension any European-based)
ideologies in regards to indigenous peoples’ rights. The different and sometimes opposing
positions on the conflict among Native activists and leaders from the North underscores the
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diversity of opinion among a group connected by its commitment to the preservation of
indigenous rights and sovereignty, aiming at the same goal, but choosing different strategies
and ways to achieve them.
Intellectual Sovereignty
Engagement and experiences with European-based ideologies, both from the right and
the left, led some Native activists and intellectuals’ to examine the use of these philosophies in
the terms of Native intellectual sovereignty. Native colonial experiences with capitalism and
individualism showed Native peoples the shortcomings and dangers of such ideologies.
Examination of Marxism-Leninism and experiences with the ideology’s practical application to
indigenous peoples, revealed the shortcomings and inadequacies of the ideology for Native
struggles. These shortcomings, combined with criticism and dismissal of Native views by both
the Left and the Right, led some Native activists to call for intellectual sovereignty and a
development of a theoretical unifying vision or an original, tradition-based Native ideology that
would formulate the goals toward which the indigenous rights movement was going. In an
introduction to Ward Churchill’s book, Marxism and Native Americans, Winnona LaDuke argued:
“No movement or group of related movements can succeed in offsetting present circumstances
merely through a shared rejection. Not only must they struggle against something, but they
must also struggle toward something. … Only a unifying theory, a unifying vision of the
alternatives can fulfill this task.”111 LaDuke and other Native leaders recognized that intellectual
sovereignty was a part of their struggle for political sovereignty.
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working on the international scene, namely within the UN mechanism, had started to challenge
the existing concepts of human rights, statehood and sovereignty, bringing in their own worldviews. Yet most of them continued to work within concepts, created for them by non-Indians.113
This continued dominance of non-indigenous frameworks was seen by some Native thinkers as a
continuation of mental or intellectual colonization. Robert K. Thomas, Cherokee anthropologist
and one of the instructors of the 1960s Workshops on Indian Affairs, believed that “Any real
social movement must have some intellectual underpinnings; at least an agreement on the
situation, if not common direction; and some new ideas being fed in by a group of native
intellectuals who have some intellectual autonomy from the ‘oppressor’, the system, or
whatever.”114
Native activists and organizations, such as AIM and IITC, have indigenized their activism
by adopting specific Native cultural forms. They turned to traditional practices and ceremonies,
mostly from the Great Plains such as drumming and singing, as a base for their political activism.
They sought out spiritual leaders, such as Leonard Crow Dog, to provide spiritual guidance and
direction for the movement.115 Using traditional drumming and regalia, activists showed the
cultural base for their activism. They used the same markers to visibly assert their sovereignty as
well. In 1977, Native delegates to the UN NGO Conference on Discrimination Against Indigenous
Populations in the Americas, opened the meeting by marching through Geneva to the United
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Nations building on the Square of Nations, wearing traditional regalia, carrying sacred objects,
and drumming and singing sacred songs. The delegates, including Oren Lyons, Russell Means,
and Jimmie Durham, entered the Palace of Nations through the official entrance, claiming thus
their place among the nations of the world, different, but equal. The march served as a public
performance of Native sovereignty.116
As Robert Warrior points out, leaders, like Vine Deloria, Jr. saw tradition-based activism
as a positive development within the movement for Native rights, as long as the revitalization of
tradition was set within a larger framework of sovereignty and was flexible to adapt to new
challenges. As such, it could provide a “rising consciousness” among Native peoples, especially
those touched by assimilation programs.117 However, without a guiding concept, critical
thinking and analysis, Deloria warned, the tradition-based approach could easily elevate
traditions onto a pedestal, slipping into idealism and assumptions of superiority, similar to
Western religious dogmas.118
Similar to Deloria, Gerald Wilkinson argued there was a need for a well thought-out
guiding intellectual base for the Native rights movement. In his letter to Deloria, Wilkinson
reflected on the Iranian revolution as an example of the danger posed by a lack of intellectual
foundation. In his view, the revolution’s appeal came from a rejection of both capitalism and
communism, and an uplift of the people’s traditions: “He [the Ayatollah] had uplifted something
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more intimate and indigenous to his people, the Islamic religion which in essence is far more
than a form of worship, it also being a form of unity, identity and culture.” The shortcomings
that Wilkinson saw were a lack of a well thought-out intellectual foundation. He felt that while
the revolution was initially both emotional and intellectual, the emotional aspect “has been
stressed to the expense of the intellectual” for political reasons. Wilkinson believed that “selfre-conceiving of national groups based on indigenous religion and culture can be satisfying and
just. … There is nothing wrong with people enthusiastically proclaiming the uniqueness of their
culture and values. However, without an adequate intellectual base it can get out of hand.”119
To prevent such an outcome, Native Americans needed “an intellectual revolution,”120 in
Wilkinson’s view.
Native leaders and intellectuals like Vine Deloria, Jr. and George Manuel offered a way
out of the mental colonization by formulating and asserting original Native philosophical
concepts and frameworks. As Glen Morris points out, Deloria started to dismantle the
intellectual colonial framework in his books Custer Died for Your Sins and We Talk, You Listen,
which offered Native activists a vision of self-determination and a vocabulary to express their
liberatory critiques.121 In his 1974 book Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties, Deloria challenged
the non-Native concept of Indian tribes as domestic dependent nations and the opposition to
their demand for sovereignty by comparing Native tribes and reservations with sovereign
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nations around the world, similar in size and land base. He argued for the renewal of the treatymaking process and the restoration of Native tribes to “a status of quasi-international
independence with the United States acting as their protector.”122 As Morris points out,
Deloria’s writing “gave permission to a new generation of indigenous activists, academics, and
technicians not only to challenge colonial convention but also to reconceptualize the entire
nature of indigenous peoples’ reality in the contemporary era.”123 While Deloria challenged
existing concepts, he also warned his fellow activists against “making the rhetoric of sovereignty
and tradition a final rather than a beginning step.”124 What he called for was to build on
traditions and the concept of sovereignty to create a new vision for the future.
In 1974, George Manuel offered such an alternate vision for the future for indigenous
and non-indigenous peoples in his book The Fourth World. His vision was based on a
combination of indigenous traditions and concepts and the application of modern technology.
Manuel imagined the Fourth World to be
…the utilization of technology and its life-enhancing potential within the
framework of the values of the peoples of the Aboriginal World - not a single
messianic moment after which there will never be another raging storm, but
the free use of power by natural human groupings, immediate communities,
people who are in direct contact with one another, to harness the strength of
the torrent for the growth of their own community. Neither apartheid nor
assimilation can be allowed to discolour [sic] the community of man in the
Fourth World. An integration of free communities and the free exchange of
people between those communities according to their talents and
temperaments is the only kind of confederation that is not an imperial
domination.125
Manuel’s vision of the Fourth World was one of a global village, based on equality of its all
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indigenous and non-indigenous members, a new reality that would reconstruct “a tradition
which people can hold a common belief, and which uses all the benefits of a global
technology.”126
Deloria’s and Manuel’s challenge to existing concepts and their alternative visions of the
future offered starting points for intellectual debates and attempts for a conception of common
vision, which, as some of their colleagues at the time felt, had been lacking in the struggle for
Native rights. In the mid-1970s, Robert Thomas saw the Native rights movement as going “in six
different directions at the same time.” He felt that most activists at the time were “simply
responding, reacting, or acting without a thought about future consequences or the direction in
which we want to push our own destiny. … Most have no, or else a very simplistic, analysis of
the Indian situation, no consensus, no real direction.”127 Five years later, in a circular letter to
15 Native intellectuals and activists, Thomas continued to lament the lack of a unifying vision
and the limitations of Native intellectuals. In his view, the few “bright, critical Indian
intellectuals” who were there, functioned “without any cohesion as a group, and with no
common intellectual life.”128 As a contrast to the situation among Native Americans within the
United States, Thomas offered the example of the Zapotec Indians of Oaxaca, who were
“developing an intellectual class in spite of repression by the Mexican government.”129
To further stress the importance of intellectual development for the survival of
indigenous peoples as peoples, Thomas also offered the example of the Yakut peoples in the
USSR. He considered the practical application of Soviet minority policies to be similar to those of
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the United States - “a political fake-out,” with an outside economic control of the people. The
theoretical Marxist-Leninist doctrine of a multicultural society in effect helped, to a degree, to
promote indigenous cultural survival. Yet Thomas mostly credited the Yakut’s achievements in
their social, educational, cultural and economic developments to the “energy, drive, and good
sense” of the people themselves with the ability to survive. Mainly, it was the intellectual realm
of the Yakut that was the most impressive to him. The Yakut people had established their own
schools and universities, cultural institutions, and newspapers, radio and television, all in the
Yakut language. They also had a Yakut Writers Union, which published a literary magazine, and a
publishing house with the output of about 160 titles a year in their language. Yakut writers also
participated in underground or self - publishing, the so-called “samizdat,” where they could
address issues such as cultural survival, political autonomy, their relation to the state,
Russification (assimilation), and the impact of technologies and pollution on their people, topics
which may have been censored out of official publications. Thomas saw the intellectual drive
behind these achievements that assured the survival of the Yakut people, to be the key element
that Native Americans were lacking.130
Other Native intellectuals and activists expressed similar views on the need for
intellectual underpinning of Native activism. Wilkinson thought that the greatest problem of
Native Americans was “not a failure to act but rather a failure to think. … We have simply failed
to grow intellectually.”131 Similarly, during his candidacy for the NCAI presidency in 1985,
Reuben A. Snake, Jr., presented a similar view: “It is time to develop and institute a nation-wide
‘Indian Think Tank’ to put our minds to work together in our best interests. It is time to start
thinking and acting internationally to create and implement political coalitions with our Indian
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relatives throughout the entire Western Hemisphere.”132 Ramiro Reynaga shared a similar
outlook on the situation. As one of the coordinators for CISA, Reynaga had a chance to engage in
political discussions with Native peoples from numerous countries, which informed his views. He
believed that Native Americans needed to create a unifying ideological standpoint that was not
European.133 He was “absolutely sure that what we need is to re-create our ideological brain as
a continental people … We urgently need a [sic] intellectual center.”134 To demonstrate his
view, Reynaga used the situation in Guatemala. He commented: “Over 95 percent of the
guerrilla fighters in Guatemala are Indians, but present as body, not as spirit nor brain. The
guerrilla fronts are named: Che, Vietnam, Sandino and 26 de Julio. As usual Indian blood is being
shed after non-Indians purposes and banners.”135 Reynaga believed that the way forward from
what he saw as a problematic situation - “the path toward Indian freedom,” lay through “the
creation of a permanent and creative Indian intellectual center. Without it our fight is only
disconnected reaction to the day by day challenges.”136
The lack of a recognizable ideology underlying the movement for Native rights did not
only obscure a clear direction for the movement, but it also exposed Native American views and
ideas to unfair criticism from non-Indians. John Mohawk argued in his 1981 Akwesasne Notes
article that the lack of recognized Native philosophers and published philosophy was “so
significant that even to speak of a ‘Native Peoples Movement’ and its principles requires that
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one invents the term for the purpose. This lack of recognized published ideology leaves the
Native peoples open to unfair criticisms, which are not based on any real intellectual history.”137
Mohawk’s hope was that the movement would develop a “well-articulated and published
ideology” and “an intellectual tradition which could be studied and shared among many
people”138
The Revolutionary Communist Party’s response to Russell Means’ speech in 1980,
discussed earlier in the chapter, exemplifies the type of criticism Mohawk referred to in his
article - paternalistic and dismissive, ridiculing Native Americans’ use of their traditions and
traditional world-views.139 The use of traditional ceremonies and regalia by Native activists also
inadvertently “played into the expectations of the dominant society.”140 In the early 1970s, Vine
Deloria, Jr., addressed this issue in his book God Is Red, commenting on the selectiveness of the
dominant society’s interest in Native Americans: “Every book on modern Indian life [has been]
promptly buried by a book on the ‘real’ Indians of yesteryear.”141 To overcome such stereotypes
of Native Americans as part of the past and challenge the dominant society’s perception, it was
necessary to include critical evaluations and strategy in any political activism.142
To counteract the criticism and dismissal of native views and traditions, and to address
the lack of cohesive intellectual underlying ideology for Native activism, leaders like Robert
Thomas and Gerald Wilkinson started to look for possible solutions. Connected by their
consideration of Native intellectual sovereignty, they proposed workshops and projects aimed
to help to remedy the problems. Thomas and Wilkinson, independently of each other and in
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separate times, attempted to organize intellectual exchanges and outputs among indigenous
activists in the Western hemisphere. Thomas suggested in a letter to Vine Deloria in 1975 that
some Native intellectuals, including himself and Deloria, should meet for some “real thinking in
concert together, and starting putting some writings for our fellow Indians,” since it was their
responsibility to, at least, “feed in some alternatives and new ideas.”143 In his 1980 circular
letter to 15 Native intellectuals, Thomas critically pointed out that they, as intellectuals, were
not doing enough: “What we do not do is use our talent as intellectuals to raise and discuss
important issues and to write. We do not function for our people in the one capacity that we are
good at and which they desperately need at this juncture of history.” Thomas sent the letter to
“start the ball rolling,” suggesting again to get together to remedy the situation.144 A letter from
1982 suggests that Thomas carried on correspondence and meetings with some of his friends,
discussing “direction and ‘tactics.”145
Like Robert Thomas, Gerald Wilkinson saw the responsibility of Native leaders and
intellectuals as striving for intellectual sovereignty. His approach to the task was hemispheric. In
the late 1970s and early 1980s, Wilkinson started to formulate a plan to establish an intellectual
indigenous network for idea exchange with the aim to provide a context and direction for a
transnational Indian movement.146 Wilkinson’s project, the Committee on the Indian Future,
proposed to hold a Hemispheric Indian Conference and to establish a committee that would
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oversee a production and publication of papers, reports, and studies on questions concerning
Native Americans, including the survival of Natives as peoples and their identity, the relationship
of Native Americans with the Left and national liberation movements, current intellectual
growth in Indian communities, the world views of Native Americans, Native Americans and
other “enclaved peoples,” revolutionary perspectives on American Indians, and Native
Americans and Marxism.147
The project was to be headed by a steering committee of six people: Gerald Wilkinson,
Vine Deloria, Jr., Robert K. Thomas, Ramiro Reynaga, and anthropologists Sol Tax and Shelton
Davis. The steering committee was to function as a working group, charged with defining the
project and its direction, and, in cooperation with other participating indigenous and nonindigenous scholars, to oversee the production and hemispheric distribution of papers.148
Wilkinson expected that the impact of the resulting papers and colloquium transcripts would be
the creation of a perspective on hemispheric Indian problems and possibilities, an intellectual
framework in which Indians could begin to talk to one another, and a future Indian-operated
institute to continue the study of the issues raised.149
Wilkinson’s proposal called for the establishment of a hemispheric indigenous institute
at the University of Chicago, which would be under Indian control and would continue the initial
work of the Committee.150

The connection of the project to an established university was

important for two reasons - as a way to educate non-Natives, and the project’s legitimacy. In an
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early discussion of the initiative, Vine Deloria pointed out: “I see a real need for us to build into
the non-Indian intellectual community a sense of movement and grappling with the issues which
will help us so that we don’t have to start at ground zero with the question ‘What do Indians
want’ every two years. … I think a university connection would give you a certain standing which
simply comes with the location whether deserved or not.”151 Wilkinson agreed that one of the
key elements of the project was for it to be “based in an academic institution.” However, he
stressed the importance of the project’s independence from the institution: “It should be in but
not of a university.”152
Having backing from an academic institution could also help support the work of the
project itself. Deloria commented: “We are starting to awaken people in our department
[University of Arizona] to what is happening and so I am much more optimistic about what can
eventually be done with your idea.”153 Association with a university could potentially also help
with the reception of the published materials the project was aiming at. As Deloria himself had
experienced, publishers and non-Native readers were not always open to Native writers
engaging with topics outside the theme of American Indians. In 1979, Deloria complained about
his publisher’s lack of effort to promote his book The Metaphysics of Modern Existence: “The
head of publicity talked to me on the phone last summer and snickered that ‘Indians don’t write
books on metaphysics’ and so the company has done nothing with the book at all.”154 Works by
Native writers dealing with international law and political science, challenging the dominant
concepts of nation and statehood may have faced similar rejection by non-Native audience;
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hence, backing by an academic institution could have been helpful.
Another key element of the project was its transnational hemispheric approach. As
Wilkinson described it, the idea for the project itself grew out of his discussions with Native
Americans in the United States “and those south of the Rio Grande River.”155 Similar to
McNickle, Riggs, and Downing, who had looked to Mexico’s indigenismo in the 1920s and 1930s
for inspiration, Wilkinson saw a cooperation with Native Americans from Central and South
America as crucial to the project’s success. In a letter to Vine Deloria, Wilkinson expressed his
frustration with Native activists in the United States, which led him to believe that Native
peoples in other countries could be a source of inspiration: “We Indians in this country are
suffering from intellectual battle fatigue coupled with a well documented propensity for selling
out. For this reason, we should be looking more and more to Indians in other countries as yet
unblessed by self-determination, an educated elite, or a BIA.”156 He believed that the hope for
revitalization of energy and will of Native Americans in the North would come from those in the
South, who had started to emerge as peoples:
It is ironic that while we have a special relation with the government and billions
of dollars in programs, and Indians in other countries do not, it is we, not they,
who are on the decline. These Indians, perhaps numbering 60 million, are
beginning to emerge as people. … [they] are asking what is a native person,
what is an Indian revolution, what is an Indian state, and what makes an Indian
happy. … they remain large in-situ communities, very close to the ways of the
past who are beginning to develop an intelligensia [sic] and to look at
themselves in a meaningful way. In their strength, we may rediscover our own.
… We are exhausted physically, spiritually, and intellectually. Our involvement
with these people, can restore in our community the market place of ideas
which enable us to grow.157
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Others agreed that the inclusion of Native representatives from Central and South
America in the project and the interchange of ideas through the hemisphere were crucial for its
success. After participating in the UN NGO Conference on Indigenous Peoples and the Land in
1981, Shelton H. Davis, one of the anthropologists on the project’s steering committee, wrote to
Wilkinson:
I just took a look at my letter to you of February 28 where I suggest that the
Steering Committee and Consultants for your project needs much greater
Native American representation from North and South America. I cannot stress
how important this is after having attended the UN NGO conference in Geneva.
The project would be making a grave error, I think, if it just contains the steering
committee and consultants listed in your original project. It needs much broader
Indian participation from North and South America. Please do give some
thought to this. In fact, I hope a Native American person can replace me on the
steering committee and I can merely serve as some sort of consultant. This
seems so basic at this point in the international Indian movement.158
The interest in the project among Native Americans in Central and South American existed, as
Reynaga’s correspondence suggests. In 1982, Arturo Argueta V. from Mexico wrote to Wilkinson
after speaking with Reynaga about the project:
I was talking with him [Reynaga] about many ideas important for both. Among
them, the necessity of creation of indian [sic] magazine or newspaper or review
to promote the interchange of ideas of our indian [sic] brothers here in
Indoamérica, and all things about indian [sic] ideology. … So, now I write to
communicate to you my interest for [sic] participate in this continental
Project.159
The activists continued to discuss the project and the need for a unifying vision still in
the late 1980s. Jim Anaya and Gerald Wilkinson stated in a circular letter in 1988, that “now is
the time to put this idea [The Committee for the Indian Future] into practice.”160 A year later,
Reynaga lamented the division among Bolivian indigenous candidates in their upcoming
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elections. He believed, that such divisions and infighting would continue until “we have a solid
and clear ideological guide.”161 The problem getting Wilkinson’s project off the ground may
have been the political and cultural diversity of Native peoples. The activists have discussed the
importance of rooting the new ideology in Native “traditions.” But with such a diversity of
Native peoples and their cultures, it may have been hard, if not impossible, to agree on whose
traditions were to be the foundation. Differences in political standing of the many diverse Native
communities and their specific issues represent other potential challenges to Wilkinson’s
project.
Wilkinson’s proposed project, its origin, concept, and aims, and the discussion
surrounding it, highlights the workings of the indigenous global movement as an idea exchange
network. The idea came out of discussions about the lack of cohesive philosophy underlining
Native activism and the need for a unifying vision, a need recognized by activists in North,
Central, and South Americas alike. The idea and specifics of the project were discussed and
promoted among activists and intellectuals through personal connections within and outside
the United States. The project exemplifies the effort by a group of Native leaders toward
intellectual sovereignty, a goal shared by activists throughout the hemisphere.

Conclusion
Through alliances with progressive organizations and leftist parties as well as the
increased international work, Native activists came in closer contact with leftist ideologies, such
as Marxism. As they did with other European-based philosophies, Native activists examined
Marxism to see what it had to offer to the struggle for their rights. They shared their views and
experiences, using the networks of the indigenous global movement, discussing the ideology
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and its application to indigenous issues. Philosophical difference, but also experience with the
actual application of Marxist principles to Native people, such as in the case of Nicaragua, led
many activist and Native thinkers to reject the philosophy as useful to their purposes. Even
activists who argued Marxism had some aspects that could be useful, did not argue for the
acceptance of the ideology as a whole or as a replacement for Native world views.
As the events in Nicaragua unfolded and Native activists got involved and the debate
over Marxism intensified some Native intellectuals considered the use of European-based
ideologies in the light of intellectual sovereignty. Some of them stressed the need for an original
Native theoretical ideology, based in Native tradition and attempted to propose projects that
would bring Native leaders together to discuss these issues. It seems no formulation of a
concrete Native ideology came out of these attempts. Perhaps it was because Native
intellectuals were a group connected more by their concerns and the questions they asked
rather than the answers they may have come to, answerers that would have been influenced by
the diverse backgrounds and situations they faced. Despite these differences, indigenous
peoples agreed on basic principles of land rights and sovereignty as their goals and over time
were able to translate these into the standards on indigenous rights set in the 2007 UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The discourses Native leaders and intellectuals
had regarding political ideologies show the importance they put on intellectual sovereignty and
original thought as part of their struggle for political sovereignty.
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Epilogue and Conclusion
Native peoples have skillfully used European political concepts and existing rhetoric to
frame their position and demands for treaty rights and sovereignty. From their international
engagement with various colonial powers to transnational activism in the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries Native leaders and activists appropriated concepts of nationhood, modernity, and
human rights to argue for their right to survive as distinct peoples. Political circumstances on the
international scene after World War II created a favorable environment for Native Americans to
work toward international recognition of their treaty rights and status as peoples. Unlike the
early twentieth century, the post-war era was dominated by the ideological competition
between the US and the USSR for allies among recently decolonized and independent countries
in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. This situation, which was reminiscent of the colonial play-off
system, offered Native Americans potential allies and pressure tools to use in their struggle to
secure respect for their treaty rights from the United States and Canada.
However, some of the available tools like Eastern Bloc media coverage were, in
themselves, often limited in their effect on US policy makers. To achieve better effectiveness,
Native Americans had to assert control over the message and the representation of their issues
in order to exert control over the production of knowledge. To do so, Native activists turned to
producing their own media. Through an increased contact with journalists during the Red Power
phase of Native activism, American Indians started to influence (to a degree) the message in
domestic and international main stream media. While Eastern Bloc media coverage of Native
issues had limited influence and did not always translate to direct political support, it played its
part in increasing awareness of Native Americans and their issues among non-Native people and
politicians. This increased awareness led to a creation of support groups throughout Europe (as
well as in the US and Canada) and cooperation with organizations focused on human rights.
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Better knowledge and increased awareness of Native issues contributed to the ability of Native
peoples to gain access to the United Nations and other international forums.
Developments on the international scene, specifically decolonization and the rise in
prominence of the UN human rights agenda in the 1960s and 1970s, further created a favorable
environment for Native peoples to bring their issues to the international arena. The geopolitical
realities of the Cold War, the twentieth-century reincarnation of the colonial play-off system,
did not automatically guarantee Native issues would be considered by international bodies like
the UN. Early attempts by Native Americans to gain access to and membership in the UN were
hampered by the nature of the Westphalian system of international relations between nationstates, guaranteeing their territorial sovereignty and non-interference in domestic issues, which
Native Americans were considered to be. However, decolonization and the increasing
importance of the UN human rights agenda offered new frameworks for Native leaders to reconceptualize their strategies and present their goals. Using the agenda of human rights, the
mechanism of non-governmental organizations (NGO) and the support that came from the
recently decolonized member states, Native activists and organizations were able to by-pass the
“magic taboo” of domestic matters and gained access to the UN. Once inside the organization,
Native peoples filled the available (albeit limited) political space there and worked to stretch
and redefine it. They introduced indigenous understandings and concepts to the discourse of
human rights and international law, changing them from within. While they had to scale back
and modify their strategies and short-term goals to gain access to the international body, they in
turn influenced and changed the organization and its mechanisms to reflect their world-views
and create standards for the treatment of indigenous peoples, including the 2007 United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).
Their success in the UN was in no small part due to indigenous global cooperation and
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ability to agree on the basic principles and demands for recognition of indigenous collective
rights and self-determination. The idea for indigenous global cooperation came from the
realization of shared historical (and contemporary) experiences with colonization. Activists such
as George Manuel of the National Indian Brotherhood promoted the idea of cooperation
through their personal connections, which became the foundation of the communication and
cooperation networks of the global movement that grew alongside them. The global indigenous
movement represents multitudes of local struggles and actors: individual activists, nonindigenous support groups and organizations, and indigenous national and transnational
organizations. Its actors come from diverse cultural and political backgrounds and their
grievances and relations with nation-states are not always the same. These differences have,
from time to time, caused tensions and dissent in the movement. Despite that, indigenous
peoples agreed on the basic demands and goals - to secure guarantees for their collective rights
and right to self-determination. Based on these common goals indigenous peoples were able to
present a unified stand on these issues vis-à-vis the nation-states. The recognition of shared
historical experiences also created a sense of commonality, which became the foundation for a
global indigenous identity.
The networks of the growing global indigenous movement also served to exchange
ideas and debate strategies among the activists. The increased visibility of Native issues and
indigenous transnational activism during the 1960s and 1970s brought them into closer contact
with various supporters and potential allies, including the domestic and international Left and
their ideologies, such as Marxism. As was the case with their predecessors, Native activists
during the Cold War engaged, examined, and sometimes used these non-Native philosophies to
further their goals. As contact with the Left increased, Native Americans examined the merits of
leftist ideologies, such as Marxism, for their struggle. Philosophical differences and experiences
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with practical application of Marxist-Leninist principles to indigenous peoples, as in the case of
Nicaragua, led many Native activists to reject the ideology and strengthened the existing
commitment to intellectual sovereignty. Through the global indigenous movement’s
connections - personal correspondence, Native newspapers, speeches, as well as books, Native
activists, leaders, writers, and intellectuals shared their views on Marxism. Some of them also
discussed the need for an intellectual direction for the Native rights movement. Proposals for
workshops and projects to come up with a theoretical ideological base for the movement
circulated along the global movement’s networks. While the debate did not produce a
theoretical base for the movement, the discourse itself advanced the argument about
limitations imposed on Native struggle by the fact that activists had to frame their demands in
the language of their colonizers and the need for intellectual sovereignty as part of the struggle
for indigenous rights and survival as distinct peoples.
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) adopted
by the UN General Assembly in September 2007, reflects Native Americans’ relentless
transnational work over the past five decades - their push to influence the representation of
Native issues in media, their use of the existing concepts of human rights and NGO mechanisms,
the global indigenous cooperation and unified stand on the basic goals, and their commitment
to intellectual sovereignty to define those goals. Gaining access to the UN generated a push for
the creation of an “indigenous peoples” category within the discourse of the UN human rights
agenda and international law, which allowed for discussions of specific indigenous rights. The
main debates and drafting of the Declaration took place during the UN Work Group on
Indigenous Populations (WGIP) meetings. The WGIP formed in 1982 because of the pressure
and lobbying by indigenous activists within the UN and was tasked with the creation of
standards for treatment of indigenous peoples. Drafts and proposals for these standards
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traveled through the global indigenous movement networks - from the WGIP through
indigenous organizations with UN NGO consultative status to local indigenous organizations and
communities and back again. The document also represents the intellectual commitment to
change and expand the existing concepts of human rights and international law by specifically
formulating indigenous collective rights.
The UNDRIP, however, also represents the continuous challenges to indigenous
aspirations. The 2007 version of the Declaration differs from the 1992 Draft Declaration
submitted by the WGIP to the UN Commission on Human Rights. The Commission then
established another work group to examine the document. During these negotiations, several
nation-states expressed concerns over the provisions for self-determination and control of
territories and resources. It took another fifteen years of nation-state debates, negotiations, and
adjustments to the text before the Declaration was adopted.1
The indigenous delegates’ original “no-change” strategy, adopted in 1995, which aimed
to defend verbatim the 1992 indigenous draft of the declaration during the UN debates and
negotiations, came under pressure and started to fracture. Since little progress had been made
during the debates toward the acceptance of the Declaration, the policy increasingly came into
question, creating dissent among the indigenous delegates and division between those in favor
of the policy and those seeing it as threatening to the entire declaration process.2
The concerns over territorial sovereignty and resource control played a role in the initial
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rejection of the UNDRIP by four settler-states: Canada, the United States, Australia, and New
Zealand. Since then, all four states have changed their position in favor of the Declaration,
though the United States issued a statement clarifying its understanding of the document’s
provisions, including the separation of collective rights from human rights and the prominence
of territorial integrity of the US.3 As a resolution, the Declaration is not legally binding and the
implementation of its principles depends on the willingness of each nation-state. While the
UNDRIP provides for protection of Native spiritual and religious traditions and sacred objects, it
only stipulates that states shall provide redress, “which may include restitution” with respect to
“religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and informed consent or in
violation of their laws, traditions and customs.”4 In theory article 11 of the Declaration provides
protection for Native sacred object, yet sacred Hopi masks and kachina dolls are being sold by
French auction houses, despite the Hopi objections.5
Recently, the Canadian government negotiated with the Algonquin of Ontario a land
claim settlement concerning 3.6 million hectares of land in Ontario. The government negotiated
with ten Algonquin communities, but not with the Iroquois Six Nations, whose traditional lands
were included in the settlement. By excluding the Iroquois, the modern day treaty negotiations
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Indigenous Peoples; Initiatives to Promote the Government-to-Government Relationship & Improve the
Lives of Indigenous Peoples,” available at < http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/184099.pdf>.
4
United Nations, Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, United Nations Document
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1; United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, United Nations document A/61/295, Article 11, available at
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf>.
5
Thomas Adamson, “French Auction House Ignores Pleas to Stop Sale of Sacred Hopi Masks,”
Associated Press on Huffington Post, December 9, 2013; “Auction house ignores pleas to delay sale of
Hopi masks,” CBS News, December 9, 2013, < http://www.cbc.ca/news/arts/auction-house-ignores-pleasto-delay-sale-of-hopi-masks-1.2456664>, accessed July 2, 2016; “French Auction House Ignores Pleas to
Stop Sale of Sacred Hopi Masks,” CBS San Francisco Bay Area, June 12, 2015, <
http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2015/06/10/french-auction-house-ignores-hopi-tribe-robert-redfordactivists-calls-to-stop-sale-of-sacred-artifacts/>, accessed July 2, 2016. France is one of the signatories of
the UNDRIP.
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denied them the right to self-determination and stands against the UNDRIP provisions
guaranteeing indigenous peoples’ rights to their lands, territories, and resources, specifically
articles 3, 4, 8 (2b), 18, 20, 25, 26 and 27.6 The UNDRIP has been passed and adopted by many
nation-states, but Native peoples now have to ensure that these nations-states will implement
the Declaration standards.

Ideas and intellectual discourses shaped the strategies and the work of Native American
activists. Engagement with outside philosophies, political concepts and framework, served
Native activists as a way to formulate their demands in a manner that would be understood by
non-Natives and to plan their actions to achieve their goals. It was the idea to use the UN human
rights agenda and enter the organization as NGOs rather than nations that opened the door to
indigenous peoples and gave them the ability to influence the concepts of human rights and
international law from within. The recognition of shared experiences led to larger cooperation
of indigenous peoples and became the foundation of global indigenous identity. Despite
continued challenges to indigenous peoples’ aspirations, there is an established category of
“indigenous peoples” embedded in the international human rights discourse, a document
defining collective rights as a part of the international agenda of human rights and law, and a
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issue at the United Nations.
Paying attention to the development of ideas and intellectual discourses shows that
Native activists did not just simply react to their situation, but that they carefully planned and

6

United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
United Nations document A/61/295, available at
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf>; Iroquois Caucus, ”Iroquois Caucus
Declaration of Opposition to the Algonquins of Ontario Agreement-in-Principle,” Ottawa, Ontario, March
3, 2016, available at < http://www.sixnations.ca/IC-AIP.pdf>; “Algonquins of Pikwakanagan reject AOO
modern treaty,” National News, March 17, 2016, available at <
http://aptn.ca/news/2016/03/17/algonquins-of-pikwakanagan-reject-aoo-modern-treaty/>.
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articulated their positions and strategies, taking advantage of existing rhetoric, frameworks, and
geopolitical situation. This approach helps us to better understand Native transnational
activism, the formation of the global indigenous movement, and the now sustained presence of
indigenous peoples on the international scene, as well as the role circulation of ideas and
peoples had on them. This work adds to the existing literature on Native activism by expanding
the discussion into the 1980s and by including examination of both moderate and radical
activists and groups and their transnational activities. Tracing the ideas of shared experiences
and their circulation also adds to the existing literature by expanding our understanding of the
rise of the global indigenous movement and the role individuals played in it.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AIM
CISA
CORPI

ECOSOC
ICC
IITC
IITC-R
ILO
ILRC
IWGIA
NARA
NCAI
NCAI-R
NGO
NIYC
NIYC-R
SAIA
UN
UNDRIP
WCIP
WGIP

American Indian Movement
Consejo Indio de Sud America (the South American Indian Council)
Consejo Regional de Pueblos Indigenas de Centro America,
Mexico, y Panama (Regional Council of Indigenous Peoples of
Central America)
Economic and Social Council
Inuit Circumpolar Conference
International Indian Treaty Council
International Indian Treaty Council Records
International Labor Organization
Indian Law Resource Center
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs
National Archives and Records Administration
National Congress of American Indians
National Congress of American Indians Records
Non-governmental Organization
National Indian Youth Council
National Indian Youth Council Records
Survival of American Indians Association
United Nations
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
World Council of Indigenous People
Working Group on Indigenous Populations
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